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We successfully navigate the world by making decisions based on what we have 
learned. In the brain, two prominent learning systems have been identified and each is 
likely to guide decisions in different ways. Research on decision making has primarily 
focused on a system for reward learning in the striatum. These studies have illuminated 
the how repeated choices and rewards build representations that guide choices and 
actions when encountering the same situation again. However, in a constantly changing 
environment, choices may not repeat themselves. Further, the environment may have 
more structure than simple reward learning can navigate. In these situations, decisions 
may be guided by a different learning system, namely a flexible learning system in the 
hippocampus which encodes episodes, or more broadly, relations between stimuli. 
However, investigations into the role of a reward learning system and a relational 
learning system in decision making have developed largely independently of each other. 
In the studies described below, I explore the function and interactions of these learning 
systems in value-guided decision making. Complementarily, I also explore how ongoing 
  
reward learning may modulate memory formation in the hippocampal system. In these 
studies, I demonstrate that reward learning and decision making is influenced by 
relational learning, and that these effects are predicted by hippocampal-striatal 
connectivity during learning. Separately, I establish that episodic memory is, in turn, 
influenced by ongoing reward learning. Successful memory is predicted by modulations 
of reward and memory regions including the striatum and hippocampus. Overall, these 
results provide novel insights into the learning systems encoding memories for successful 
decision making in the future.
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How do we make decisions? Making good decisions, from what to eat for lunch 
to what career to pursue, is essential for survival and success. A full understanding of 
how the brain learns from experience and makes future decisions is a pressing issue in 
psychology and neuroscience, as understanding these capacities can help us understand 
everyday actions, and most importantly, make progress in treating dysfunctions of 
behavior caused by addiction, disease, and psychiatric disorders. Research in 
neuroscience has started to unravel how the brain learns from experience and uses this 
knowledge to make choices. While this research is just beginning, we now have clues 
about the kinds of learning and memory that support decision making. In the research 
described in this dissertation, I illustrate several directions for expanding our 
understanding of learning and decision making by exploring how two different learning 
and memory systems, a reward learning system in the striatum and a relational memory 
system in the hippocampus, can guide our choices. 
As we navigate the world, we are constantly encoding relationships between 
events, while at the same time, we are learning from occasional experiences that involve 
reward or punishment. Navigating the world establishes flexible relational representations 
of the environment via learning processes in the hippocampus and related structures (for 
review, see Eichenbaum and Cohen, 2001). Meanwhile, experiences of reward or 
punishment are encoded as more simple stimulus-reward associations by a learning 
system in striatum and other brain regions (for review, see Rangel et al., 2008). While 
these systems are traditionally studied separately, a representation of the world in 
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conjunction with knowledge of reward associations in can be exploited for later planning 
and goal-directed behavior to acquire rewards and avoid punishments (Tolman, 1948).  
Decision making in everyday life complex, and to deal with the complexity of our 
environment, we utilize multiple types of information to make decisions. Studies of 
learning from reward feedback have thus far made the most progress in detailing a source 
of information for decision making. This research has shed light on the important role of 
the striatum and dopamine in learning and choice, but many open questions and 
unexplored areas remain. In everyday experience, instead of well-learned reward 
associations, we often use more flexible memory for experiences, especially in novel 
situations. This suggests a prominent role for the hippocampus in decision making. 
However, the role of relational memory and the hippocampus in decision making has so 
far received little attention. Further, reward learning and relational learning processes and 
the supporting neural systems are often studied in relative isolation (e.g., Davachi, 2006; 
Schultz, 2006). Intriguingly, recent evidence suggests that relational memory in the 
hippocampus interacts with reward learning in the striatum to allow generalization of 
information to novel situations (Shohamy and Adcock, 2010). A complete understanding 
of human learning and decision making may thus require a consideration of the joint and 
interactive contributions of these learning systems. 
The research in this dissertation explores connections between the cognitive and 
neural systems underlying reward and relational learning in decision making. In the four 
studies described in this dissertation, I probe the interaction of reward learning and 
relational learning to understand how different types of learning experiences can 
influence later behavior. This approach attempts to connect the study of learning and 
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decision making more closely to the learning systems utilized in the dynamic 
environments encountered in everyday behavior, where there is no separation between 
reward or relational learning and where different learning and memory systems may be 
engaged at the same time. Complementarily, I investigate the impact of concurrent 
reward learning on episodic memory formation. First, in this chapter, I outline the 
background and current state of neuroscience research on the neural systems for reward 
and relational learning in decision making.  
 
II.  Systems for learning 
A primary goal of research in neuroscience is to understand the neural systems 
that support learning and memory for future adaptive behavior. We have learned that the 
brain contains specialized systems for making decisions based on different types of 
information. I will focus on two systems that in particular have been shown to be 
prominent in encoding behaviorally-relevant information: a system for learning reward 
associations from repeated experience and a system for learning relations and episodic 
memories from a single experience. In the brain, a reward (or habit) learning system is 
associated with the basal ganglia, including the striatum and midbrain dopamine nuclei, 
while a relational (or episodic) system is associated with the hippocampus and 
surrounding medial temporal lobe (MTL) cortices (Squire, 1987; Schacter, 1990; Squire, 
1992; Cohen and Eichenbaum, 1993; Knowlton et al., 1996; Gabrieli, 1998; Wagner et 
al., 1998; Eichenbaum and Cohen, 2001; Poldrack et al., 2001; Paller and Wagner, 2002; 
Hartley and Burgess, 2005; Foerde et al., 2006; Eichenbaum et al., 2007; Daw and 
Shohamy, 2008; Foerde and Shohamy, 2011b). The discovery of separate functions of a 
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reward learning system and a relational learning system several decades ago has 
supported the development of the prominent “multiple memory systems” perspective for 
understanding how behavior is driven by underlying neural systems. 
While this overview of reward and relational learning and memory systems is 
simple, the cognitive and neural systems supporting these types of learning are complex. 
Behaviorally, decades of learning research in animals has revealed a multiplicity of 
stimulus-reward and stimulus-response representations with distinct influences on 
behavior (Daw et al., 2005; Dayan et al., 2006; Balleine et al., 2008; Rangel et al., 2008). 
The neural systems supporting learning from reward are also complex, and the regions 
involved undoubtedly extend beyond dopamine neurons and the striatum (Daw and Doya, 
2006; Balleine et al., 2008; Rangel et al., 2008; Takahashi et al., 2009; Li et al., 2011; 
McDannald et al., 2011). For the purposes of the studies described in this dissertation, 
however, I will use “reward learning” as a general term for the representation and 
updating of stimulus-response or stimulus-reward (S-R) associations in the brain, where 
these types of associations are believed to depend on the striatum and its dopaminergic 
inputs.  
Similarly, research on relational memory has revealed multiple kinds of 
representations (Eichenbaum and Cohen, 2001; Davachi, 2006; Eichenbaum et al., 2007). 
Neurally, in contrast to the multiple systems supporting reward learning, there is more 
convergence on the importance of a single structure, the hippocampus. The hippocampus, 
because of a combination of unique circuitry and high plasticity (McClelland et al., 
1995), is consistently identified as a critical locus of memory formation. In humans, 
damage to the hippocampus and surrounding medial temporal lobe results in a highly 
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specific memory deficit that renders new episodic learning impaired while sparing other 
learning processes (Cohen and Squire, 1980, 1981; Squire, 1992; Gabrieli, 1998; 
Eichenbaum and Cohen, 2001). Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies 
have shown that hippocampal activity supports the successful encoding of experience 
(Brewer et al., 1998; Wagner et al., 1998; Schacter and Wagner, 1999; Kirchhoff et al., 
2000; Otten et al., 2001). More specifically, activity predicts successful encoding of 
relations between items and between items and contexts (Eichenbaum and Cohen, 2001; 
Paller and Wagner, 2002; Davachi, 2006; Eichenbaum et al., 2007; Hannula and 
Ranganath, 2008). Activity in single neurons in the hippocampus has been shown to 
encode and recollect sequences of places in animals as well as humans (Foster and 
Wilson, 2006; Gelbard-Sagiv et al., 2008; Carr and Frank, 2012), supporting the 
encoding episodes.  
In general, these results suggest that the memory representations in the 
hippocampus are relational, in that they contain information about spatial, temporal, or 
associative relations between multiple stimuli (Eichenbaum and Cohen, 2001; 
Eichenbaum et al., 2007; Staresina and Davachi, 2009). A second key feature of these 
memories is representational flexibility – hippocampus-based memories can be accessed, 
transferred, and used in novel contexts (Cohen, 1984; Cohen and Eichenbaum, 1993; 
Eichenbaum, 2000). Based on the critical role of the hippocampus in encoding relations, 
or stimulus-stimulus (S-S) associations, I will use “relational learning” as a general term 





Neuroscience research on decision making has focused extensively on the role of 
the learned reward associations. The learning of predictive relationships between stimuli 
and reward is well described by reinforcement learning theories (Rescorla and Wagner, 
1972; Houk et al., 1995; Schultz et al., 1997; Frank et al., 2004; Everitt and Robbins, 
2005; Daw and Doya, 2006; Schultz, 2006; Rangel et al., 2008). Behavioral and 
economic studies have demonstrated that choices are predominantly driven by learned 
value. Basing choices on value is obviously an adaptive strategy; it allows organisms to 
make choices that provide them with the food, money and other resources needed for 
survival.  
In reward learning experiments, reinforcement learning models accurately predict 
the phasic spiking of dopamine neurons as well as the blood oxygen-level dependent 
(BOLD) signal from fMRI studies in the ventral striatum (Houk et al., 1995; Montague et 
al., 1996; Schultz et al., 1997; Berns et al., 2001; Knutson et al., 2001; McClure et al., 
2003; O'Doherty et al., 2003). Dopamine neuron phasic spiking is well-described by the 
difference between the expected and received reward, the reward prediction error signal 
in reinforcement learning models. This dopamine response can then update the value of 
stimulus-reward associations that underlies value predictions and behavior (e.g. Reynolds 
et al., 2001; Tsai et al., 2009). The link between the key learning signal in reinforcement 
learning models and a neural correlate in a widely-projecting neuromodulatory signal has 
been one of the biggest success stories in systems and computational neuroscience. 
While research in humans and animals on value learning has been extremely 
productive and influential, the basic reinforcement learning theories that this research 
relies upon are relatively limited in explanatory scope. Beyond stimulus-reward 
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associations, basic reinforcement learning theories do not explain how other forms of 
learning guide decision making (Tolman, 1948; Doya, 1999; Daw et al., 2005; Daw and 
Shohamy, 2008). While in many situations simple reward learning is sufficient, we have 
additional cognitive and learning systems to guide choice.  
Reinforcement learning relies on repeated experiences to extract associations 
between predictive stimuli and rewarding or aversive feedback. This kind of learning is 
“model-free”, in that simple value associations are acquired without connections to other 
stimuli or a representation of the world (Daw et al., 2005). Learning over repeated 
experience is a powerful feature, because it allows an organism to easily navigate 
regularly experienced events by automatically extracting predictive relationships between 
stimuli and outcomes. Similarly, habitual motor behaviors offer a large advantage over 
re-planning every regularly used action. However, if the environment shifts or the 
animal’s internal motivation changes, reinforcement learning requires re-exposure to 
contingencies to re-learn the values of decision options.  
The inflexibility of a simple reward learning system can be demonstrated by 
behavioral paradigms such as devaluation. For example, when a lever is reliably and 
repeatedly associated with a favorite food, pressing the lever to get a reward can become 
a habitual behavior. If the food reward were suddenly paired with illness, it would be 
adaptive for the animal to avoid the lever and explore other options. However, a reward 
learning system based on simple reinforcement learning will only update the value of the 
lever after re-experiencing the lever-food-illness association. This is not an adaptive 
behavior, and indeed, this is not what animals do. When the environment changes, 
animals have been shown to rely on a more flexible learning system that has access to a 
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representation of the environment, including predictive (S-S) associations between 
neutral stimuli (Daw et al., 2005). This different type of learning has been shown to 
depend on different non-habitual circuits including the dorsomedial striatum, the frontal 
cortex, and possibly the hippocampus (Yin and Knowlton, 2006). Lesions to components 
of this alternate learning system render behavior inflexible, while lesions to the lateral 
striatum prevent behavior from becoming habitual (for review, see Yin and Knowlton, 
2006). Thus, learning and decision making in complex and shifting situations may in part 
rely on one or more separate learning systems distinct from the reinforcement learning-
related striatal system. 
 
Relational learning 
One candidate learning system that could complement a reward learning system 
in decision making is a relational learning system localized to the hippocampus and 
surrounding MTL. Studies on episodic learning and memory have highlighted a central 
role for the hippocampus in flexible, relational learning (Knowlton et al., 1996; Dusek 
and Eichenbaum, 1997; Eichenbaum and Cohen, 2001; Davachi, 2006). Extensive 
converging evidence indicates that the hippocampus and surrounding MTL cortices 
support the rapid formation of memories for single episodes (Squire, 1987, 1992; Cohen 
and Eichenbaum, 1993; Gabrieli, 1998; Wagner et al., 1998; Eichenbaum and Cohen, 
2001; Paller and Wagner, 2002; Eichenbaum et al., 2007).  
While initial research in humans suggested that the hippocampus was critical for 
forming declarative memories characterized by conscious experience, more recent 
research suggests a role for the hippocampus in relational learning regardless of 
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awareness (Henke, 2010; Hannula and Greene, 2012). Research is converging on the 
view that the hippocampus plays an essential role in binding experiences together, 
whether parts of a scene or elements sequentially experienced in time (Davachi, 2006; 
Staresina and Davachi, 2009; Turk-Browne et al., 2010). This perspective on relational 
memory as separate from a question of awareness also facilitates an easier integration 
with research on hippocampal function in animals. Animal research, in contrast to most 
human memory research, has focused on the hippocampus as a critical region for 
representing for spatial location, navigation, and binding of elements in the environment 
(Eichenbaum and Cohen, 2001). 
Until recently, little attention was given to a role for relational memories in the 
hippocampus in human decision making. This may have been partly because of a bias to 
view human hippocampal function from a declarative memory point of view. However, 
research on human relational learning in the hippocampus strongly suggests that it is a 
critical system for adaptive behavior, as will be discussed below. Stimulus-stimulus 
relational associations between stimuli can provide building blocks for planning and 
evaluating consequences in decision making (Lengyel and Dayan, 2005). A relational 
memory system in the hippocampus may thus be well suited to address the inflexibility of 
decision making based on reinforcement learning in the striatum (Daw and Shohamy, 
2008). 
 
III.  Interactions between learning systems 
A reward learning system in the striatum and a relational learning system in the 
hippocampus have been proposed to compete for the control of behavior (Poldrack and 
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Packard, 2003). Frequently, studies of memory system function are designed to isolate 
the roles of different learning systems. One commonly used paradigm is the Morris water 
maze, where animals can use either a location-based strategy (reliant on the 
hippocampus) or a cue-based strategy (reliant on the striatum) to solve the task. It has 
been shown that inactivating one learning system can improve the performance of the 
type of learning supported by the other learning system (e.g. Lee et al., 2008). In general, 
studies combining lesions of either the MTL or the striatum with behavioral tasks that 
probe either spatial-relational learning or habit learning have shown that an intact MTL is 
essential for the former, while the striatum (specifically, the caudate) is essential for the 
latter (Packard et al., 1989; Kesner et al., 1993; McDonald and White, 1993; Packard and 
McGaugh, 1996; Packard, 1999; for a review, see Poldrack and Packard, 2003).  
In humans, striatal disruption (such as occurs in Parkinson’s disease) impairs 
performance on a variety of incremental, stimulus-response learning tasks (Saint-Cyr et 
al., 1988; Downes et al., 1989; Owen et al., 1993; Knowlton et al., 1996; Swainson et al., 
2000; Shohamy et al., 2004a; Shohamy et al., 2004b; Shohamy et al., 2005; Shohamy et 
al., 2006), but spares performance on tasks that involve relational memory such as 
declarative knowledge (Knowlton et al., 1996). In a related human functional imaging 
study, a negative correlation was found between hippocampal and striatal activation 
during learning (Poldrack et al., 2001); however, with fMRI data, a causal connection 
between interactions and behavior cannot be established. 
These studies and many others suggest that reward and relational learning not 
only support different kinds of learning but also that in some situations these systems 
competitively interact (Poldrack and Packard, 2003). 
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Interaction via hippocampal-striatal connectivity 
A competitive interaction between reward learning and relational learning may 
not characterize all interactions, however, and many studies now support a case for some 
functional cooperation between these systems (for review, see Shohamy and Adcock, 
2010; Pennartz et al., 2011).  Neurophysiological studies in animals have shown that 
activity in the hippocampus and striatum is correlated during learning as well as in offline 
replay (Pennartz et al., 2004; Johnson and Redish, 2007; Lansink et al., 2008; Tort et al., 
2008; Lansink et al., 2009; Singer and Frank, 2009; van der Meer and Redish, 2009).  
Cooperative interactions between systems could be supported by anatomical 
connections between the hippocampus and ventral striatum (Kelley and Domesick, 1982; 
Cohen et al., 2009). Neuroanatomical studies have shown that the hippocampus projects 
directly to the ventral striatum, forming a component of the “reward-related” ventral 
corticostriatal loop (Haber et al., 2006; Cohen et al., 2009; Haber and Knutson, 2010). 
Neurophysiological studies suggest that this connection underlies functional interactions 
between these two regions (Lansink et al., 2009; van der Meer and Redish, 2009). 
Directly supporting a role for such connectivity in adaptive behavior, 
hippocampal inputs to the striatum have been shown to be critical for learning place 
preferences, a classic measure of reward learning (Ito et al., 2008). Further, the 
hippocampus has been shown to exert some control over striatal dopamine levels and 
striatal activity. For example, stimulation of the ventral hippocampus has been shown to 
enhance the number of spontaneously activated dopamine neurons in the midbrain, 
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resulting in significantly greater dopamine release in the ventral striatum (Legault and 
Wise, 1999; Lodge and Grace, 2006, 2008).  
From a computational perspective, it may be beneficial for these systems to 
cooperate by sharing information. For example, if a relational learning system in the 
hippocampus is engaged in planning a course of action in an environment, it could be 
efficient for this system to access model-free values stored in the reward learning system. 
This type of interaction has been hinted at in several neurophysiological studies of maze 
navigation (Johnson and Redish, 2007; van der Meer and Redish, 2009). While rats 
navigated a maze, hippocampal activity at decision points reflected future paths in toward 
reward (Johnson and Redish, 2007). In the same task, activity in the striatum was 
increased at decision points, supporting the hypothesis that planning-like activity in the 
hippocampus accesses reward representations in the striatum (van der Meer and Redish, 
2009). However, even if these systems share information, it is possible that they compete 
for the eventual control of behavioral output (e.g. Daw et al., 2005). 
 
Common dopaminergic inputs to both systems 
Cooperative interactions between reward and relational learning systems are also 
supported by the fact that both the striatum and the hippocampus receive 
neuromodulatory inputs from midbrain dopamine neurons. In addition to the well-known 
and prominent midbrain dopamine neuron projections to the striatum, dopamine neurons 
in the midbrain ventral tegmental area (VTA) also project to the hippocampus (Fuxe, 
1965; Lindvall and Bjorklund, 1974; Swanson, 1982; Gasbarri et al., 1994a; Gasbarri et 
al., 1994b). (However, see Smith and Greene (2012) for data suggesting that the 
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noradrenergic neurons from the locus coeruleus are the actual source of dopamine in the 
hippocampus.) Dopamine has been shown to modulate long-term plasticity in the 
hippocampus. For example, dopamine agonists promote longer-term facilitation of 
synaptic transmission (Huang and Kandel, 1995; Otmakhova and Lisman, 1996; Lisman 
et al., 2011), while dopamine antagonists prevent it (Frey et al., 1990). Functionally, the 
hippocampus may also communicate with the dopamine system via a circuit connecting 
the hippocampus, ventral striatum, and VTA (Lisman and Grace, 2005). 
Many studies support the behavioral importance of dopamine in the hippocampus. 
Lesions to midbrain dopamine projections to the hippocampus have been shown to impair 
spatial memory (Gasbarri et al., 1996). Dopamine in the hippocampus has been shown to 
be necessary for long-lasting maintenance of fear memories (Rossato et al., 2009). 
Increases in hippocampal plasticity in response to a novel environment depends on the 
activation of dopamine receptors (Li et al., 2003; Lemon and Manahan-Vaughan, 2006; 
Granado et al., 2008). Also, dopamine D1-type receptor knockout also alters the ability of 
hippocampal place cells to adapt coding to a new environment (Tran et al., 2008). 
Finally, Morris and colleagues have demonstrated that dopamine in the hippocampus is 
critical for the formation of lasting episodic-like memories of spatial organization of 
rewards (Bethus et al., 2010). Collectively, these studies support a tight linkage between 
the midbrain dopamine system and the hippocampus in memory formation. Thus, 
dopamine, which has been primarily associated with stimulus-response learning and 





Overlapping learning signals in functional MRI studies 
While fMRI studies in humans initially supported a competitive view of 
hippocampal and striatal function during learning (Poldrack et al., 2001), recent work has 
shown support for similar responses across systems. In the realm of reward learning and 
value-based decision making, multiple recent studies have found hippocampal activity 
correlated with value and feedback (Kumaran et al., 2009; Lebreton et al., 2009; 
Dickerson et al., 2011; Foerde and Shohamy, 2011a; Simon and Daw, 2011; Wimmer et 
al., 2012). In some studies, hippocampal activation has also been found to correlate with 
reward prediction errors during reward receipt, a result characteristically localized to the 
striatum (Dickerson et al., 2011; Foerde and Shohamy, 2011a). In other studies, 
hippocampal activation correlated with the value of options during choice, a result 
characteristically localized to the VMPFC (Simon and Daw, 2011; Wimmer et al., 2012). 
These results further challenge a simple competitive account of striatal and hippocampal 
memory systems. 
In relational memory studies, similar co-activation of striatal and hippocampal 
systems has been reported. In a motivated memory-encoding paradigm, successful 
memory formation for high reward trials was predicted by increased activity in and 
correlation between the hippocampus and VTA (Adcock et al., 2006). In an incidental 
encoding study, reward value cues activated the striatum, and midbrain and hippocampal 
activity predicted successful memory formation (Wittmann et al., 2005). Outside of a 
reward context, striatal signals have also been shown to reflect successful memory 




IV.  Systems for decision making 
How does reward learning and relational learning support decision making? 
Theoretical and experimental studies of reward learning are closely linked to decision 
making. The function of phasic dopamine neuron activity was understood via prior 
research in engineering and computer science on how to program machines to learn from 
feedback (Houk et al., 1995; Montague et al., 1996; Sutton and Barto, 1998). In contrast, 
decision making is rarely approached from the perspective of relational learning. While 
research on reward learning benefitted from an immediate connection to behavior, the 
connection between relational learning and decision making is much less clear. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that the representations acquired by these this system support 
adaptive behavior. Relational memory and reward learning may converge in decision 
making, as discussed below. 
 
Reward learning and decision making 
To understsand human decision making, animal conditioning studies and basic 
behavioral economic choice studies served as a starting point (e.g. O'Doherty et al., 
2003). It is now well established that in functional MRI studies, the ventral striatum 
responds to reward prediction errors (Hare et al., 2008). Other regions have been shown 
to respond to choice value during decision making, such as the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex (VMPFC) (Daw et al., 2006; Hare et al., 2008; Chib et al., 2009). Based on many 
studies, well-established findings such as reward prediction error and value responses in 
in the human brain can be leveraged to study decision making in more complex and 
changing environments. Interestingly, several recent studies of reward learning illustrate 
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how reward learning and decision making are impacted by relational, or “higher-order” 
information.  
In one example, Daw et al. (2011) demonstrated that the striatal reward prediction 
error signal in humans is sensitive to relationships in the environment that simple 
reinforcement learning would be blind to. In a learning task, participants made sequential 
decisions at two stages. By using a multi-stage design, reward feedback responses in the 
brain can be probed for the influence of different learning systems: one which tracks 
simple stimulus-reward associations (in a model-free manner, as in simple reward 
learning) and one that is aware of the overall two-stage structure of the game (in a model-
based manner, perhaps related to relational learning). If the reward learning system in the 
striatum only has access to knowledge derived from simple reward learning, reward 
prediction errors should only reflect the model-free feedback component. However, 
participant’s choice behavior and the striatal reward response was actually best described 
by a combination of simple stimulus-reward learning and model-based learning (Daw et 
al., 2011). This result demonstrates that one of the most basic neural correlates of reward 
learning is also influenced by additional structure in the environment. 
In a second example, a recent electrophysiology study demonstrated that 
dopamine neurons respond to higher-order contingencies in the environment (Bromberg-
Martin et al., 2010a). In a task where stimulus-response-reward associations switched 
repeatedly, Bromberg-Martin found that after unexpected reward omission, on the next 
choice, the dopaminergic reward prediction error signal had already systematically 
shifted to correctly predict reward feedback on the alternate stimulus. Remarkably, this 
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signal was reflected not only in dopamine neurons, but also in a circuit upstream of the 
midbrain including the habenula and globus pallidus (Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010a).  
These studies illustrate that simple reward learning signals may reflect additional 
higher-information about relationships in the environment. However, it is not known 
what neural systems support the acquisition of this type of information. It is possible that 
a learning system in the striatum itself tracks this information, but it is more likely that 
this information comes from other sources. Often, these kind of flexible representations 
and are related to the prefrontal cortex (Miller and Cohen, 2001; Hampton et al., 2006). 
However, given the role of the hippocampus in relational learning the hippocampus may 
also play a critical role in supplying relational information to a reward learning system 
(Lengyel and Dayan, 2005).  
 
Relational learning and decision making 
Research on episodic and relational memory has approached the question of value 
and decision making from a different direction. Human memory studies have explored 
the neural systems supporting memory for positive and negative stimuli (Phelps, 2004; 
Murty et al., 2011). For decision making, it is almost of no question that people will 
choose to avoid negative stimuli and approach positive stimuli, should the situation 
warrant it, regardless of whether or not emotional stimuli are remembered. However, 
memories for positive and negative events can be very useful for decision making when 
memories can be linked into relational representations that allow people to predict the 
consequences of future actions. Of course, memory formation in the hippocampus is 
characterized by its relational nature (Davachi, 2006).  
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While simple relational encoding is often not considered from a decision making 
perspective, it is precisely these kind of relations that can be used to construct a model of 
the world (Lengyel and Dayan, 2005). Such representations can then be used in planning 
and decision making to predict the consequences of actions as in model-based theories of 
decision making (Daw et al., 2005; Lengyel and Dayan, 2005). Additionally, the role of 
the hippocampus in navigation, as established by decades of research in animals 
(Eichenbaum and Cohen, 2001), strongly suggests that the hippocampus may be critical 
for model-based learning.  
Notably, the multiple studies that support a role for the hippocampus in relational 
learning can also be viewed as providing support for a role of the hippocampus in model-
based learning and decision making. For example, one of the most commonly cited 
studies for the role of the hippocampus in relational memory uses a transitive inference 
paradigm (Dusek and Eichenbaum, 1997). In this paradigm, animals learn via repeated 
stimulus-reward associations to prefer A > B, C > D, and D > E. Following learning is a 
test with novel pairs, where transfer of knowledge leads to a preference of B > D. 
Hippocampal lesions impair performance on these novel pairs, but not on pre-trained 
pairs (Dusek and Eichenbaum, 1997). Importantly, hippocampal damage specifically 
impairs the ability to perform such transfer, without significantly impacting the ability to 
learn the individual associations (Bunsey and Eichenbaum, 1996; Dusek and 
Eichenbaum, 1997; Eichenbaum and Cohen, 2001; Buckmaster et al., 2004). 
Interestingly, damage to the striatum results in the opposite pattern – impaired feedback-
based learning of the individual associations, but spared transfer (Myers et al., 2003; 
Shohamy et al., 2006). 
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Another key set of studies for establishing a role of the hippocampus in relational 
memory also involves reward learning, and highlights a possible mechanism by which 
the hippocampus can influence decision making. In this paradigm, called acquired 
equivalence, participants learn a series of associations using trial and error. Each of the 
associations in the series is learned individually; however, the associations sometimes 
overlap between stimuli. For example, participants learn that A->X, B->X, and A->Y. 
Participants are then tested on transfer of this knowledge to a novel association (B->Y). 
Animal studies suggest an important role for the hippocampus in transfer (Coutureau et 
al., 2002). In human participants with amnesic mild cognitive impairment, a condition 
that often leads to Alzheimer’s disease, the transfer across associations is impaired, but 
basic learning of associations through reward is intact (Myers et al., 2003). A study using 
functional MRI has shown that such transfer is supported by hippocampal activation, in 
conjunction with activation in the dopaminergic midbrain (Shohamy and Wagner, 2008). 
These results indicated that during learning, when individual associations were being 
experienced, the hippocampus was engaged in integrative encoding (Shohamy and 
Wagner, 2008).  
These findings provide insight into a possible mechanism by which relational 
learning can influence decision making. By demonstrating that hippocampal activity 
during learning predicts subsequent choice, these findings raise the possibility that 
associative mechanisms in the hippocampus continuously integrate episodes as they are 
being experienced. This suggests that hippocampal-dependent decision making is 
essentially a form of generalization, emerging from relational links between learned 
representations driven by the overlap between them.  
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As described above, prominent support for the hippocampus in flexible relational 
learning comes from paradigms that involve coincident learning of reward associations. 
Such concurrent learning may more closely relate to everyday experience, where reward 
learning and relational learning are not artificially separated. Such findings cut against a 
view that proposes competition as a basic model of interaction between relational and 
reward learning (Poldrack and Packard, 2003). By learning relational representations that 
can serve as a basis for generalizing related reward experiences, the brain may be able to 
take advantage of relational learning to flexibly apply knowledge in novel decisions. 
 In conclusion, the research outline above has suggested an important role for 
relational learning in decision making. Studies of reward learning are expanding beyond 
simple probes of reinforcement learning and have so far demonstrated that classic reward 
signals in the brain are sensitive to relations in the environment that go beyond simple 
stimulus-response associations (Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010a; Daw et al., 2011). At the 
same time, studies of relational learning have demonstrated a critical role of the 
hippocampus in reward learning and flexible decision making (Dusek and Eichenbaum, 
1997; Shohamy and Wagner, 2008). 
 
V. Questions and chapter introductions 
In this dissertation, I present four studies. Collectively, these studies aim to 
increase our understanding of the cognitive and neural systems that support learning and 
decision making, with a focus on two specific systems: a relational learning system in the 
hippocampus and a reward learning system in the striatum. In Chapter 2, I investigate 
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whether relational memory processes impact reward learning (Wimmer, Daw, and 
Shohamy, 2012). Specifically, I explore whether value generalizes across related stimuli 
and use fMRI to explore the neural correlates of this effect. While simple aspects of 
stimulus-reward learning have been extensively investigated, the environment often 
presents more complex situations that are outside the scope of basic reinforcement 
learning. In this experiment, my goal was to investigate the following questions: How is 
knowledge about value similarity between stimuli acquired? How does such knowledge 
impact choice behavior?  Do the striatum and the hippocampus each play independent or 
cooperative roles in contributing to these different aspects of learning? 
In Chapter 3, I investigate whether relational memory processes in the 
hippocampus interact with subsequent reward learning to shift value and bias decision 
making (Wimmer and Shohamy, in press). In the study described in Chapter 2, learning 
relations between stimuli and between stimuli and feedback was intermixed, and thus it 
was not possible to isolate the precise mechanisms underlying the transfer of reward 
across stimuli. In Chapter 3, we extend these findings with a new study aimed to 
elucidate the specific mechanism by which the hippocampus contributes to value 
assessment and reward learning, and how the hippocampus interacts with the striatum to 
support this process.  This study focuses on the following questions:  How does reward 
learning interact with relational associations? Can value transfer from a rewarded 
stimulus to a previously associated neutral stimulus? Does a cooperative interaction 
between relational learning in the hippocampus and reward learning in the striatum 
during reward learning supports later decision making? 
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Together, Chapters 2 and 3 address questions about how memory representations 
in the hippocampus interact with reward learning to guide choice. In the studies described 
in Chapter 4 (Wimmer and Shohamy, in preparation) and Chapter 5 (Wimmer, Braun, 
and Shohamy, in preparation), I turn to explore how episodic memory is impacted by 
choice and reward learning. In Chapter 4, I determine whether episodic memory is 
modulated by choice and reward in a dynamic reward learning environment. I also probe 
the effect of consolidation on this influence. In Chapter 5, I use fMRI to explore the 
neural mechanisms underlying the effect of choice and reward on memory. Specifically, I 
ask whether value signals in the VMPFC are also related to memory, and whether 
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In Chapter 2, I approach the use of relational representations in reward learning and 
choice by probing learning in a basic reinforcement learning task with a relational 
structure that links the reward likelihood of paired options. 
 
Abstract 
Research in decision making has focused on the role of dopamine and its striatal 
targets in guiding choices via learned stimulus-reward or stimulus-response associations, 
behavior that is well-described by reinforcement learning (RL) theories. However, basic 
RL is relatively limited in scope and does not explain how learning about stimulus 
regularities or relations may guide decision making. A candidate mechanism for this type 
of learning comes from the domain of memory, which has highlighted a role for the 
hippocampus in learning of stimulus-stimulus relations, typically dissociated from the 
role of the striatum in stimulus-response learning. Here, we used fMRI and computational 
model-based analyses to examine the joint contributions of these mechanisms to RL. 
Humans performed an RL task with added relational structure, modeled after tasks used 
to isolate hippocampal contributions to memory. On each trial participants chose one of 
four options, but the reward probabilities for pairs of options were correlated across trials. 
This (uninstructed) relationship between pairs of options potentially enabled an observer 
to learn about options’ values based on experience with the other options and to 
generalize across them. We observed BOLD activity related to learning in the striatum 
and also in the hippocampus. By comparing a basic RL model to one augmented to allow 
feedback to generalize between correlated options, we tested whether choice behavior 
and BOLD activity were influenced by the opportunity to generalize across correlated 
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options. Although such generalization goes beyond standard computational accounts of 
RL and striatal BOLD, both choices and striatal BOLD were better explained by the 
augmented model. Consistent with the hypothesized role for the hippocampus in this 
generalization, functional connectivity between the ventral striatum and hippocampus 
was modulated, across participants, by the ability of the augmented model to capture 
participants’ choice. Our results thus point toward an interactive model in which striatal 





Research in decision making posits a computational role for the dopamine system 
and its striatal targets in guiding choices via learned stimulus-reward or stimulus-
response associations (Houk et al., 1995; Schultz et al., 1997; Frank et al., 2004; Everitt 
and Robbins, 2005; Daw and Doya, 2006; Schultz, 2006; Rangel et al., 2008). However, 
there has been increasing recognition that this narrow mechanism for “habit” learning 
cannot explain the full diversity of choice behavior, or even the striatum’s contribution to 
it (Balleine et al., 2008; Rangel et al., 2008; Redish et al., 2008). Still, it remains less 
precisely understood how other forms of learning, possibly involving distinct cognitive 
and neural systems, contribute to choice (Doya, 1999; Daw et al., 2005; Daw and 
Shohamy, 2008).  
One promising avenue for addressing this gap is the largely separate domain of 
memory research, where a finely detailed distinction between different forms of learning 
has long been established (Schacter, 1990; Squire, 1992; Knowlton et al., 1996; Gabrieli, 
1998; Eichenbaum and Cohen, 2001). Perhaps the best-characterized system is that for 
episodic memory, associated with the hippocampus and operationally distinguished from 
a striatal habit system (Schacter, 1990; Squire, 1992; Knowlton et al., 1996; Gabrieli, 
1998; Eichenbaum and Cohen, 2001; Poldrack et al., 2001; Hartley and Burgess, 2005; 
Foerde et al., 2006; Mattfeld and Stark, 2010). Echoing non-habitual accounts of decision 
making, hippocampal memories represent the relation between multiple arbitrarily 
associated stimuli. Due to their relational nature, hippocampal memories are also flexible 
and can be generalized across stimuli and contexts (Cohen and Eichenbaum, 1993; Dusek 
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and Eichenbaum, 1997; Eichenbaum and Cohen, 2001; Davachi, 2006; Shohamy et al., 
2008; Staresina and Davachi, 2009).  
In memory tasks, the relational hallmark of hippocampal memories has been 
demonstrated using procedures that first embed relations among stimuli and then probe 
whether later choices reflect relational knowledge (Dusek and Eichenbaum, 1997; Myers 
et al., 2003; Preston et al., 2004; Greene et al., 2006; Shohamy et al., 2006; Shohamy and 
Wagner, 2008; Zeithamova and Preston, 2010). For example, in ‘acquired equivalence,’ 
people first learn that stimulus A is associated with outcome X, and that stimulus B is 
also associated with outcome X. Having indirectly learned that A and B are related, in 
terms of their common outcome X, people later transfer additional knowledge about 
stimulus A to stimulus B, presumably based on the learned ‘equivalence’ between them. 
Converging evidence suggests that acquired equivalence depends on the hippocampus 
and surrounding medial-temporal lobe cortex (e.g., Coutureau et al., 2002; Myers et al., 
2003; Shohamy and Wagner, 2008). 
Here, we sought to leverage this approach in the context of a reinforcement 
learning task to determine whether relational encoding contributes to decision making. 
Participants made repeated choices in a reward learning task, in which the probability of 
reward associated with each of four options diffused randomly. Structured relationships 
between options’ outcomes were embedded via correlated reward probabilities between 
pairs of options, creating an (uninstructed) equivalence between them (Figure 2.1). Thus, 
this task incorporates one of the essential elements of ‘acquired equivalence’ (Honey and 
Hall, 1989; Myers et al., 2003; Shohamy and Wagner, 2008), namely, that pairs of 
options are related in virtue of sharing a common outcome, enabling (if this structure is 
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detected and encoded) generalization of subsequent learning between them. However, in 
contrast to studies in the memory domain, the common outcome here is a correlated 
likelihood of reward, rather than a particular stimulus. Moreover, this correlational 
structure is embedded within a trial-and-error reward learning task, allowing us to ask 
whether and how inferred similarity relationships of this kind can affect instrumental 
choice behavior. Importantly, standard reinforcement models (ranging from Thorndike’s 
(1911) law of effect to more modern TD rules (e.g. Schultz et al., 1997)) should in 
principle be entirely blind to this kind of structure. 
We characterized learning behavior using reinforcement learning models in order to 
measure the extent to which choices are driven by the correlational structure across 
option’s values. We then used fMRI to identify regions of the brain where activation 
covaried with decision variables from the models, to investigate whether the inclusion of 
this structure implicated the hippocampus instead of (or in addition to) traditional 
reinforcement learning activations in the striatum. Critically, we could then examine 
these signals to test whether they reflected value generalization, and specifically whether 
ventral striatal BOLD activity reflected relational knowledge. Finally, we used 
multivariate analyses of the fMRI data to examine whether the use of such structure to 
guide choices might be reflected in increased functional connectivity between the 








Materials and Methods 
Participants. Twenty-four right-handed fluent English speakers with normal or corrected-
to-normal vision participated in the study. All participants were free of neurological or 
psychiatric disorders and fully consented to participate. Informed consent was obtained in 
a manner approved by the New York University Committee on Activities Involving 
Human Subjects. Three participants’ data were excluded: two due to software problems 
(one for a partial loss of behavioral responses, one for missing timing information), and a 
third because the participant elected to leave the experiment before the completion of 
data acquisition. Behavioral and functional imaging data are presented from the 
remaining twenty-one participants (mean age, 19.3 years; range, 18-28; 10 female). 
Participants were paid $20 per hour for the approximately 2-hour duration of 
participation plus one-fifth of the nominal rewards the participant earned in the 
experimental task. 
 
Task. In the experimental task (Figure 1a; Daw and Shohamy, 2008), on each of 300 
trials, participants chose one of four presented face stimuli and then received monetary 
feedback. This reinforcement learning task is a variant of a “four-armed bandit” task 
(Daw et al., 2006; Wittmann et al., 2008). The face stimuli, which were constant across 
trials and participants, were taken from the Stanford Face Database. The location of the 
faces was permuted randomly from trial to trial. 
On each trial, participants had 2 s to choose between the four options (Figure 
2.1A), using an MR-compatible button response pad held in the right hand. After the 
participant made a selection and until the end of the choice period, the selected option 
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was framed in blue and the unchosen options were decreased in brightness. Participants 
then received binary reward feedback for 2 s, a $0.25 “win” outcome represented by an 
image of a quarter dollar and a $0.00 “miss” outcome represented by a phase-scrambled 
image of a quarter dollar (Figure 2.1A). If no choice was recorded during the choice 
period, no reward outcome was displayed and the face options remained on the screen 
until the end of the trial. Trials were intermixed with variable duration inter-trial fixation 
null events (ITI; mean 2 s, range 0-12 s). The total time allotted for null events was equal 
to one-third of the scan time. The duration and distribution of null events was optimized 
for estimation of rapid event-related fMRI responses as calculated using Optseq software 
(http://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/optseq/). The task was presented using the 
Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997) and projected onto a mirror screen above the 
participant’s eyes. 
Participants were instructed that each face option was associated with a different 
probability of reward, that these probabilities could change slowly, and that their goal 
was to attempt to find the most rewarding option at a given time in order to earn the most 
money. They were also instructed that rewards were tied to the face identity and not the 
face position. Prior to the scanning session, participants completed a short practice 
version to familiarize them with the task and to ensure that their button responses 
reflected their intended choices. 
Each of the options (S1-S4) was associated with a different probability of 
monetary reward. Across the 300 trials in the experiment, the reward probabilities 
diffused gradually according to Gaussian random walks, so as to encourage continual 
learning. Unbeknownst to the participants, to provide the opportunity of encoding 
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stimulus-stimulus relational structure, the faces were grouped into equivalent pairs (here 
referred to as faces S1 & S3 and S2 & S4). The chance of reward on choosing S1 or S3 (and 
similarly S2 or S4) was the same on any particular trial; however, trial feedback only 
displayed the reward outcome for the selected face. The reward probability for each pair 
of face stimuli changed over time, diffusing between 25% and 75% according to 
Gaussian random walks with reflecting boundary conditions. Two instantiations of two 
sets of random walks were generated, and these were then inverted (i.e., subtracting all 
probabilities from 100%) to give a total of four sequences (Figure 2.1B). So as to ensure 
that these strong positive correlations did not make the choice problem trivial (i.e., with 
all four options often having roughly the same value), a more modest negative correlation 
was included between the two sets of walks within each of these sequences  (r2 between 
pairs, -0.135 and -0.369; vs. r2 = 1 within paired options). Reward probability sequences 
were counterbalanced between participants, as was the mapping of particular face stimuli 
to the underlying reward sequences.  
After the completion of scanning, participants answered a series of questions that 
assessed their strategies during learning and their awareness of the contingencies across 
options. To further probe any knowledge of the underlying task structure provided by the 
equivalence relationships, participants were also given a questionnaire that included 
pictures of the four face stimuli. Participants were instructed to draw lines connecting the 
pairs of stimuli that for any reason seemed related to one another, and then to describe 
why they paired those options together (data available for 18 participants). Participants 




Imaging procedure. Whole-brain imaging was conducted on a 3.0T Siemens Allegra 
head-only MRI system at NYU’s Center for Brain Imaging, using a Nova Medical NM-
011 head coil. Head padding was used to minimize head motion; subsequent inspection 
showed that no participant’s motion exceeded 2mm in any direction from one volume 
acquisition to the next. Structural images were collected using a high-resolution T1-
weighted MPRAGE pulse sequence (1 X 1 X 1 mm voxel size). Functional images were 
collected using a gradient echo T2*-weighted echoplanar (EPI) sequence with blood 
oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) contrast (TR = 2000 ms, TE = 15 ms, flip angle = 
82, 3 X 3 X 3 mm voxel size; 33 contiguous oblique-axial slices), tilted on a per-
participant basis approximately 23° off of the AC-PC axis to optimize sensitivity to 
signal in the orbitofrontal cortex and the medial temporal lobe (Deichmann et al., 2003). 
The task was scanned in four blocks each of 310 volumes (10 min 20 s). For each 
functional scanning block, four discarded volumes were collected prior to the first trial to 
allow for magnetic field equilibration. 
 
Behavioral Analysis. Model-based analyses were used to investigate participants’ 
learning and utilization of the reward equivalence structure to guide choices. Such 
analyses attempt to explain the timeseries of choices in terms of previous events, 
allowing precise, quantitative questions to be posed about the dynamics of behavioral 
adjustment. (See O'Doherty et al., 2007; Daw, 2011 for reviews of the methodology.)  
 First, we sought to test whether participants adjusted their choices dynamically in 
response to the rewarding outcomes. Because of the fluctuating probability of reward, we 
could not estimate a learning curve or a percent correct over the course of the task. 
35 
 
Instead, as in prior studies, a logistic regression model was fit to explain each 
participant’s sequence of choices in terms of two explanatory variables coding events 
from the previous trial: the choice made and whether it was rewarded (both coded as 
binary indicators) (Lau and Glimcher, 2005; Gershman et al., 2009; Daw et al., 2011; Li 
and Daw, 2011). In the present study the dependent variable is multinomial (i.e. choices 
over four options), so that the appropriate model is a conditional logit (McFadden, 1974), 
i.e. the link function is the softmax from reinforcement learning (Daw, 2011). 
Having determined that participants’ choices were influenced by prior rewards, 
we next aimed to investigate more detailed aspects of learning using two variations of an 
RL model fit to the choice sequences (Sutton and Barto, 1998), as detailed below.  
The model learns to assign an action value to each option, Q1…Q4, according to 
previously experienced rewards. These are assumed to be learned by a delta rule: if 
option c was chosen and reward r (1 or 0) received, then Qc is updated according to: 
 
 Qc,t = Qc,t-1 + α*δc,t       (1) 
 
 δc,t = rt – Qc,t-1        (2) 
 
where the free parameter α controls the learning rate. To embody possible generalization 
of value across paired options with yoked drifting reward probabilities, the model 
includes a capacity to update the partner option yoked to the current choice. In particular, 
if option c was chosen, with partner p, then in addition to updating the value of c, Qc, as 




 Qp,t = Qp,t-1 + α2 * δp,t       (3) 
 
 δp,t = rt – Qp,t-1        (4) 
 
with the free parameter α2 controlling generalization learning rate. When α2 is set to zero, 
the model is blind to correlational structure, and corresponds to models studied 
previously (Daw et al., 2006; Schönberg et al., 2007; Gershman et al., 2009). In this 
sense, this no-generalization limit provides a null hypothesis or baseline model against 
which to test for generalization effects. With a non-zero generalization learning rate the 
model allows the reward feedback associated with a selected option (e.g., S1 or S2) to 
update the value of its partner (S3 or S4, respectively). Because the models are otherwise 
identical, this parameter isolates generalization: i.e., we reasoned that if the model with a 
free generalization learning rate fit significantly better than the baseline one, then such a 
difference would be attributable to generalization across partners. Moreover, the 
estimated value of the learning rate measures the strength of the generalization effect 
(Daw and Shohamy, 2008). Note that a version of the model in which instead of moving 
partners’ values toward the obtained rewards, non-partners’ values are moved away from 
them (reflecting anti-generalization according to negative correlations; Hampton et al., 
2006) makes predictions quantitatively similar to the version used here. This is because 
choice probabilities in the softmax (below) are driven only by the differences between Q 
values. Thus, for concreteness, and because the positive correlations were stronger in the 
reward schedules as programmed, we used the positively generalizing form of the rule. 
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Given value estimates on a particular trial, participants are assumed to choose 
between the options stochastically with probabilities P1…P4 according to a softmax 
distribution (Daw et al., 2006): 
 
 Pc, t  ∝ exp(β(Qc,t + ϕI(c,ct-1)))      (5) 
 
The free parameter β represents the softmax inverse temperature, which controls 
the exclusivity with which choices are focused on the highest-valued option. The model 
also included a free parameter ϕ, which, when multiplied by the indicator function I(c,ct-
1), defined as 1 if c is the same choice as that made on the previous trial, and zero 
otherwise, captures a tendency to choose (for positive ϕ) or avoid (for negative ϕ) the 
same option chosen on the preceding trial (Lau and Glimcher, 2005; Schönberg et al., 
2007). Note that since the softmax is also the link function for the conditional logit model 
discussed above, this analysis also has the form of a regression from Q values onto 
choices (Lau and Glimcher, 2005; Daw, 2011) except here, rather than as linear effects, 
the past rewards enter via the recursive learning of Q, controlled, in nonlinear fashion, by 
the learning rate parameters. 
In order to search for indications of generalization during the task (i.e. exploiting 
the relational structure underlying the gamble options), we compared the fit of two 
variants of the Q-learning model described by Equations 1-5: 1) the “base” model, where 
the generalization learning rate, α2, was set to zero, and 2) the “generalization” model, 
where α2 was a free parameter.  
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Although equivalence effects would be expected to evolve over time as 
participants gradually learned the equivalence, for simplicity and lacking a well 
supported formal model of the dynamics of such learning, we consider a simplified model 
in which α2 is taken as fixed across the experiment. Because the partner learning rate is 
thus fit to explain choices even over early parts of the task during which it is unlikely that 
participants will yet have detected any generalization structure, this is a conservative 
analysis in the sense that it will tend to underestimate the asymptotic equivalence effects 
(Daw and Shohamy, 2008).  
For each participant, maximum likelihood values for the parameters α, β, and ϕ, 
as well as α2 for the generalization model, were estimated using a gradient search 
(repeated with 20 different starting points, decreasing the chance of local optima) over 
the likelihood of the participant’s observed choice sequence, for each trial conditional on 
the previous rewards and choices (Lau and Glimcher, 2005; Daw et al., 2006; Daw, 
2011). In particular, log likelihood is computed as the sum over trials of log(Pc) for the 
actually chosen option using values learned by the model from the previously delivered 
rewards. A separate set of parameters was optimized for each participant. 
To test whether the models provided a reliable account of participants’ behavior, 
we performed several analyses. First, we tested whether the base and full generalization 
models fit significantly better than chance (i.e. a model with no parameters, with Pc(s,t),t = 
.25 for all t), using likelihood ratio tests. The relative degree of improvement over the 
chance model provides a standardized descriptive index of how well a model fits, called 
pseudo-R2 (Camerer and Ho, 1999; Daw et al., 2006), which we report for comparison 
with other studies. This is defined as (R - L)/R where L and R are, respectively, the log 
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likelihood of the choices under the model (base or generalization) and under purely 
random choices (Pc(s,t),t = 0.25 for all t).  
For the critical comparison between models, the performance of the base model 
and the full generalization model were compared using likelihood ratio tests on the 
individual participants’ and summed group log likelihood values. Such a test examines 
the null hypothesis that any improvement in model fit is due to chance, correcting for the 
inclusion of additional free parameters (e.g., Stephan et al., 2009).  
In order to reason about the prevalence of the two models across the population as 
a random effect that might vary across participants, we conducted an additional analysis 
using the Bayesian Model Selection (BMS) method of Stephan et al. (2009). In particular, 
we estimated Bayes factors (the posterior evidence for one model over the other; Kass 
and Raftery, 1995) using the AIC criterion (Akaike, 1974), and submitted these to the 
spm_BMS routine from SPM8 (Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, 
Institute of Neurology, London, UK).  
 
Imaging analysis. Preprocessing and data analysis was performed using Statistical 
Parametric Mapping software (SPM5; Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, 
Institute of Neurology, London, UK). Functional images were realigned to correct for 
participant motion and then spatially normalized by estimating a warping to template 
space from each participant’s anatomical image (SPM5, “segment and normalize”) and 
applying the resulting transformation to the EPIs. Images were resampled to 2mm cubic 




For reinforcement learning model-based analysis of the fMRI data, we 
investigated correlations with trial-by-trial parametric signals derived from simulations of 
the model described above (Eq. 1-5). Data were analyzed using SPM5, under the 
assumptions of the general linear model. The events on each trial were modeled by half-
second boxcar regressors at the time of stimulus onset and of outcome feedback. These 
two events were modulated by parametric regressors: the trial-by-trial probability of the 
chosen option (Eq. 5) on the stimulus onset, and the trial-by-trial prediction error (Eq. 4) 
on the outcome. Each event was also modulated by a second parametric regressor 
capturing the difference between probabilities or prediction errors in a model with and 
without generalization (formally, the partial derivative of the modeled quantity with 
respect to the partner learning rate; see below). Nuisance boxcar regressors were also 
included during the choice period (4 s) and outcome display periods (2 s) to account for 
general effects of visual stimulation. 
To generate the parametric regressors for the imaging analysis, the free 
parameters for the learning model were chosen as follows. First, the learning model was 
re-estimated with the generalization learning rate, α2, set to zero. This was chosen so as to 
best characterize values and prediction errors under the null hypothesis of no 
generalization, allowing us to test (and perhaps reject) it at the neural level. Second, as 
has been noted previously (Daw et al., 2006), individual parametric fits in tasks and 
models of this sort tend to be noisy, and regularization of the behaviorally fit parameters 
across participants tends to improve a model’s subsequent fit to fMRI data. Accordingly 
(following previous work: Daw et al., 2006; Schönberg et al., 2007; Gershman et al., 
2009), we generated regressors for each participant using a single setting of the RL 
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model’s free parameters, here taken as the mean over all participants of the best fitting 
individual estimates. The group means estimate the population-level parameters in a 
random-effects model of inter-subject variability (Holmes and Friston, 1998), and are 
thus a principled choice for the entire group. Note that although we thus do not 
characterize individual variability in most of the behavioral model parameters for the 
purpose of generating fMRI regressors, our approach does capture individual variability 
in the most important parameter for our questions of interest, the generalization learning 
rate, α2, since the prediction error partial derivative “difference” regressor capturing its 
effects in the fMRI model (see below) is taken as a random effect across subjects.  
To investigate whether value-related neural signals reflect generalization of 
feedback across partner options, two additional regressors were included to accompany 
the base parametric RL regressors of reward prediction error and choice probability. 
These two “difference regressors” each characterize how one of these trial-by-trial 
parametric timeseries would change if the model included learning from partner option 
feedback (i.e., if the parameter α2 were nonzero). Intuitively, these regressors represent 
the difference between the probabilities (or prediction errors) generated according to two 
competing assumptions about the generalization learning rate α2: that it takes on some 
nonzero value Δ, vs. the null assumption that α2 = 0 (Wittmann et al., 2008; Daw, 2011; 
Daw et al., 2011). Thus, if the BOLD signal in an area is better correlated with the 
regressor timeseries for nonzero generalization (α2 = Δ), then, given the additive nature of 
the GLM, the net BOLD signal will be best explained by a sum of contributions, from the 
main regressor (α2 = 0) plus the difference regressor. If, instead, the BOLD signal 
correlates are best explained by α2 = 0, there should be no effect of the difference 
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regressor. In other words, this analysis separates a test for generic prediction error 
(without generalization) and an additional, orthogonal, test of whether such activity 
would actually be better explained by the prediction error including generalization (the 
test of the difference regressor in the same voxels). This approach (Wittmann et al., 2008; 
Daw et al., 2011; Bornstein and Daw, 2012) more cleanly separates these two inferences 
than simply including regressors generated according to both models and contrasting 
them (e.g., Hampton et al., 2008) particularly when the signals predicted by the models 
are correlated. 
More formally, this additive approach approximates the (nonlinear) effect of an 
arbitrary α2 on the modeled probability or prediction error timeseries in the context of the 
standard linear analysis of the BOLD response by using a Taylor expansion of this 
nonlinear function around α2 = 0 and retaining the first-order (linear) term (Friston et al., 
1998; Daw, 2011). This corresponds, in the above scheme, to taking the learning rate 
increment Δ infinitesimally small, or equivalently, to defining the difference regressors as 
the partial derivatives of the modeled timeseries with respect to α2, evaluated at α2 = 0. 
Thus, if the BOLD response is better explained by a timeseries including nonzero 
generalization, the additive general linear model will explain the BOLD signal via the 
weighted sum of both regressors; in particular, a significantly positive effect will be 
estimated for the partial derivative. Voxels that show significant correlations with both 
prediction error and the prediction error difference regressor, or base chosen value and 
the chosen value difference regressor, exhibit activity that is better fit by a generalization 
learning model.  
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In order to test whether neural effects related to reinforcement learning variables 
were better explained by including effects of generalization, we identified activity 
correlated with basic RL variables, then tested for effects of the difference regressors 
(orthogonalized against the original variables to test only for residual activity), in the 
vicinity. To test whether these effects were significant in the same voxels (thus, whether 
activity in a voxel is best described by the weighted sum of both effects) we examined the 
conjunction of two tests, using SPM’s conjunction null (Nichols et al., 2005). Note that 
although the difference regressors were orthogonalized to the underlying prediction error 
variables, the validity of conjunction inference using the minimum t statistic does not 
depend on the conjoined tests being independent (Nichols et al., 2005). 
Finally, we examined functional interactions between the striatum and the hippocampus 
during learning. We focused on a ventral striatum cluster identified in the above GLM as 
having a significant correlation with the prediction error difference regressor (6 mm 
spherical ROI; coordinates: 14, 8, -8). A psycho-physiological interaction (PPI) analysis 
was estimated to test for increases in functional correlation between the ventral striatum 
(the physiological variable) and other brain regions during choice trials (the 
psychological variable). The time course of activation from the ROI was extracted and 
deconvolved. This timecourse was interacted with the choice trial boxcar indicator and 
then convolved with the HRF. The model included the striatal timecourse by trial 
regressor, the trial regressor, and the unmodulated striatal timecourse regressor (Friston et 
al., 1997). We then correlated the resulting beta values with individual difference 
measures of the relative fit of the generalization model to behavior (calculated as the 
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difference between choice likelihoods for the base model vs. the generalization model 
(e.g. Hampton et al., 2008; Simon and Daw, 2011)). 
fMRI model regressors were convolved with the canonical hemodynamic 
response function and entered into a general linear model (GLM) of each subject’s fMRI 
data. The six scan-to-scan motion parameters produced during realignment were included 
as additional regressors in the GLM to account for residual effects of subject movement. 
Linear contrasts of the resulting SPMs were taken to a group-level (random-effects) 
analysis. We report results corrected for familywise error due to multiple comparisons 
using cluster size (Friston et al., 1993); this approach assesses the spatial extent of 
clusters defined by an initial and arbitrary uncorrected threshold, which we take as P < 
0.005 for all analyses. Accordingly, for display purposes, we render all activations at this 
threshold. We conduct this correction either whole brain, or within small volumes for 
which we had an a priori hypothesis. In particular, in the striatum we used a hand-drawn 
mask of the right nucleus accumbens, based on prior studies showing robust prediction 
error and model-based influences in this region (Wittmann et al., 2008; Daw et al., 2011) 
(in both cases most robustly on the right). In the MTL we use an anatomically defined 
mask which included both the hippocampus and parahippocampus, derived from the 
AAL atlas (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002). All voxel locations are reported in Montreal 
Neurological Institute (MNI) coordinates, and results are displayed overlaid on the 







Over the course of the experiment, participants won $7.56 ± 0.10 (mean ± SEM 
across participants). Participants were able on most trials to enter a choice within the time 
constraints (9.6 ± 1.4 missed trials out of 300). On completed trials, response times were 
1.16 s ± 0.02 (grand means ± SEMs across participants). 
As the task provides only binary feedback about the selected option on each trial, 
information about similarities between options can only accumulate over multiple trials 
and switches between options. Because of these properties of the design, knowledge of 
the task structure may not often reach the level of explicit awareness. Participants shifted 
their choice selection an average of 115.10 ± 9.47 times (range 32-211), which provides 
an opportunity for participants to compare values across options. To investigate whether 
participants displayed explicit awareness of the relational structure of the task, after the 
experiment, we presented them with a display of the four options and asked them to 
indicate, by drawing connecting lines, which pairs of options seemed related in any way, 
and also asked them in a written follow-up question to describe any reasons underlying 
their answer.  
Across the group, pairing performance did not differ from chance (33%; mean 
correct 22% ±10; data available for 18 participants), indicating that participants, 
collectively, were not explicitly aware of the manipulation. Individually, our criterion for 
explicit knowledge was both correctly pairing the options and exhibiting some explicit 
knowledge of the reward equivalence structure on the written question, a combination 
achieved by only one participant. (On the written question, that participant stated that “… 
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the pairs seemed to alternate when those 2 faces were ‘lucky.’”) These post-task 
measures suggest that the influence of the reward equivalence structure on choice 
behavior, as discussed below, is not likely due to participants’ explicit detection of the 
relational structure of the task.  
 
Reinforcement learning model of choices 
Next, we used the fit of computational models to examine the trial-by-trial 
dynamics of behavioral adjustment. In particular, such models allow quantifying how the 
choices depend on recent feedback, allowing questions to be asked about the specific 
nature of the updating: in particular, here, whether it reflected generalization between 
partners. 
 First, to examine whether participants adjusted their behavior dynamically to 
previous rewards, we fit a simple regression model measuring the extent to which each 
participant’s choice sequence was predicted by the reward on the previous trial, also 
controlling for the previous choice as an additional explanatory variable, as done 
previously (Gershman et al., 2009; Li and Daw, 2011). Consistent with prior reports, we 
found that across participants, the effect of the previous reward was significant (beta = 
4.12 ± 1.12, t(20) = 3.67, P < 0.005), indicating participants learned choice preferences 
from previous rewards, while the effect of the previous choice was not significant (beta = 
0.06 ± 0.26, t(20) = 0.22, P > 0.5). 
Next, to examine whether this adjustment reflected the underlying hidden reward 
equivalence structure in the gambling task, we tested the fit of more detailed 
reinforcement learning models characterizing trial-by-trial adjustments in values for each 
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option. In particular, we compared models which differed only in whether they 
generalized between partners, allowing us to test whether choice behavior evidenced any 
generalization between equivalent options (S1 & S3 and S2 & S4) (Daw and Shohamy, 
2008). Standard reinforcement learning models would assume that participants’ tendency 
to choose an option is based on a learned value for that option which is updated only 
from experience with outcomes from choices of that option. In contrast, a generalization 
model embodies the idea that outcomes received for one option can influence learning 
about the value of another option. 
To address this question, we considered the fit of two different reinforcement 
learning models. The “base” model consisted of a standard reinforcement learning model 
blind to the relational structure of the task, while the “generalization” model extended the 
base model to allow feedback about the present choice to update the value of the 
unchosen partner option by way of an additional learning rate parameter. The two models 
coincide when this additional parameter takes on the value zero. A similar generalization 
model has been shown to better fit participant choice behavior in a prior study that 
reported the results of a task analogous to the current one (Daw and Shohamy, 2008).  
First, we confirmed that both the base and generalization models each explained 
choices better than chance. This was the case both in the aggregate over participants 
(likelihood ratio tests; c263 = 6,694.20; c284 = 6,833.10; P’s < 1e-16) and also individually 
for all participants for both the base and the generalization model at P < 0.0001. Pseudo-
r2 statistics (a descriptive measure of model fit appropriate for comparing between 




Next, we compared the two models’ fits to one another to determine whether there 
was evidence for generalization. For choice likelihoods aggregated over all participants 
(equivalent to assuming all participants complied with one model or the other, and testing 
which one), the difference in log choice likelihoods (Table 2.1) was 69.4 in favor of the 
generalization model, i.e. the choices were exp(69.4) more likely given the generalization 
model than the base model (Kass and Raftery, 1995). We formally tested whether such an 
improvement was expected due to chance given the extra free parameters with a 
likelihood ratio test; the restriction to the base model was indeed rejected in favor of the 







Base 5386.5 --- 0.68 ± 0.06 4.50 ± 1.09 0.19 ± 0.04 --- 
Generalization 5317.1 
 c221= 138.9 
p<1e-16 
0.69 ± 0.06 4.86 ± 1.11 0.19 ± 0.03 0.09 ± 0.04 
 
Table 2.1. Reinforcement learning model fits. Reinforcement	  learning	  model	  fits.	  For	  comparing	  the	  base	  model	  and	  the	  generalization	  model,	  which	  incorporates	  value	  generalization	  across	  partnered	  options,	  shown	  are	  negative	  log-­‐likelihood	  (-­‐LL),	  aggregate	  likelihood	  ratio	  test	  statistic	  (c2),	  and	  random-­‐effects	  maximum-­‐likelihood	  parameter	  estimates	  (mean	  ±SEM	  across	  participants)	  for	  both	  the	  base	  and	  generalization	  reinforcement	  learning	  models.	  
 
The foregoing analyses aggregated evidence across participants. We next sought 
to address whether there were individual differences and whether the effects might be 
driven by outliers. Examining individuals, likelihood ratio tests also rejected the base 
model for 11 of 21 participants considered individually (at P < 0.05; 12/21 at  P < 0.06). 
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In order to more formally examine evidence for either model at the group level, allowing 
for the possibility that the existence of generalization might vary across participants (i.e. 
taking the identity of the best-fitting model as a random effect), we conducted an 
additional Bayesian analysis of the choice fits, fitting a hierarchical model in which 
participants are assumed to be drawn from either sort and estimating the proportions 
(Stephan et al., 2009). The estimated fraction of generalizers in the population was 0.853 
(compared to 0.147 for non-generalizers); the “exceedance probability”, or posterior 
probability that the generalization model was the more prevalent of the two, was 99.9%. 
 The hypothesis of generalization may also be assessed at the group level by 
treating the learning rate controlling generalization as a random effect analogous to 
population-level effects in fMRI (Holmes and Friston, 1998). Across participants, the 
best fitting estimates were indeed significantly different from zero (t(20) = 2.40, P < 0.05; 
range -0.01 to 0.69, Table 1; note that to render this test meaningful it is important that 
we did not constrain the estimated parameter to be positive).  
 Though significant, the generalization effect was modest in size: on the average 
over participants, generalization learning rates were approximately 13% of the primary 
learning rate. We might expect generalization to be fractional, due to participants’ 
potentially incomplete detection of the relationship. In particular, our model likely 
underestimates the asymptotic degree of generalization, since for simplicity it treats the 
parameter as constant throughout the experiment (see Methods), in effect averaging over 
early parts of the experiment in which the relationship could yet not have been learned. 
Absent a well supported quantitative model of the timecourse of such learning, we 
separately estimated generalization learning rates for the first and second half of the 
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experiment. The estimated generalization learning rates were significantly greater in the 
second half (first half: 0.059 ± 0.025; second half: 0.154 ± 0.046 ,  P < 0.05 one-tailed 
reflecting the directional hypothesis), which suggests that our model is detecting the 
expected increase in generalization knowledge over the course of the experiment.  
Intriguingly, the single participant that displayed clear evidence of being 
explicitly aware of the generalization task structure showed the greatest model likelihood 
benefit for the generalization model and the second-highest fit generalization learning 
rate. Importantly, however, excluding this participant from the group likelihood ratio test, 
Bayesian model selection analysis, and parametric tests did not affect the significance of 
the results. This suggests that while most participants were not explicitly aware of the 
generalization structure, our generalization model clearly detected the single participant 
that did exhibit awareness as an outlier, supporting the validity and sensitivity of our 
approach. 
Together, these results provide evidence that participants utilized the underlying 
relational reward equivalence structure to generalize reward feedback across equivalent 
options and guide their choice behavior. 
 
Imaging results 
Our analyses of the behavioral data established that the generalization 
reinforcement learning model, which embodied the generalization of value across pairs of 
equivalent options, provided a better fit to participants’ choice behavior than a 
reinforcement learning model blind to this relational structure. Thus, we turned to the 
BOLD fMRI data to investigate neural correlates of this generalization knowledge. In 
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particular, we sought activity correlated with reward predictions and prediction errors as 
produced by simulations of the reinforcement learning model under the null assumption 
of no generalization, and then tested whether this activity showed additional evidence of 
generalization knowledge. We particularly sought to test whether BOLD correlates of 
reward prediction error in the ventral striatum were naïve to generalization, as would be 
predicted under the standard model of these responses, and if these signals originate in a 
procedural learning system entirely separate from a putative cortico-hippocampal system 
capable of detecting relations and generalizing from them (Daw, 2011; Daw et al., 2011). 
We focused first on activity correlated with the reward prediction error when the 
outcome is revealed. Since reward prediction errors report the difference between 
received and expected rewards, they may reflect the effects of generalization (if any) on 
the expectations. In particular, if outcomes received for some option also affect the value 
predicted for its partner, they will affect the prediction error reported on subsequent 
choices of the partner option. In contrast, such generalization-driven updating of values 
for an unselected option is not possible in standard stimulus-reward association learning 
models. To distinguish these possibilities, the fMRI model included a parametric 
regressor for the base prediction error, assuming no generalization, and a second 
“difference regressor” (technically, the partial derivative of the error signal with respect 
to the generalization learning rate, or equivalently the difference between the signals 
predicted by models with and without small amounts of generalization), characterizing 
how it would be expected to change if generalization were included (see Methods). In 
particular, the sum of the base prediction error and difference regressors, in any weighted 
combination, corresponds approximately to the prediction error from a model including 
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generalization (Figure 2.1B). Thus, since the general linear model used for fMRI 
analysis is additive, if BOLD responses in a region significantly reflect effects of both 
regressors, then the net activity there is better explained by a prediction error including 
generalization, and the region may support the value generalization effect we observed in 
participants’ behavior. 
The difference regressor for prediction error across participants included a mean 
number of 105.3 ±7.0 positive deflections and 173.4 ±7.4 negative deflections. 
Difference regressor values were often most extreme when participants switched choices, 
as this is when the generalization model makes the most divergent predictions from the 
base model. To illustrate this effect, consider the case where an option (e.g. S1) has been 
rewarded on the last several trials, but the participant switches to choosing the partnered 
option on the next trial (e.g. S3). In the generalization model but not the base model, the 
value for S3 has increased, and this expectation will modulate the prediction error signal. 
Here, this will lead the difference regressor to include a negative deviation: if the choice 
is rewarded, this is less of a positive “surprise” to the generalization model, while if it is 
not rewarded, this omission is more of a negative surprise.  
 Accordingly, we first localized regions where BOLD activity correlated with 
prediction errors derived from the base reinforcement learning model. Reward prediction 
error correlates have been found most prominently in the ventral striatum (Knutson et al., 
2001; Pagnoni et al., 2002; McClure et al., 2003; O'Doherty et al., 2003; Delgado et al., 
2005; Daw et al., 2006; Lohrenz et al., 2007; Schönberg et al., 2007; Hare et al., 2008), a 
region densely innervated by midbrain dopamine neurons (Falck and Hillarp, 1959; 
Knutson and Gibbs, 2007). Replicating these findings, in the current experiment, 
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prediction error at reward outcome correlated with BOLD responses throughout the 
bilateral ventral striatum (Figure 2.2, left; right peak z = 5.57 (14, 4, -14), left peak z = 
5.27 (-22, -4, -16); both clusters were significant whole-brain FWE-corrected for cluster 
size). 
We next examined whether residual activity in this region reflected effects that 
could be explained by generalization of value between options. Indeed, activation in a 
region of the right ventral striatum significantly correlated with the difference regressor 
designed to capture the effects of generalization on prediction error (Figure 2.2, center; z 
= 3.16 (14, 8, -8),  P < 0.001 uncorrected; P < 0.01 SVC for FWE in an a priori right 
nucleus accumbens anatomical ROI). A conjunction analysis (Figure 2.2, right; P < 
0.001 uncorrected;  P < 0.01 SVC) verified that this effect was spatially overlapping with 
the prediction error itself and therefore (see Methods) that the net activity in this region 
was better explained by a prediction from the generalization model. (A similar sub-
threshold cluster was observed in the left ventral striatum.)  
 
Figure 2.2. Ventral striatum BOLD and value generalization.  Ventral	  striatum	  BOLD	  signals	  are	  best	  described	  by	  a	  model	  that	  incorporates	  generalization	  knowledge.	  A,	  Prediction	  error,	  left.	  Prediction	  error	  difference	  due	  to	  value	  generalization,	  middle.	  B,	  Conjunction	  of	  prediction	  error	  and	  prediction	  error	  difference	  due	  to	  generalization	  (P	  <	  0.05,	  SVC;	  all	  	  P	  <	  0.005	  unc.,	  for	  visualization).	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Thus, in contrast to predictions based on simple reinforcement learning models, 
the net BOLD signal in the right ventral striatum, a region often characterized by a 
reward prediction error response, is best explained by a reinforcement learning model 
that incorporates generalization knowledge. This result is consistent with other recent 
indications that the striatal error signal is more sophisticated than previously suspected 
(Daw et al., 2011; Simon and Daw, 2011). 
 Next, we asked whether generalization knowledge was also reflected in 
anticipatory value-related signals during the choice period. Again, we first localized 
regions where activity correlated with the value of the selected option (the “chosen 
value”) during the choice period. Here, following evidence from unit recordings that 
action values in the brain are normalized between options (Platt and Glimcher, 1999; 
Dorris and Glimcher, 2004; Sugrue et al., 2004), and previous fMRI work (Daw et al., 
2006), we define an action’s value by the probability that the model predicts it will be 
chosen, which (Equation 5 in Methods) is a normalized transform of the raw value. Prior 
reinforcement learning studies of learning and decision making have often found 
correlates of chosen value in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Daw et al., 2006; Kim et 
al., 2006; Plassmann et al., 2007; Hare et al., 2008; Boorman et al., 2009; Gershman et 
al., 2009; Palminteri et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2010). Accordingly, at a reduced whole-
brain threshold, we also observed a cluster of activation in the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex correlated with value (z = 2.97 (-6, 58, -18), P < 0.001 unc). The most extensive 
region of correlation, however, was observed bilaterally in the hippocampus (Figure 2.3; 
right peak z = 3.88 (34, -6, -26), left peak z = 3.49 (-16, -22, -20); P < 0.05 cluster-
corrected in a medial temporal lobe mask). Chosen value correlates in the hippocampus 
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have not often been reported in previous studies of reward learning and decision making, 
but this finding is consistent with several more recent reports of value encoding in the 
hippocampus in categorization and passive viewing tasks (Kumaran et al., 2009; 
Lebreton et al., 2009; Dickerson et al., 2011). 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Hippocampal BOLD correlated with value. Hippocampal	  activation	  correlated	  with	  chosen	  value	  during	  the	  choice	  period	  of	  the	  reward	  equivalence	  task.	  (P	  <	  0.05,	  SVC;	  P	  <	  0.005	  unc.,	  for	  visualization.)	  
 
We then asked whether these responses also reflected generalization knowledge. 
An analysis of the value difference regressor did not show any significant correlation in 
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. In the left hippocampus, we observed a cluster 
correlated with difference regressor at an uncorrected whole-brain threshold (P < 0.005), 
but this activation did not survive cluster-correction based on a medial temporal lobe 
mask. The lack of significant evidence for generalization effects in these signals is 




To examine this hypothesis further, we turned to individual differences in 
generalization as expressed behaviorally and tested their relationship to functional 
connectivity between the striatum and hippocampus. To assess connectivity, we 
conducted a psycho-physiological interaction (PPI) analysis using as a seed the region of 
right ventral striatum showing a significant fit to the prediction error difference due to 
generalization. Overall, trial-related activity in the ventral striatum was significantly 
correlated with activity in widespread brain regions, including multiple clusters in the 
hippocampus. We correlated the degree of connectivity from ventral striatum, across 
participants, with the model fit benefit provided by the generalization model to the choice 
behavior (the difference in choice likelihoods between the generalization and null 
models; n = 20, excluding a single outlier whose benefit was > 2 SD from the mean (the 
participant who exhibited high awareness of task structure)). We found that the degree of 
striatal-hippocampal connectivity was significantly predicted by the generalization model 
improvement in fit to choices (z = 4.0 (26, -18, -16); Figure 2.4). Further, the cluster 
showing a connection between connectivity and generalization overlapped with the 
regions of the hippocampus where the BOLD signal exhibited a significant correlation 
with choice value. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that the hippocampus (and 
more specifically, hippocampal-striatal functional connectivity) contributes to choices 











Our data show that choice behavior and feedback-related BOLD signals in the striatum 
are both influenced by the generalization of reward across equivalent options, as revealed 
by a novel reinforcement learning task in which payoff probabilities between pairs of 
options were correlated, providing an opportunity for participants to encode stimulus-
stimulus relations. This structure, wherein individual cues have common outcomes, 
leading to generalization between them, is conceptually similar to the structure of 
acquired equivalence tasks used in research on memory to probe hippocampal 
representations (Myers et al., 2003; Daw and Shohamy, 2008; Shohamy and Wagner, 
2008). However, here the common outcomes are likelihood of reward, rather than (as in 
paired associate learning used in human studies) the identity of the outcome stimulus. 
Nevertheless, we found that the influence of this shared reward probability on both 
choice behavior and striatal BOLD signaling was captured by a reinforcement learning 
model that, whenever feedback was received about an option’s value, also fractionally 
updated the value of its equivalent partner. Notably, such generalization on the basis of 
correlational structure is not predicted by standard reinforcement learning models 
commonly used to describe reward-driven learning and associated neural responses in the 
midbrain dopamine system. 
 The present results suggest that human participants do indeed encode structure 
and generalize across correlated choice options during RL. One ambiguity that remains is 
to what extent our effects are driven by positive correlations between “equivalent” 
options or, instead or additionally, by weaker negative correlations that were also 
included between the two equivalent pairs in our reward schedules. For concreteness (and 
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because the positive correlations were objectively much stronger), our analysis assumed 
positive generalization. However, in our model and overall framework (see Methods) 
generalization driven by correlations could, in principle, also arise due to negative 
generalization between anti-correlated non-partners. Both conceptually and 
mathematically (due to symmetries in the softmax choice equations), positive and 
negative generalization might be expected to have quantitatively quite similar effects on 
choices and BOLD signals. Therefore, disentangling the relative contributions of 
similarity and distinctiveness to generalization awaits further experiments manipulating 
the positive and negative correlations independently. In RL tasks, unambiguous negative 
generalization between options has been observed when their values are strongly anti-
correlated due to a serial reversal contingency (Hampton et al., 2006; Bromberg-Martin et 
al., 2010b). Importantly, the central cognitive and computational issues and our basic 
conclusions about generalization according to structure crosscut this distinction between 
positive and negative generalization.  
 
Hippocampus and value 
On the basis of the analogy between the correlational structure embedded in our task and 
that in acquired equivalence studies (Coutureau et al., 2002; Myers et al., 2003; Shohamy 
and Wagner, 2008), we hypothesized that learning of correlational structure would 
implicate the hippocampus. Our data provide somewhat mixed support for this 
hypothesis. The most direct evidence in favor was our finding that connectivity between 
the striatum and hippocampus predicted the degree to which participants’ choice behavior 
was better described by the generalization model.  
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Also consistent with hippocampal involvement in this task, we found strong and 
widespread covariation of the BOLD signal in bilateral hippocampus with chosen option 
value, derived from the reinforcement learning model. This activation stands out in the 
context of the literature on reinforcement learning tasks similar to ours, particularly since 
similar activity is much more widely reported in ventromedial PFC (Daw et al., 2006; 
Kim et al., 2006; Plassmann et al., 2007; Hare et al., 2008; Boorman et al., 2009; 
Gershman et al., 2009; Palminteri et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2010), where value-related 
activity was relatively modest in the present study.  
An intriguing possibility is that the inclusion of structure in the present task 
recruited systems for valuation at least partly distinct from those exercised by other tasks. 
This hypothesis is consistent with other recent reports of hippocampal activation related 
in some way to stimulus value, which used task designs (active learning, passive 
observation, or model-based reinforcement learning) that might enhance the relevance of 
relational information relative to standard reinforcement learning tasks (Kumaran et al., 
2009; Lebreton et al., 2009; Dickerson et al., 2011; Simon and Daw, 2011). However, 
future studies will be necessary to directly test this hypothesis by specifically comparing 
learning with a relational component vs. without within a single study.   
We were unable to demonstrate the effects of value generalization quantitatively 
in hippocampal correlates of value, even though effects of generalization were visible in 
the striatum. Based on our hypothesis that the hippocampus supports generalization 
between options’ values, this result is puzzling and it may indicate that the hypothesis 
was incorrect. At the same time, this null result should not be over-interpreted; this may 
be due, for instance, to our less refined quantitative characterization of the neural 
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correlates of chosen value in the hippocampus, relative to prediction errors as studied in 
the striatum. In particular, it has been persistently unclear whether neural activity in many 
different parts of the brain correlates with chosen value linearly, or better via some 
nonlinear transform or normalization such as the softmax employed here (Platt and 
Glimcher, 1999; Corrado et al., 2005; Daw and Doya, 2006; Daw et al., 2006). However, 
the form of this relationship is not well specified, and because our analysis seeking neural 
correlates of generalization is based on a linear approximation (a first-order Taylor 
expansion of the modeled signal’s dependence on the learning rate for generalization), it 
is likely particularly sensitive to any misspecification of this sort. (See also Daw et al.’s, 
2011, discussion of value-related BOLD activity in ventromedial PFC vs. striatum for a 
similarly equivocal result from a similar analysis.) 
Because our results give mixed support to the hypothesized role of the 
hippocampus in value generalization, it is worth considering whether our design changes 
some key aspects of acquired equivalence that engage the hippocampus. The chief 
difference from most acquired equivalence studies is that in our task equivalence is 
driven by value (e.g. stimulus-reward equivalences) rather than arbitrary stimulus-
stimulus associations of the sort used in prior human and animal acquired equivalence 
studies (Coutureau et al., 2002; Myers et al., 2003; Shohamy and Wagner, 2008). 
However, acquired equivalence has also been demonstrated via value in rodents (albeit 
without neural manipulations to test hippocampal involvement; Honey and Hall, 1989). 
Moreover, entorhinal lesions have been shown in rodents to affect acquired equivalence 
using a task that counterbalances both stimulus-stimulus and stimulus-reward outcomes 
between partners and non-partners (Coutureau et al., 2002). This suggests that the 
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medial-temporal lobe memory system may be implicated more generally in encoding and 
inferring equivalence, rather than specifically for stimulus-stimulus encoding. 
Finally, although conscious awareness is sometimes viewed as a characteristic of 
hippocampal episodic representations, the finding that most participants in our task did 
not report awareness of the relational structure does not preclude hippocampal 
involvement. Work in both memory and decision making isolates different types of 
representations operationally by the nature of the information coded rather than by self-
report; in this context, there is much evidence of hippocampal involvement in relational 
coding absent conscious awareness (Greene et al., 2006; Shohamy and Wagner, 2008; 
Hannula and Ranganath, 2009). Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that in the current 
study the single participant who showed clear evidence of awareness of the task structure 
also showed the strongest evidence of generalization in trial-by-trial choices. Future 
studies are necessary to more directly probe the role of awareness of structure on 
generalization and on the role of the hippocampus and the striatum in generalization-
guided choices.  
 
Ventral striatum and value generalization 
Although our task elicited relational coding not typically implicated in reinforcement 
learning tasks and may have recruited additional neural circuitry subserving this function, 
we nevertheless also observed the now-standard correlates of reward prediction error in 
the ventral striatum (Knutson et al., 2001; McClure et al., 2003; O'Doherty et al., 2003; 
Delgado et al., 2005; Lohrenz et al., 2007; Hare et al., 2008). However, here the net 
striatal activation was better explained by error signals from the augmented model that 
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learned its predictions about an option’s rewards not just from feedback about that option, 
but also by generalizing from its partner. By design, such a finding goes beyond what can 
be explained by standard reinforcement learning models without such augmentation, and 
demonstrates that the ventral striatum has access to information about correlational 
structure of a sort that goes beyond the simple, stimulus-reward learning normally 
associated with this area. The question of whether striatal value signals reflect such 
generalization was left open by a related study by Hampton et al. (Hampton et al., 2006), 
who investigated generalization in a serial reversal task (which causes two options’ 
values to be negatively correlated, rather than positively, as here). There, value correlates 
in ventromedial PFC were shown to reflect generalization, but the same question was not 
asked about prediction errors in the striatum. (Also, unlike the present study, participants 
in the Hampton task were instructed as to the reversal contingency.)  
The finding of generalization in the striatal error signal also cuts against two-
system accounts of both reinforcement learning and of memory systems, which envision 
that a standard temporal-difference learning system is responsible for limited, “habitual” 
behaviors, whereas more sophisticated decision-making phenomena drawing on cognitive 
maps or action-outcome associations (in memory terms, relational representations) are 
segregated in a parallel, competing network for “model-based” reinforcement learning 
(Doya, 1999; Daw et al., 2005; Balleine et al., 2008; Rangel et al., 2008; Redish et al., 
2008). Contrary to our results, such an architecture predicts that signals originating within 
the putative temporal-difference system (notably, the ventral striatal prediction error) will 
be naïve to relational information even when behavior, under the control of the more 
sophisticated system, reflects it.  
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Two other recent results attempting to interrogate the model-free vs. model-based 
distinction more explicitly also found evidence for model-based effects on striatal 
prediction error signals (Daw et al., 2011; Simon and Daw, 2011). Altogether, these 
results suggest that the systems are more interacting than separate, an idea even more 
directly supported by the present study’s results regarding functional connectivity 
between striatum and hippocampus. That said, another possibility regarding the present 
dataset is that generalization effects do not arise from a full model-based planning 
system, but rather, from standard temporal-difference learning operating over an input 
representation that reflects the relationship between the options (i.e., which maps options 
to values but with equivalent options coded in an overlapping fashion; Gluck and Myers, 
1993; Moustafa et al., 2009). Such an interpretation is also consistent with recent 
evidence from a two-phase acquired equivalence task that suggested that generalization 
effects arose already during the initial learning phase rather than via inference about 
equivalent relationships conducted during the probe phase (Shohamy and Wagner, 2008) 
(as would be expected from a model-based reinforcement learning system). 
Although some results suggest that prediction errors in striatal BOLD may in part 
reflect dopaminergic inputs there (Pessiglione et al., 2006; Knutson and Gibbs, 2007; 
Schott et al., 2008; Schönberg et al., 2010), it is not possible to isolate the underlying 
neural cause for our effect, or in particular to conclude whether prediction errors carried 
by dopamine neurons also similarly reflect generalization. A related point is that the net 
BOLD signal in an area likely superimposes multiple underlying neural causes – 
including local processing and activity from different inputs. Thus, although our analysis 
uses the conjunction of multiple additive effects to assess what sort of prediction error 
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signal best explains the net BOLD response, it is not possible to exclude the possibility 
that these effects have different neural sources, and in particular that the generalization-
related activity originates from a different source than the prediction error. All these 
questions could best be answered using unit recordings. However, in this respect it is 
interesting that our results are strongly reminiscent of a recent neurophysiological study 
in nonhuman primates, which showed that dopamine neurons also reflect values learned 
by generalization between two (negatively correlated) options in a serial reversal task 
(Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010b).  
All these results (but not the idea of strictly segregated learning systems) are 
broadly consistent with strong anatomical connections between the hippocampus and the 
mesolimbic dopamine system. Intriguingly, in the present dataset, we find that functional 
connectivity between these regions, the ventral striatum and hippocampus, is predicted by 
the degree that participant’s choices were fit by the generalization model. Anatomically, 
the ventral striatum may gain access to relational representations via direct projections 
there from the hippocampus and medial temporal lobe (Kelley and Domesick, 1982; 
Cohen et al., 2009). Conversely, value information in the hippocampus may arrive via 
significant projections from midbrain dopaminergic neurons of the ventral tegmental area 
(Dahlström and Fuxe, 1964; Swanson, 1982; Frey et al., 1990; Gasbarri et al., 1994b; 
Huang and Kandel, 1995; Otmakhova and Lisman, 1996). These latter connections have 
broader implications for how hippocampal memories are influenced by reward, 
motivation and predictions (e.g. Adcock et al., 2006; Shohamy and Wagner, 2008; Kuhl 




Limitations and future directions 
One limitation of the present study is that, although our findings demonstrate that 
participants used the equivalence between the options to guide choices and that this effect 
increases in the second half of the experiment, our reinforcement learning model does not 
explicitly characterize the learning of the equivalence. In order to focus on the question 
of whether participants’ value learning reflected the equivalence structure, we took the 
degree of such learning and the underlying equivalence structure over which it operated 
as fixed throughout the task. For the questions of the present study, the main consequence 
of this approach is likely to underestimate the asymptotic size of the generalization effect, 
but it leaves open the question of how learning of the equivalence structure occurred. 
Accounts of such learning are reasonably well understood (at least in the abstract, it can 
be accomplished by Bayesian model comparison; Griffiths and Tenenbaum, 2005; 
Courville et al., 2006; Kemp and Tenenbaum, 2008); however, the present experimental 
design is not well suited to testing them. In particular, since the actual equivalence 
structure was fixed throughout the task, the learning of it occurred alongside many other 
potentially confounding changes (e.g. representational, strategic, or habituation) that may 
occur simply with time on task; a more targeted design would incorporate dynamic 
equivalencies so as to test different dynamic accounts of how participants follow them.  
In general, our results highlight the promise of integrated investigations of 
memory and decision making. While often studied separately, it is clear that memory, if 
is it to be behaviorally beneficial, exists to guide decisions (Buckner, 2010; Shohamy and 
Adcock, 2010). A growing number of studies already focus on the cognitive and neural 
underpinnings of the use of different types of information in decision making (Johnson et 
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al., 2007; Daw and Shohamy, 2008; Shohamy and Adcock, 2010; van der Meer et al., 
2010). Future studies may further probe how and when these different types of memory 
are reassembled into behavior by studying more complex decision processes and 
environments in conjunction with computational models (e.g. Daw et al., 2005). In this 
respect, our data point to the ability of the striatum to utilize information characteristic of 
relational memory systems, thus suggesting at least one underexplored way in which past 






















Chapter 3: Preference by Association: A Neural Mechanism for How 











Chapter	  3	  is	  from	  an	  in	  press	  paper	  (Science):	  Wimmer,	  G.E.,	  and	  Shohamy,	  D.	  Preference	  by	  
association:	  A	  neural	  mechanism	  for	  how	  memory	  biases	  decisions.	  	  
Because	  of	  journal	  requirements,	  formatting	  for	  this	  chapter	  is	  includes	  the	  
introduction,	  results,	  and	  discussion	  all	  as	  part	  of	  the	  main	  text.	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In Chapter 2, I demonstrated that higher-order relational structure in a reward learning 
game impacts choice behavior and striatal prediction error signaling. Building on these 
findings, in Chapter 3 I explore the impact of relational associations on decision making 




Every day people make new choices between alternatives that they have never 
directly experienced. Yet, such decisions are often made rapidly and confidently. Here 
we show that the hippocampus, traditionally known for its role in building long-term 
declarative memories, enables the spread of value across memories, thereby guiding 
decisions between new choice options. Using functional brain imaging in humans, we 
discovered that giving people monetary rewards led to activation of a pre-established 
network of memories, spreading the positive value of reward to non-rewarded items 
stored in memory. Later, people were biased to choose these non-rewarded items. This 
decision bias was predicted by activity in the hippocampus, by reactivation of associated 
memories, and by connectivity between memory and reward regions in the brain. These 
findings explain how choices among new alternatives emerge automatically from the 
associative mechanisms by which the brain builds memories. Further, our findings 





Decisions are sometimes guided by direct past experience: If a choice led to a 
good outcome in the past, people are likely to make that same choice again. This process 
is known to depend on reward learning mechanisms in the striatum (Schultz, 2006; 
Rangel et al., 2008). But frequently in life we have to decide between options we have 
never considered before. It has been suggested that such decisions could be guided by 
associative memory (Brogden, 1939; Tolman, 1948; Eichenbaum, 2000); however, 
surprisingly little is known about how this happens.  
We investigated the mechanism by which neural circuits for memory modulate 
value and guide decisions about new choice options. Our central hypothesis was that the 
hippocampus enables the positive value of reward to spread across associated memories, 
thereby increasing the value of items that were never rewarded. Specifically, we 
hypothesized that receiving reward can lead to two simultaneous and interactive 
processes: the direct learning of stimulus-reward associations in the striatum, and the 
spread of reward to associated items stored in memory via the hippocampus. 
This hypothesis is grounded in two essential features of how the hippocampus builds 
memories. First, the hippocampus encodes relationships between items and events that 
appear together, forming an associative link between them (Eichenbaum and Cohen, 
2001; Hannula and Ranganath, 2009; Staresina and Davachi, 2009). Second, because of 
this associative link, when a person later encounters one item, the hippocampus can 
complete the pattern and automatically reactivate the neural representation of the other 
item (Polyn et al., 2005; Foster and Wilson, 2006; Kuhl et al., 2010; Kuhl et al., 2011), 
allowing the integration of old memories with new ones.  
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We reasoned that these features of memory formation in the hippocampus could 
provide a mechanism by which reward experiences can systematically change the value 
of items that were never rewarded – they gain a positive value merely by association. If 
so, then this mechanism predicts that later, when confronted with a decision, people will 
be biased to choose items that were never rewarded in the past (Brogden, 1939; Kimmel, 
1977; Walther, 2002; Wimmer and Shohamy, 2011). By emphasizing the associative 
nature of processes in the hippocampus, regardless of awareness (Eichenbaum and 
Cohen, 2001; Hannula and Ranganath, 2009; Turk-Browne et al., 2009; Schapiro et al., 
2012), this mechanism further predicts that the hippocampus might bias value even when 














Figure 3.1. Decision bias task. The	  task	  consists	  of	  three	  phases:	  Association	  learning,	  Reward	  learning,	  and	  Decision	  making.	  A,	  In	  the	  Association	  phase,	  participants	  were	  exposed	  to	  a	  series	  of	  pairs	  of	  pictures	  (S1	  and	  S2	  stimuli),	  while	  performing	  a	  cover	  task	  to	  detect	  “target”	  upside-­‐down	  pictures.	  S1	  stimuli	  were	  either	  face,	  scene,	  or	  body	  part	  pictures.	  S2	  stimuli	  were	  circle	  images.	  B,	  In	  the	  Reward	  phase	  participants	  learned	  through	  classical	  conditioning	  that	  half	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of	  the	  S2	  stimuli	  were	  followed	  by	  a	  monetary	  reward	  (S2+),	  while	  the	  other	  S2	  stimuli	  were	  followed	  by	  a	  neutral	  outcome	  (no	  reward,	  S2-­‐).	  S1	  stimuli	  never	  appeared	  in	  this	  stage.	  C,	  In	  the	  Decision	  phase,	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  decide	  between	  two	  stimuli	  (both	  S1	  or	  both	  S2)	  for	  a	  possible	  monetary	  win;	  no	  feedback	  was	  provided	  and	  all	  gains	  were	  awarded	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  experiment.	  Decision	  bias	  was	  operationalized	  as	  the	  tendency	  to	  choose	  S1+	  over	  S1-­‐	  stimuli	  in	  this	  phase.	  
 
To test our prediction that reward will spread across associated memories, we 
used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to measure brain responses during a 
learning and decision task designed to test how associative memory biases decisions 
between new choice options (Wimmer and Shohamy, 2011) (Figure 3.1). First, we had 
participants (n = 28) build new associative memories by exposing them to regularities 
between pairs of neutral stimuli (denoted here as S1 and S2). These regularities were 
encoded incidentally while participants performed a cover task (Figure 3.1A).  
Next, we associated value with some items using a classical conditioning 
paradigm in which half of the S2 stimuli (S2+) were now followed by a monetary reward 
(Figure 3.1B). This procedure is known to enhance the value of the directly rewarded 
items via well-described reward learning mechanisms in the striatum (Rangel et al., 
2008). Critically, we hypothesized that at the same time, associative memory processes in 
the hippocampus would activate the specific S1 items associated with the rewarded S2 
items, resulting in a transfer of the reward to the S1 items as well, through hippocampal-
striatal connectivity (Shohamy and Adcock, 2010; Pennartz et al., 2011). This would 
increase the value of S1 items that were linked to the rewarded S2 items (S1+), creating a 
bias towards choosing these items in the future – despite the fact that these items were 
never rewarded and were not even seen during reward learning.  
73 
 
To measure the effect of associative memory on value, in the final phase 
participants made a series of decisions in which they had to choose between two S1 items, 
selecting the ‘luckier’ one for potential winnings, awarded at the end of the experiment 
(Figure 3.1C, top). Absent any spread of reward, participants should be equally likely to 
choose any of these non-rewarded items and brain activity during the prior Reward phase 
should be unrelated to these decisions. However, if reward spreads and biases decisions, 
then participants should be biased towards choosing those non-rewarded S1 items that 
were previously associated with the S2 rewarded items. Thus, we operationalized 
“decision bias” as the tendency to chose S1+ items over S1- items, and we hypothesized 
that decision bias should be related to neural processes in the hippocampus during reward 
learning. 
To test this hypothesis, we focused our analyses on brain activity during the 
Reward phase and asked whether activity during this phase was related to later biases in 
decisions. We made three specific predictions about the neural mechanisms giving rise to 
the spread of value to new choice options: (1) If associative memory processes underlie 
shifts in value, then biased decisions should be predicted by the magnitude of activation 
in the hippocampus during reward learning; (2) If reactivation of associations is the 
mechanism by which value spreads, then during reward learning there should be evidence 
of neural reactivation in visual areas that represent the original S1 items; (3) If decision 
bias stems from interactions between associative memory processes in the hippocampus 
and reward learning processes in the striatum, then bias should be related to functional 
connectivity between these two regions.  
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Behaviorally, participants tended to choose the S2+ over the S2- items in the 
Decision phase, indicating successful reward learning. Interestingly, decision bias in 
favor of S1+ items varied markedly both within and across individuals: Most participants 
displayed a bias in favor of S1+ items, but some did not (Figure 3.2A). Within 
individuals, this measure of bias was strong for some associations, but weaker for others. 
This variability in behavior allowed us to ask: What are the neural mechanisms that 
support decision bias? 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Decision bias behavior and bias-predicting hippocampal activity. Decision	  bias	  varies	  within	  and	  across	  participants	  and	  is	  related	  to	  activation	  in	  the	  hippocampus	  during	  the	  Reward	  phase.	  A,	  Decision	  phase	  preferences	  for	  S2+	  stimuli	  (grey)	  and	  S1+	  stimuli	  (average,	  blue;	  within-­‐participant	  mean,	  black;	  error	  bars	  represent	  ±	  SEM).	  




To test our first prediction that decision bias is related to hippocampal activity, we 
used a general linear model to compare blood oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) activity 
during the Reward phase between items that led to later behavioral decision bias vs. those 
that did not, within individuals (i.e. S1+ > S1-) (Figure 3.2B). Activation in the posterior 
hippocampus during reward learning was greater for items that led to more decision bias 
(Figure 3.2C). A similar pattern was found across individuals: Activation in the 
hippocampus correlated with the proportion of biases in subsequent decisions (30, -6, -
20; P < 0.05 SVC). As would be expected if decision bias is driven by the spread of value 
through associative memory processes, neural predictors of bias were selective to the 
Reward phase. Parallel analyses of BOLD activity during the Association and Decision 
phases found no areas of the brain within or across participants where activation 
correlated with decision bias. 
To investigate whether hippocampal activity was related to explicit memory for 
the S1-S2 associations, after scanning we tested participants’ ability to correctly pair S1 
and S2 items and asked about their choice strategy and awareness of task structure . 
Reflecting the automatic nature of the underlying associative memory processes (Turk-
Browne et al., 2009; Wimmer and Shohamy, 2011), we found no evidence for explicit 
memory of the associations. Moreover, there was no relationship between measures of 
explicit S1-S2 memory and either decision bias or hippocampal activity (Figure 3.S3) . 
While it is difficult to conclusively determine implicitness of cue pairings (De Houwer 
and Moors, 2007), these findings suggest that the role of the hippocampus in decision 





Figure 3.3. Visual reactivation predicts bias. Reactivation	  of	  category-­‐specific	  visual	  areas	  during	  the	  Reward	  phase	  predicts	  subsequent	  decision	  bias.	  A,	  Example	  participant	  region	  of	  interest	  masks	  (derived	  from	  the	  Association	  phase)	  for	  body,	  face,	  and	  scene	  S1	  stimuli.	  Masks	  were	  applied	  to	  S2	  presentations	  during	  the	  Reward	  phase.	  B,	  S2	  presentation	  elicits	  activation	  in	  visual	  regions	  responsive	  to	  associated	  S1	  stimuli	  when	  participants	  later	  exhibit	  decision	  bias	  (t(22)	  =	  2.29,	  P	  <	  0.05).	  	  
 
To test our second prediction that decision bias is supported by reactivation of 
associations, we exploited the fact that the different categories of S1 stimuli (faces, 
scenes, and body parts) elicit activation in distinct areas of visual cortex (Reddy and 
Kanwisher, 2006). In our design, these category-specific S1 items were associated with S2 
items in the Association phase; in the Reward phase, however, only S2 stimuli were 
presented. Thus, during reward learning, any selective activation in these visual cortical 
areas likely reflects associative reactivation, in memory, of these items. This allowed us 
to test whether biases in decisions, as measured behaviorally, were predicted by 
differential activation in category-specific areas during the Reward phase.  
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We analyzed associative reactivation during the Reward phase using participant’s 
responses to S1 visual stimuli during the Association phase to define activation masks 
(Figure 3.3A) . These participant-specific masks were then applied to Reward phase 
responses evoked by S2 stimuli, relative to the alternative categories, resulting in a 
measure of reactivation for each participant for each association. We compared 
reactivation for associations that led to high vs. low decision bias. This analysis revealed 
that reactivation in visual regions during reward learning predicted later biases in 
decisions (Figure 3.3), such that across all categories there was greater neural 
reactivation for high- vs. low-bias decisions. 
Reflecting the continual updating of memory representations, reactivation was 
significant in the first half of the Reward phase; it was present but weaker over the full 
Reward phase, as additional learning about the S2 items took place. Importantly, 
reactivation was selective to the associated category-specific regions and was not general 




Figure 3.4. Hippocampus-caudate connectivity predicts bias. Decision	  bias	  was	  related	  to	  functional	  connectivity	  between	  the	  hippocampus	  and	  the	  striatum	  during	  the	  Reward	  phase.	  A	  PPI	  analysis	  revealed	  correlated	  activity	  between	  the	  hippocampus	  and	  the	  striatum	  during	  trials	  that	  led	  to	  high	  vs.	  low	  decision	  bias.	  The	  same	  region	  in	  the	  striatum	  was	  also	  found	  to	  correlate	  with	  reward	  learning.	  This	  indicates	  that	  the	  hippocampus	  and	  striatum	  may	  form	  a	  functional	  circuit	  to	  support	  shifts	  in	  value.	  
 
Finally, we tested our third prediction that decision bias is related to functional 
interactions between the hippocampus and the striatum during the Reward phase. 
Specifically, we reasoned that an interaction between associative reactivation of S1 
stimuli via the hippocampus with reward learning in the striatum could provide a link 
between S1 stimuli and reward.  
We investigated functional connectivity during the Reward phase by conducting a 
psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis using right hippocampus as a seed and 
decision bias (high vs. low) as the behavioral (psychological) modulator. We found a 
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functional relationship between the hippocampus and the striatum which was 
significantly greater for high-bias stimuli (z = 3.23 (6, 6, 12); P < 0.05 SVC; Figure 3.4) . 
We then investigated whether the correlation between the hippocampus and 
striatum for high-bias decisions is mediated by reactivation in visual cortical regions. To 
test this, we extracted trial-by-trial measures of evoked responses to high-bias stimuli and 
performed a formal mediation analysis on the path between the hippocampus and the 
striatum via the potential visual cortex mediator . Consistent with the PPI result, we 
found that high decision bias was related to correlated BOLD activity in the hippocampus 
and striatum (0.214 ± 0.054, P < 0.001). Additionally, we found a trend for a mediating 
effect of visual reactivation on this relationship (0.010 ± 0.006, P < 0.08) . 
To test for the specificity of these connectivity results, we conducted a series of 
control analyses . In a PPI analysis of the Association phase, we found no areas with 
differential connectivity that related to decision bias, and in the Reward phase, we found 
no significant activation outside of the striatum. Furthermore, in the mediation analysis, a 
control region activated by Reward phase trials (in the temporal-parietal junction) did not 
show any connectivity with regions of interest for high decision bias stimuli . Together, 
these results indicate that decision bias depends not only on hippocampal activation 
during reward learning, but additionally on functional connectivity between the 
hippocampus and the striatum, putatively mediated by reactivation in visual cortical 
regions. 
These results indicate that reward can spread to bias the value of options that were 
themselves never directly rewarded (Walther, 2002; Wimmer and Shohamy, 2011). This 
provides insight into how people are biased by past experience to make new decisions 
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between options that were never previously rewarded: Networks of associations in 
memory, formed across many different experiences, can result in the spread of value 
across associations.  
The idea that memory and decision making are intertwined has deep roots in 
behavioral theories of both memory (Tolman, 1948; Eichenbaum and Cohen, 2001; 
Shohamy and Adcock, 2010) and decision making (Gilovich et al., 2002; Weber et al., 
2007; Morewedge and Kahneman, 2010; Kahneman, 2011). Yet, there has been 
remarkably little evidence for an underlying mechanism. Understanding the mechanism 
by which value spreads among related memories in the brain may help explain why 
people sometimes develop seemingly ungrounded preferences for, or against, particular 
things, places, or people. Although we highlight how transfer of past experience can 
guide behavior in a changing environment, this same mechanism may also lead to 
seemingly “irrational” choices, consistent with social and cognitive theories regarding the 
role of associative memory in decision making heuristics (Gilovich et al., 2002; 
Kahneman, 2003; Weber et al., 2007; Morewedge and Kahneman, 2010; Kahneman, 
2011). 
The finding that the hippocampus supports the spread of value provides several 
new insights into the neural bases of both memory and decision making. First, our 
findings extend the role of the hippocampus beyond memory per se, demonstrating that 
the hippocampus contributes directly to value assignment and to decision making. 
Second, although in humans the hippocampus is traditionally associated with 
explicit declarative memory (Eichenbaum and Cohen, 2001), our results indicate that 
transfer of value by the hippocampus is not driven by conscious awareness. Thus, our 
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results suggest that the hippocampus contributes to automatic assessment of value, 
perhaps performing a function similar to Bayesian inference about value (Tenenbaum et 
al., 2011). 
Finally, while it is known that memory can support decisions by retrieving 
relevant information at the time of decisions (Preston et al., 2004; Johnson and Redish, 
2007), our results demonstrate an alternative mechanism whereby the hippocampus 
dynamically modulates value representations during learning itself (Gluck and Myers, 
1993; Eichenbaum, 2000; Shohamy and Wagner, 2008). This mechanism allows value to 
spread and bias decisions without effortful retrieval at the time of decision.   
Understanding how associative memory biases decisions provides insight into 
critical open questions in decision making research. While reward learning models have 
been successfully applied to many aspects of behavior, these models cannot account for 
the full diversity of animal and human decision making (Daw et al., 2005; Hyman et al., 
2006; Rangel et al., 2008). The uncovering of a neural mechanism by which associative 
memory biases decision making sheds light on how value generalizes across experience, 









Materials and Methods 
Participants 
Thirty-one fluent English speakers with normal or corrected-to-normal vision 
participated in the study. All subjects were free of neurological or psychiatric disorders 
and consented to participate. Informed consent was obtained in a manner approved by the 
Columbia University Institutional Review Board. Three subjects’ data were excluded 
because they did not show evidence of simple reward learning for the S2 stimuli, as 
measured in the post-learning Decision phase (less than 75% preference for all three 
reward-associated S2 stimuli). Behavioral and functional imaging data are presented from 
the remaining twenty-eight subjects (17 female; mean age, 23 years; range, 18-32). 
Subjects were paid $20 per hour for the approximately 2-hour duration of participation, 
plus one-fifth of the nominal rewards they earned in the experiment. 
 
Procedure 
The task was a newly developed variant of a “sensory preconditioning” paradigm 
(Brogden, 1939, 1947; Kimmel, 1977; Port et al., 1987). fMRI data were collected during 
three phases: Association, Reward, and Decision making (Figure 3.1). Additional 
behavioral data were collected before and after the task, as detailed below.  
 
Pre-task stimulus ratings 
Stimuli for each subject were selected based on a pre-task liking rating section. 
The stimulus selection procedure used subject’s liking ratings to select neutral stimuli 
that were closely matched in liking across categories to ensure that subjects did not have 
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strong pre-existing preferences for selected stimuli. Subjects rated 20 stimuli in each of 
the three picture categories (faces, scenes, and body parts) and 20 patterned circle stimuli 
using a scale anchored with “strong dislike” and “strong like”. Ratings data were 
collected during the high-resolution anatomical scan using an MRI-compatible trackball 
response unit; a subset of four subjects instead completed ratings on a laptop computer 
before entering the scanner. The selection algorithm picked two S1 pictures from each of 
the face, scene, and body part categories and six S2 circle stimuli for use in the six S1-S2 
stimulus pairs in the experiment. (See supplementary text for descriptive statistics of pre-
experiment stimulus ratings.) 
 
Association phase 
In the Association phase, subjects were incidentally exposed to sequences of pairs 
of stimuli (Figure 3.1A). On each trial, a picture (S1; face, scene or body part) preceded a 
patterned circle (S2). S1 and S2 stimuli were organized in pairs, with a particular S1 
stimulus always preceding a particular S2 stimulus. Subjects were not informed of these 
pair relationships or the trial structure. To distract subjects from deliberately encoding the 
associations, they were given a cover task that instructed them to respond to occasional 
inverted target face, scene, or body pictures. (Targets were followed by a circle stimulus; 
neither the target picture nor circle were part of the critical stimulus pairs.) Subjects 
responded to target stimuli with a button press and to the S1 and S2 stimuli with an 
alternate button press. Each pair was presented 10 times in a pseudo-random order, 
intermixed with 18 target trials. To improve the implicit pairing of the stimuli, the inter-
trial interval (ITI) was twice as long as the inter-stimulus interval (ISI) (4 s vs. 2 s; 
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Figure 3.S2) (following Walther, 2002; Wimmer and Shohamy, 2011). FMRI data were 
collected in two blocks of approximately 6 min duration. 
 
Reward phase 
In the Reward phase, subjects underwent a Pavlovian conditioning procedure in 
which S2 stimuli were predictive of either reward or neutral outcomes (Figure 3.1B). 
Only S2 stimuli were used as conditioned stimuli; no S1 stimuli appeared during this 
phase. Three S2 circle stimuli were paired with a reward (S2+) and the remaining three 
were paired with a neutral outcome (S2-). One S2 stimulus previously associated with 
each category of S1 (face, scene, and body part pictures) was paired with reward and one 
with neutral feedback, giving an S2+ and S2- stimulus for each category. Each S2 stimulus 
was presented on 16 reward learning trials in a pseudo-random order. For S2+ stimuli, the 
reward outcome appeared with a probability of 81% (13/16 trials); for S2- stimuli, the 
neutral outcome appeared on all trials.  
To maintain continuity between phases, subject instructions were similar to those 
in the preceding Association phase. Subjects were instructed to respond to a target reward 
stimulus (a picture of a one-dollar bill) with a button press and the other stimuli (S2 
stimuli and the neutral grey square stimulus) with an alternate button press. Subjects were 
instructed that when they correctly responded to the reward stimulus, the reward would 
be added to their earnings of which they would receive a percentage at the end of the 
study. Subjects were also informed that they might notice predictive associations between 
particular circle stimuli and reward or neutral outcomes.  
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A Reward phase trial consisted of the presentation of an S2 stimulus, a fixation 
ISI, a reward or neutral outcome, and a variable ITI fixation of mean 2 s (range: 0.5-10.5 
s). The duration and distribution of null events was optimized for estimation of rapid 
event-related fMRI responses as calculated using Optseq software 
(http://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/optseq/). FMRI data were collected in two blocks of 
approximately 6.5 min duration. 
  
Decision phase 
In the Decision phase, we assessed subject’s preferences for the S2 and S1 stimuli. 
To assess reward learning, choices between S2 stimuli included a reward-associated S2+ 
circle and a neutral-associated S2- circle. To assess decision bias, choices were between 
S1+ and S1- stimuli, i.e., between an S1 stimulus from an Association phase S1-S2 pair 
where the incidentally associated S2 was later rewarded (S1+) and an S1 where the 
associated S2 was not rewarded (S1-) (Figure 3.1C). Choices between S1 stimuli were 
always within-category (e.g. between two face pictures). Subjects were instructed to 
choose the option that they thought was more likely to lead to winning $1. Subjects were 
informed that the outcome of their choice would not be presented immediately and that 
they would receive a percentage of their earnings at the end of the experiment.  
On each trial, two stimuli were presented (randomly permuted on the left and 
right side). Subjects selected the left or right picture with a corresponding left or right 
button response during a 2.5 s response period. From the time the subject made a 
selection until the end of the choice presentation period, the selected option was framed 
in blue, followed by a jittered ITI with a mean of 2 s (range: 0.5-10.5 s). If no choice was 
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recorded during the choice period, the options remained on the screen until the end of the 
trial. Each critical choice between reward- and neutral-associated stimuli was presented 
four times, in pseudo-random order, yielding 24 trials. FMRI data were collected in one 
block of approximately 5 min duration. 
  
Post-task stimulus ratings 
After the completion of the Decision making phase and while still in the scanner, 
subjects were given a liking rating test similar to the ratings at start of the experiment, in 
order to test whether there were any changes in liking ratings. Subjects were presented 
with each of the S1 and S2 stimuli from the experiment and were instructed to indicate of 
how much they liked each stimulus.  
 
Explicit memory test 
Outside of the scanner, subjects completed a questionnaire on a laptop computer 
that probed memory for the S1-S2 pair relationships from the initial Association phase of 
the experiment. A single S1 face, scene, or body picture was shown above two S2 circle 
stimulus options: one that had been incidentally paired with the presented S1 stimulus in 
the initial Association phase of the experiment and a lure that had been paired with a 
different S1 stimulus. Subjects were instructed to select the circle (S2) that seemed 
“related to” the picture (S1).  
Next, subjects completed a computerized questionnaire that instructed them to 
rate the likelihood that the S2 and S1 stimuli would be associated with winning money. 
Subjects then answered a series of written questions that assessed both memory for and 
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awareness of patterns of presentation during the Association phase and Reward phase, 
and choice strategies for the Decision making phase (see supplementary text). Finally, 
subjects were paid for their participation and given one-fifth of their winnings from the 
Reward and Decision making phases of the experiment.  
 
Stimuli 
All phases of the task were presented using the Matlab (Natick, Massachusetts) 
and the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997). Stimuli were projected onto a mirror 
above the subject’s eyes in the MRI system. The face stimuli were selected from the 
Stanford Face Database and the CVL Face database (Peter Peer, http://www.lrv.fri.uni-
lj.si/facedb.html). Scene stimuli were selected from an internal database. Body part 
stimuli were selected via a search of publicly available images on the internet. 
 
Imaging procedure 
Whole-brain imaging was conducted on a 3.0T Phillips MRI system at Columbia 
University’s Program for Imaging and Cognitive Sciences, using a SENSE head coil. 
Head padding was used to minimize head motion; no subject’s motion exceeded 2 mm in 
any direction from one volume acquisition to the next. Structural images were collected 
using a high-resolution T1-weighted MPRAGE pulse sequence (1 X 1 X 1 mm voxel 
size). Functional images were collected using a gradient echo T2*-weighted echoplanar 
(EPI) sequence with blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) contrast (TR = 2000 
ms, TE = 20 ms, flip angle = 72, 2 X 2 X 3 mm voxel size; 38 contiguous axial slices). 
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For each functional scanning run, five discarded volumes were collected prior to the first 
trial to allow for magnetic field equilibration.  
 
Behavioral analysis 
We analyzed subjects’ responses during the Decision phase of the task and during 
the post-task tests (stimulus liking and explicit memory). We used subjects’ tendency to 
choose S2+ over S2- stimuli as a measure of how well they learned the association 
between the S2 stimuli and reward or neutral feedback in the Reward phase. Decision bias 
was estimated by measuring subjects’ tendency to choose S1+ over S1- stimuli. A single 
preference score for each of the three reward-associated S2+ and the three associated S1+ 
stimuli was derived by averaging subject’s responses over the four presentations of each 
choice. Since any spreading of value to S1+ stimuli could be limited by the individual 
subject’s maximal preference for the S2+ stimuli, we also calculated a relative score of 
decision bias on a per-subject basis. This was computed by dividing S1+ choices by each 
subject’s average preference for the S2+ stimuli; if S1 decision bias was greater than S2 
stimulus preference, the relative decision bias was set to 100%.  
 
Imaging analysis 
Preprocessing and data analysis was performed using AFNI (Cox, 1996) and 
Statistical Parametric Mapping software (SPM8; Wellcome Department of Imaging 
Neuroscience, Institute of Neurology, London, UK). Functional images were coregistered 
manually using AFNI. In SPM, images were realigned to correct for subject motion and 
then spatially normalized by estimating a warping to template space from each subject’s 
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anatomical image and applying the resulting transformation to the EPIs. Images were 
resampled to 2 mm cubic voxels, smoothed with an 8 mm FWHM Gaussian kernel, and 
filtered with a 128 s high-pass filter. SPM was used to estimate general linear models 
(GLMs) and psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analyses. Reactivation and mediation 
functional connectivity analyses were completed using AFNI and custom routines in 
Matlab. 
For analysis of all phases of the experiment, fMRI model regressors were 
convolved with the canonical hemodynamic response function and entered into a general 
linear model (GLM) of each subject’s fMRI data. The six scan-to-scan motion parameters 
produced during realignment were included as additional regressors in the GLM to 
account for residual effects of subject movement. Linear contrasts of the resulting SPMs 
were taken to a group-level (random-effects) analysis. We report results corrected for 
family-wise error (FWE) due to multiple comparisons (Friston et al., 1993); this approach 
assesses the strength of activations defined by an initial and arbitrary uncorrected 
threshold, which we take as P < 0.005 for all analyses. Accordingly, for display purposes, 
we render all SVC significant activations at this threshold. We conduct this correction at 
the peak-level within small volumes for which we had an a priori hypothesis or at the 
whole-brain cluster level. For regions of interest in the striatum and in the MTL 
(including both the hippocampus and parahippocampal cortex) we used anatomically 
defined masks derived from the AAL atlas (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002). Additionally, 
for the anterior hippocampus, a 6 mm diameter spherical region of interest was drawn at 
the coordinates reported previously in a different temporal association learning paradigm 
(28, -10, -22) (Staresina and Davachi, 2009). All voxel locations are reported in Montreal 
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Neurological Institute (MNI) coordinates; results are displayed overlaid on the average of 
all subjects’ normalized high-resolution structural images.  
 
Decision bias-related activation 
Our initial fMRI analysis focused on detecting activation directly related to 
decision bias during the Reward phase. The experimental design involved three different 
pairs of stimuli. Subjects often showed variability in decision bias across the face, scene, 
and body S1 stimulus categories (Figure 3.2B and supplementary text). This variability 
allowed us to contrast the BOLD signal (hereafter referred to as “activation”) related to 
high versus low decision bias for each subject. This analysis included all subjects who 
exhibited variability in bias, excluding three subjects with 100% bias for all categories 
and two subjects with 0% bias for all categories. Behavioral decision bias, as a percent of 
Decision phase choices, was transformed within-subject into a rank measure, yielding a 1 
to 3 low- to high-bias scale. The decision bias regressor in the GLM modulated predicted 
trial-evoked activation (6 s) during the Reward phase. A similar model was applied to the 
Association learning phase and the Decision phase data to test the specificity of Reward 
phase results.  
 
Reactivation of associations and decision bias 
Next, we explored within-subject correlates of decision bias that may be evident 
in Reward phase reactivation of paired S1 stimuli. This analysis tested whether decision 
bias is predicted by reactivation of associations, which may allow the binding of reward 
and neutral outcomes to both the presented S2 stimulus and reactivated S1 stimulus. Our 
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paradigm utilized three categories of S1 stimuli (faces, scenes, and body pictures), which 
have been found to activate distinct regions of the visual cortex: fusiform face area 
(FFA), parahippocampal place area (PPA), and extrastriate body area (EBA) (Kanwisher 
et al., 1997; Epstein and Kanwisher, 1998; Downing et al., 2001). This allowed us to test 
if activation during the Reward phase, where only S2 stimuli were presented, also elicited 
activation of the category-specific S1 stimuli incidentally associated with individual S2 
stimuli during the preceding Association phase.  
To measure reactivation, we derived stimulus category (face, scene, and body 
part) masks for each subject from the Association phase, applied these masks to contrasts 
of S2 stimuli in the Reward phase, and sorted the resulting values by subsequent decision 
bias. In detail, first, regions of interest were derived from activation to the stimuli 
presented in the Association learning phase. A GLM was estimated with separate 
regressors for S1 face, scene, and body part stimuli as well as “upside-down” target trials 
(1.75 s). Contrasts were constructed to estimate responses to specific S1 categories: [face 
- (scene + body)], [scene - (face + body)], [body - (face + scene)]. The resulting 
individual contrasts were masked to include only the top 1% of voxels for each contrast 
that also fell within a group mask (thresholded at P < 0.001, uncorrected) based on 
activation to category-specific stimuli in the Association phase. For face stimuli, we used 
a mask of the ventral visual cortex, as the group mask did not capture individual face-
responsive regions in the ventral occipital cortex (Figures S4-S5). The resulting summed 
subject masks for face, scene, and body part stimuli resemble expected FFA, PPA, and 
EBA activation patterns, respectively, based on prior literature (Kanwisher et al., 1997; 
Epstein and Kanwisher, 1998; Downing et al., 2001) (Figures S4-S5). 
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Next, a Reward phase GLM was estimated similar to the model of the Association 
phase described above. Here, instead of modeling the presentation of S1 face, scene, and 
body part stimuli, the GLM modeled the presentation of S2 circle stimuli (2 s) that were 
incidentally paired with the face, scene, and body part pictures in the Association phase. 
Thus, the contrasts were between S2 stimuli that differed only in their S1 associations, e.g. 
[S2 face - (S2 scene + S2 body)]. The category-specific masks from the Association phase 
were applied to the resulting contrasts of the Reward phase GLM. In the Reward phase, 
beta values in voxels falling within the mask were averaged to produce one value per S2-
associated category per subject. These values were sorted within-subject according to 
subsequent decision bias. Across-subject values for high, medium, and low bias were 
created from the sorted within-subject values. Statistical tests were performed on the 
resulting data for high vs. low bias. The majority of subjects had two equivalent high- or 
low-bias pairs, which were averaged together; the medium bias condition only existed 
within a subset of subjects (n = 8) and was not included in subsequent analyses due to 
lack of statistical power. 
The Association phase masks were also used to compute mean levels of activation 
in the Association phase contrasts themselves. These values were used to establish the 
specificity of Reward phase reactivation in two ways. First, they were verified to not 
differ according to later decision bias. Second, they were used to normalize Reward 
phase reactivation estimates by controlling for baseline levels of responding to the actual 
picture stimuli in the Association phase. It could be argued that the use of the Association 
phase for voxel selection induces a confound, given the inclusion of both the S1 and 
associated S2 stimulus on each trial. However, any bias induced by the Association phase 
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will be minimized as the Association phase activation was itself used to normalize the 
Reward phase reactivation estimates. Additionally, when a similar reactivation procedure 
was used with masks derived from the Association phase S2 presentation, Reward phase 
activation did not correlate with decision bias.  
 
Reward phase parametric learning signals 
We additionally tested for signals related to reward learning. FMRI data in the 
Reward phase were analyzed using event onsets that modeled the whole trial (6 s) as well 
as the onsets for the S2 stimulus (0.5 s) and the reward outcome (0.5 s).  
To model reward learning, we utilized a standard temporal difference 
reinforcement learning model to correlate BOLD activity with trial-by-trial estimates of 
stimulus value and reward prediction error, the difference between stimulus value and 
received reward (O'Doherty et al., 2004; Daw et al., 2006; Hare et al., 2008). The Reward 
phase associations between S2 stimuli and outcomes were Pavlovian, with reward 
appearance independent of behavioral responses, and thus we could not fit the parameters 
of a reinforcement learning model to behavior. Instead, the reinforcement algorithm 
learning rate α was set at 0.25 such that stimulus values for S2 stimuli, initialized at zero, 
reached asymptote for S2+ stimuli (approximately 0.7) by the end of the phase. (Results 
are robust to different learning rate settings.)  
To model association learning signals, we adapted a temporal difference model to 
correlate BOLD activity with trial-by-trial estimates of stimulus “surprise” due to the 
unpredicted presentation of lone S2 stimuli. During the preceding Association phase of 
the experiment, specific S1-S2 temporal associations were incidentally experienced, but in 
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the Reward phase, these associations are violated by the presentation of the lone S2 
stimulus. The unexpected omission of the S1 and the unexpected lone presentation of the 
S2 in the Reward phase may lead to a “stimulus prediction error”, a response previously 
attributed to the hippocampus and midbrain dopamine system (Lisman and Grace, 2005; 
Kumaran and Maguire, 2006, 2007). Prediction errors are highest at the beginning of 
reward learning when expectations of joint S1–S2  presentation are the highest. As the 
Reward phase proceeds, expectations would be updated via the prediction error signal, 
leading to decreasing surprise. The learning rate for this model was set to α = 0.25, 
similar to the reward learning rate. The prediction error signal thus captures stimulus-
specific activation that exponentially decreases with repeated S2 presentations during 
Reward phase trials. 
 
 
Functional connectivity analysis 
Two methods were used to explore functional connectivity related to decision 
bias. First, we performed a psychophysiological-interaction (PPI) analysis (Friston et al., 
1997). Second, to test for mediation of decision bias-related connectivity, we extracted 
per-trial estimates of evoked activation and conducted regression analyses (Adcock et al., 
2006). These analyses focused on the first half of the reward phase, where we found 
evidence for significant reactivation. 
In the PPI analysis, a seed region in the hippocampus was defined in the GLM 
contrast of high versus low decision bias during Reward learning (26, -34, -12, 6 mm 
region of interest; Figure 3.2C). The PPI analysis was estimated to test for increases in 
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functional correlation between the hippocampus and other brain regions (the 
physiological variable) during the Reward learning phase for high versus low decision 
bias stimuli (the psychological variable). The timecourse of activation from the 
hippocampus was extracted and deconvolved. This timecourse was multiplied by the 
decision bias indicator and then convolved with the hemodynamic response function 
(HRF). The model included the hippocampus timecourse by decision bias regressor, the 
decision bias regressor and the unmodulated hippocampus timecourse regressor (Friston 
et al., 1997). We explored interactions in the whole brain and in striatal regions of interest 
defined by 6mm radius spheres around peak striatal clusters correlated with reward 
prediction error (6, 6, 12) and value (18, 14, 4) in the reward learning GLM (Figure 
S3.3). As a control, we analyzed data from the Association phase in a similar manner. 
Finally, we tested whether visual regions, defined per-subject, mediated decision 
bias-related connectivity between the hippocampus and striatum. While the visual cortex 
pathway lacks direct connectivity with the other regions, functional correlations could 
arise via intermediate pathways. This analysis was conducted on trial-by-trial extracted 
activation values which enabled the use of subject-defined masks as regions of interest. 
Stimulus-evoked activation to S2 stimuli for each trial was estimated by extracting 
normalized activity from 4-6 s after trial onset, minus a baseline response taken from -2 
to 0 s before trial onset. The response timepoint selection was visually verified to overlap 
with peak trial-evoked responses independent of condition. Activation values were sorted 
into two bins within each subject: S2 stimuli for which the associated S1 stimulus 
exhibited subsequent decision bias versus those that did not. This method is conceptually 
similar to an approach that estimates separate regressors for each trial in a GLM and 
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combines the resulting estimates to compute between-region correlations (Rissman et al., 
2004).  
As in the PPI analysis, activation values in the hippocampus were extracted from 
the region that exhibited activity predictive of decision bias; activation values in the 
striatum were extracted from the ROI in the right caudate correlated with reward 
prediction error. For the visual cortex, we extracted activity from subject-specific ROI 
masks derived from face, scene, and body responses, as used in the reactivation analysis. 
As a control, we extracted data from an ROI in the temporal-parietal junction (62, -42, 
22) that exhibited a significant response to Reward trials overall but which would not be 
expected to contribute to decision bias.  
To test whether visual regions mediate connectivity between the hippocampus and 
striatum, we conducted a formal mediation analysis (Wager et al., 2009). A multi-level 
mediation was estimated using a custom Matlab toolbox (Tor Wager, 
http://wagerlab.colorado.edu/tools). We estimated per-subject path coefficients for the 
hippocampus to striatum (Path c), hippocampus to visual cortex (Path a), and visual 
cortex to striatum (Path b). The mediation tests whether the path via the visual cortex 
accounts for significant covariance in the hippocampus-striatum path. At the second-
level, the analysis uses bias-corrected bootstrap significance testing to derive a sensitive 
measure of path and mediation effects (randomly sampling 100,000 observations within 
each path at the subject level). This analysis provides path coefficients, standard errors, 
and two-tailed, uncorrected p-values for each path and the mediation effect. 
 
Association and Decision phases 
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Where appropriate, parallel GLM and functional connectivity analyses were 
conducted on data from the Association and Decision phases of the experiment 








Pre-experiment liking ratings 
Stimuli were selected based on individual ratings of 20 stimuli in each category to 
match median liking across stimulus types. On the liking scale, transformed into 0-100% 
values, the mean liking for selected S1 stimuli and S2 stimuli was almost exactly matched 
(56.14% ± 1.73 and 56.11% ± 1.66, respectively (mean ± SEM)). Within S1-S2 pairings, 
stimuli were also closely matched in liking: the absolute difference in liking between 
stimuli in a pair across subjects was near zero (mean participant rating deviation, 1.78%; 
maximum, 6.75%). Residual initial liking rating differences between S1 stimuli did not 
predict subsequent preferences during the Decision phase. Liking ratings for 
subsequently chosen high-bias (S1+ versus S1-) stimuli were no different than zero (-
0.05% ± 0.61). Liking ratings were numerically lower for low-bias stimuli (-1.66% ± 
0.92), a pre-experiment difference in liking ratings that would, if anything, work against a 
subsequent decision bias. 
 
Association learning phase 
During the Association learning phase, performance on the target-detection task 
was near ceiling (2.78% ± 1.01 incorrect responses; 4.70% ± 1.22 missed responses). 





Reward learning phase 
During the Reward learning phase, responses to the reward were rarely missed or 
in error (misses, 1.44% ± 0.77, errors, 0.92% ± 0.35 of trials). Reaction times to the S2 
stimuli were 778.3 ms ± 29.0. Reaction times to S2+ and S2- stimuli did not differ; both 
showed a decrease over time, but this change only reached significance for S2+ stimuli 
(from 796.7 ms ± 30.2 to 759.9 ms ± 30.6; t(27) = 2.44, P < 0.05). Reaction times to S2 
stimuli did not differ according to later decision bias. 
 
Decision making phase 
Reward-associated S2 stimulus (S2+) preference overall was 79.4% ± 3.9. Broken 
down by associated S1 stimulus picture type, mean preference values were 79.5% ± 6.7 
for face-associated S2 stimuli, 81.3% ± 5.5 for scene-associated S2 stimuli, and 76.8% ± 
7.0 for body-associated S2 stimuli. 
Decision bias overall, as measured by S1+ versus S1- preference, was 53.8% ± 5.4 
(computed relative to S2 preference). Broken down by picture type, mean preference 
values were 54.2% ± 9.4 for face S1 stimuli (n.s.), 42.0% ± 8.9 for scene S1 stimuli (n.s.), 
and 66.4% ± 8.2 for body S1 stimuli (t(26) = 1.99, P < 0.10). Within-participant, ranking 
the three stimulus pairs of different categories by decision bias illustrates variability that 
was subsequently used to probe neural correlates of bias (86.3% high, 50.6% medium, 
20.8% low decision bias; Figure 3.2B). Each category type only allowed choices versus 
one alternative stimulus in the Decision phase and thus participants were often at 100% 
or 0% bias for a given category. Among ranked decision bias values, for the high 
stimulus 19/28 (68%) of participants exhibited 100% bias for at least one pairing and 
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23/28 (82%) of participants show greater than 50% preference for at least one pairing. 
Conversely, for at least one low stimulus, 21/28 (75%) of participants exhibited 0% bias. 
Decision making phase reaction times were 1228.8 ms ± 46.2 for S1 choices and 
1164.3 ms ± 4.7 for S2 choices. Reaction times for S1 and S2 choices did not significantly 
differ. Within-participants, reaction times did not differ between high versus low decision 
bias S1 choices. 
In the Reward learning and Decision making phases of the experiment, 
participants earned an average of $14.00 ± 1.41. 
 
Post-experiment liking ratings 
After the Decision making phase, participants rated their current liking for the S1 
and S2 stimuli. (Liking data for one participant is missing due to an error in data 
recording.) While this measure may not be fully independent of Decision phase 
preferences (as choices themselves may influence liking), results from this phase 
nevertheless support the preferences exhibited in the Decision phase. Liking for S2 
stimuli showed a strong effect of reward associations in the Reward phase (change in S2+ 
minus change in S2-, 15.17% ± 3.63; t(26) = 4.18, P < 0.001). Liking overall did not 
increase over the experiment for S1+ versus S1- stimuli (1.26 % ± 1.65, n.s.). However, 
liking for S1 stimuli when sorted by decision bias exhibited a significant difference for 
high versus low decision bias stimuli (change in S1+ minus change in S1-; high = 8.95% ± 
3.46; low = -3.26% ± 2.33; t(22) = 5.08, P < 0.01; Figure S3.3A). 
A final measure further supports the Decision phase choice and liking ratings. 
When outside of the scanner, participants were asked to rate, for each S1 and S2 stimulus, 
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how likely they thought it would be to be associated with winning money. (Participants 
rated stimuli on a scale similar to that used for liking ratings, but labeled with 0% reward 
and 100% reward anchors.) Reward likelihood ratings for S2 stimuli reflected reward 
associations in the Reward phase. Reward likelihood ratings for S1 stimuli when sorted 
by decision bias exhibited a significant difference for high versus low decision bias 
stimuli (S1+ minus S1-; high = 17.15% ± 4.85; low = -11.59% ± 5.53; t(22) = 4.46, P < 
0.001), consistent with the results from the liking rating questionnaire. 
 
Testing explicit awareness of associations 
After leaving the MRI scanner, participants completed a matching probe and a 
written questionnaire to determine memory and post-experiment awareness for the 
incidental S1-S2 associations from the Association phase of the experiment (see Methods 
for details). (Data from one participant is missing due to an error in data recording.) Pair 
memory accuracy for S1-S2 associations was not different than chance (53.7% ± 3.25 
correct; only one participant exceeded 4/6 correct). Pair memory averaged across picture 
categories did not correlate with mean decision bias, nor did pair memory within-
category correlate with decision bias within-category. When pair memory accuracy was 
sorted by high versus low bias, the difference was not significant (high 59.38% ± 7.3 vs. 
low 45.7% ± 7.5; t(22) = 1.19, n = 23, P > 0.2; Figure S3.3B).  
As noted in the main text, exploratory analyses of brain activation related to 
association memory in the Association and Reward phases revealed no activation in 
regions of interest to correctly-associated versus incorrectly-associated stimulus pairs, 
even at a liberal uncorrected threshold of P < 0.01. 
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On the final paper questionnaire, we asked participants if they noticed any 
regularities or pairings in the first (Association) part of the experiment. (For text of 
questions, see section at end of supplement.) No participants exhibited evidence of 
awareness of the pairings. Finally, in an additional question, no participants exhibited 
knowledge of the hypothesis of the study. Combined with participants’ pair memory 
accuracy, these data indicate that participants’ Decision phase choices and activation in 
the hippocampus were not driven by explicit awareness of stimulus associations.  
However, it is possible that participants’ awareness of associations following the 
Association phase was higher than that exhibited after the experiment; such awareness 
could influence participants’ learning and decision making. While we cannot probe 
memory in the middle of the experiment without drawing attention to the manipulation of 
interest, we conducted a separate additional behavioral study to address this question. In 
this experiment, instead of probing memory for pairings at the end of the experiment after 
the Reward and Decision phases, pair memory was probed immediately following the 
Association phase. Significant memory performance and pair association awareness at 
this point could indicate that participants in the fMRI study also had access to stronger 
association memories during learning and decision making. Procedures for the pre-
experiment stimulus rating, Association phase, and pair memory probe were otherwise 
identical to those in the main fMRI study. Immediately after the Association phase, 
participants (n = 19, 11 female, age range 18-26 years) completed the pair memory probe 
that instructed participants to match an S1 stimulus at the top of the screen with one of 
two S2 stimuli below.  
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Replicating the finding from the main fMRI experiment, as well as a previous 
behavioral study (Wimmer and Shohamy, 2011), pair memory performance was not 
different from chance (56.1% ± 5.4; t(18) = 1.13, P > 0.20),  Further, in an extended 
written questionnaire, no participants reported noticing the regular S1-S2 pair 
presentations. When informed about the pairs and then asked if they noticed the pair 
presentations, the majority of participants responded in the negative (11 responded “no”, 
4 responded “a little”, and 4 responded “yes”). Memory performance in the subgroup that 
reported having noticed the pair presentations was lower than in the full group (41.5%, n 
= 4). After being informed about the Association phase pairs, participants were asked 
which type of picture (circle, face, scene, or body) was always present in a pair. 75% of 
participants (of 16 who selected an answer) correctly responded that the circle was 
always present. We then asked participants to identify whether the circle came first or 
second in the sequence: Only half of those who had responded correctly that the circle 
was always present answered correctly that the circle came second. Participants’ inability 
to recognize the temporal position of the common stimulus, immediately subsequent to 
an Association phase with 60 repetitions of pairings, indicates a low level of awareness 
for the association structure.  
The lack of significant pair memory supports the hypothesis that the kind of 
association learning engaged during the task does not tend to lead to explicit, declarative 
knowledge of associations. Thus, with respect to mechanisms underlying decision bias, 
these null memory findings suggest that strategic inferential reasoning about S1-S2-
reward associations, operating during the Reward phase or the Decision making phase, is 
unlikely to account for shifts in S1 preferences.  
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Nevertheless, it is possible that the memory probes we employed did not reveal 
awareness of the pair associations underlying the task. Some studies have demonstrated 
that awareness during learning may not be reflected in memory measures (c.f. Gawronski 
and Walther, 2012). Thus, determining the degree of implicitness underlying decision 
bias is an important area for future study. 
 
Decision bias predictors 
During the Reward learning phase, outside of the hippocampus, a whole-brain 
FWE-corrected analysis of the decision bias contrast did not show any additional regions 
predictive of bias. In the striatum, we did not find any regions predictive of bias, even at a 
liberal uncorrected threshold of P < 0.01. 
 
Reactivation predictors of decision bias 
In the first half of the Reward learning phase we found significant reactivation of 
associations for stimuli in pairs that later showed high vs. low decision bias, as described 
in the main text (Figure 3.3). We found that over all categories, reactivation was greater 
for high vs. low decision bias in 74% of participants (t(22) = 2.55, P <0.05). The 
reactivation effect was present numerically across the entire Reward learning phase (high 
= 0.121 ± 0.039, low = -0.020 ± 0.081; t(22) = 1.13, P < 0.20). When limiting our analyses 
to the second half of the Reward phase a difference was not found (high = -0.006 ± 0.041, 
low = 0.014  ± 0.044; t(22) = 0.33, n.s.). 
In a follow-up analysis we examined activation to each stimulus category 
separately (faces, scenes and body parts), comparing individual associations that led to 
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later high vs. low decision bias. As this analysis is restricted to a separate test for each 
category, activation values for high vs. low decision bias are necessarily compared 
between-participants and include a smaller group of participants, both of which lead to 
weaker statistical power to detect an effect. For face-associated S2 stimuli, the 
reactivation measure was greater for high vs. low decision bias trials at a trend level (high 
0.238 ± 0.110, low -0.034 ± 0.075; t(19) = 2.08, P < 0.06; nhigh = 10, n nlow = 11). 
Activation for body-associated S2 stimuli was numerically higher for high vs. low 
decision bias (high 0.056 ± 0.043, low -0.060 ± 0.0132; t(17) = 1.08, P > 0.10; nhigh = 13, 
nlow = 6), while in the scene-associated S2 stimuli we detected no difference (high 0.003 ± 
0.060, low 0.009 ± 0.065, n.s.; nhigh = 7, nlow = 14). 
As a control, we tested whether reactivation was due to generally higher levels of 
activity across visual regions of interest rather than in specific visual regions reflecting S2 
pairing. Mean activation across the three sets of participant-specific masks did not differ 
for high vs. low decision bias Reward phase trials (P > 0.45). Also, we verified that the 
reactivation result was found if category-specific region of interest activation was 
normalized by activation across all visual regions of interest. This measure exhibited 
much higher variance (for example, activation to actual visual stimuli in the Association 
phase was only marginally significant), but nevertheless, the reactivation effect was 
replicated (69% of participants exhibited greater reactivation for high versus low decision 
bias). 
Finally, as noted in the main text, as a control we also tested whether activation in 
the Association learning phase predicted decision bias. While we found activation overall 
during the Association learning phase in the hippocampus and surrounding medial 
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temporal lobe (Figure 3.S2, masked for the MTL), we did not find significant correlates 
of decision bias in the MTL. Similarly, during the Association phase, activation to the 
presentation of S1 face, scene, and body stimuli did not differ by later bias (t(22) = -0.78, 
n.s.). A parallel analysis of reactivation in the Decision phase is not possible as choices 
present actual face, scene, and body part stimuli. 
 
Reward learning activation 
In the Reward phase reward learning GLM, we examined brain activation related 
to learning associations between S2 stimuli and reward and neutral outcomes. The reward 
learning signals we examined were derived from a simple temporal difference model of 
learning (e.g., Sutton and Barto, 1998; O'Doherty et al., 2004). At S2 stimulus 
presentation we tested correlates of learned stimulus value, the reward prediction error 
elicited by stimulus presentation; at reward presentation we tested correlates of reward 
prediction error, focusing on the striatum (O'Doherty et al., 2004).  
Activation in the bilateral striatum significantly correlated with the predicted 
value of presented stimuli (Figure S3.3A). At reward presentation, a region of the right 
caudate correlated with reward prediction error (Figure 3.3B; 90 voxels at P < 0.005, 
uncorrected). While this activation did not survive small-volume correction in the striatal 
region of interest (P < 0.12), we focus on this region in later analyses given its proximity 
to the striatal region correlated with value. Additionally, a region of the right ventral 
putamen significantly correlated with reward prediction error (Figure S3.3B). 
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In an exploratory analysis, we also found that activation in the posterior 
hippocampus correlated with reward prediction error (20, -28, -6; z = 3.86, p < 0.05 SVC, 
correcting for the additional ROI analysis). 
 
Reward phase association learning activation 
In this analysis, we found a cluster of activation in the ventral tegmental area / 
substantia nigra pars compacta (VTA/SNc) that significantly correlated with the stimulus 
prediction error regressor (z = 3.40 (4, -18, -12)). This cluster overlaps with a midbrain 
activation reported in a previous study of learning in a related paradigm (Shohamy and 
Wagner, 2008). Clusters of activation in the left and right hippocampus were significant 
at P < 0.001 uncorrected but did not survive small-volume correction. This result was 
specific to the Reward phase and was not due to generic decreases in activity across the 
phase. 
 
Functional connectivity analysis 
Results of the Reward phase PPI analysis of hippocampal-striatal functional 
connectivity for high- vs. low-bias stimuli are reported in the main text and Figure 3.4. A 
control analysis of hippocampal connectivity during the Association phase revealed no 
interaction between decision bias and hippocampal connectivity anywhere in the brain, 
even at a liberal uncorrected threshold of P < 0.01. 
A summary of the Reward phase mediation result is reported in the main text. 
This analysis tested whether a pathway from hippocampus to striatum via participant-
specific visual cortical regions mediated hippocampal-striatal connectivity. We report 
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mediation results from the full group of participants with high-bias stimuli, for the first 
half of the Reward phase. While this analysis is different from a PPI analysis and uses 
trial-by-trial estimates of evoked responses, we found that hippocampal-striatal 
connectivity replicated that found using PPI. More complete statistics on the paths 
between regions are as follows: Path a) hippocampus to visual cortex (0.426 ± 0.086, P < 
0.001); Path b) visual cortex to caudate (0.050 ± 0.015, P < 0.001); Path c) hippocampus 
to caudate (0.214 ± 0.054, P < 0.001). For low-bias stimuli, functional connectivity 
between the hippocampus and visual cortex was not significant and we found no 
evidence for mediation. 
To verify the specificity of the functional connectivity result between the 
hippocampus and the caudate in predicting decision bias in the Reward phase, we 
conducted several control analyses, as mentioned in the main text. First, a control 
analysis tested connectivity between regions of interest and a task-activated region of the 
temporal-parietal junction during the Reward phase that was not expected to show 
differential connectivity in the temporal-parietal junction. This analysis revealed that 
connectivity between the hippocampus and the control ROI did not differ between trials 
that led to high versus low decision bias.  
As another control, we analyzed Association phase connectivity between regions 
of interest for high- and low-bias stimuli. We found no significant connectivity during 
trials that led to high bias for either the hippocampus to visual cortex pathway or the 
pathway between visual cortex and striatum. These results confirm the selective role of 
functional connectivity during the Reward phase between the hippocampus, visual cortex, 
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In Chapters 2 and 3 I demonstrated that relational representations impact reward 
learning and value-based decision making, via hippocampal-striatal connectivity. The 
studies in Chapters 4 and 5 address the complementary question of how long term 




Memory is central to adaptive behavior. Extensive research has demonstrated that 
the cognitive and neural systems for remembering episodes are distinct from the ability to 
associate stimuli or actions with reward. However, in everyday life these two types of 
learning often co-occur. Currently, it is unknown whether and how memory for events is 
affected by ongoing learning of stimulus-reward associations. We thus sought to examine 
how these two processes interact – that is, how episodic memory is influenced by 
incremental learning of stimulus-reward associations. If these two types of learning are 
indeed distinct, then during a rewarded learning task, feedback would only influence 
learning, with no impact on memory for events. Alternatively, trial-by-trial choices and 
reward feedback may also influence episodic memory, indicating a functional interaction 
between these two processes. We developed a task where participants made choices 
between two options, each associated with drifting reward probabilities, and received 
feedback (a monetary reward or nothing). During learning, pictures of objects were 
presented as part of the choice options (Study 1) or as part of the feedback (Study 2). 
These pictures were not related to the reward task, and each object appeared only once 
during the experiment. Subsequently, participants were given a surprise memory probe to 
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measure episodic memory for the incidentally presented pictures. To test how reward 
learning affects long-term memory formation, the probe was administered immediately 
after learning or a day later. Although unrelated to prediction or receipt of reward, 
episodic memory for the pictures was above chance. Moreover, memory was influenced 
by trial-by-trial experiences. Study 1 revealed that memory for pictures presented at 
choice was enhanced by reward, but only when the memory test was immediate: 
surprisingly, we found that after a day reward impaired memory. In Study 2, we found 
that for pictures presented during feedback, reward enhanced memory, and this was 
stronger after a delay. These findings demonstrate that ongoing learning about reward can 
influence memory formation, suggesting novel interactions between episodic memory 




In everyday life, experiences of events and of reward outcomes are often 
intermixed and interacting. However, memory for events and rewards have traditionally 
been studied separately. Understanding the intersection of these types of learning and 
memory is important, as this may illuminate factors influencing the selectivity of 
memory. Further, memories formed during reward experiences may be especially 
relevant for future decision making.  
Research on the cognitive and neural systems supporting episodic memory has 
focused on understanding memory for neutral events. These studies have revealed a 
critical role for the hippocampus and medial temporal lobe (Davachi, 2006). Research on 
the systems supporting reward learning and value-based decision making, on the other 
hand, has focused on how humans and animals learn from and utilize reward feedback. 
These studies have revealed a critical role for dopamine and the striatum (Rangel et al., 
2008). Here, stimulus-reward associations are established via well-described reward 
learning signals conveyed by the phasic firing of midbrain dopamine neurons (Schultz, 
2006). However, it is largely unknown whether and how episodic memory is influenced 
by learning from reward. For example, it is unknown if episodic memory is modulated by 
the same learning signal conveyed by dopamine neurons. Additionally, it is unknown if 
reward similarly modulates memory for experiences preceding feedback vs. experiences 
that coincide with feedback. 
Prior studies have found memory enhancement by single-trial reward feedback or 
reward motivation (Wittmann et al., 2005; Adcock et al., 2006; Bialleck et al., 2011; 
Mather and Schoeke, 2011). These studies suggest that reward may influence both 
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ongoing incremental learning of stimulus-reward associations as well as episodic memory 
formation. Potentially, reward may influence memory by projections from midbrain 
dopamine neurons to the hippocampus (Shohamy and Adcock, 2010). Midbrain 
dopamine neurons projecting to the striatum update value associations via the difference 
between expected and received reward (reward prediction error) (Schultz, 2006), and this 
signal may also influence the encoding of episodic experiences in the hippocampus. 
Dopamine in the hippocampus has been shown to enhance cellular measures of memory 
over time (Huang and Kandel, 1995; Bethus et al., 2010). The possible influence of 
dopamine on episodic memory may be particularly evident after a delay, allowing for 
memory consolidation.  
Similarly, the presentation of choice options with high predicted values increases 
dopamine neuron firing (Morris et al., 2006; Roesch et al., 2007), a signal which may 
also increase memory. In a choice situation, it is also possible that memory will be 
enhanced for experiences associated with choices. In addition to the influence of value, a 
beneficial effect of choice on memory may arise from effects of attention and self-guided 
exploration (Krajbich et al., 2010; Voss et al., 2011). 
Research on memory and emotion also offers an important perspective on the 
modulation of memory by reward. Emotion, in particular arousal, has been shown in 
many cases to enhance memory (McGaugh, 2004). During ongoing reward learning, 
more surprising reward or miss feedback may elicit an increase in arousal, which may 
modulate memory. Prior research has found that arousing events can both increase 
(Anderson et al., 2006) and decrease (Mather, 2007) memory for nearby neutral events. 
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When arousing events are directly relevant for adjusting ongoing behavior, it is unknown 
whether arousal or reward (valence) will predominantly affect memory formation. 
Alternatively, in an ongoing learning context, episodic memory may be 
unaffected by reward. In research on the function of multiple memory systems, a reward 
or “habit” learning system and an episodic memory system are often found to be 
independent or to interact competitively (Poldrack and Packard, 2003). Thus, incremental 
reward learning may be independent from memory formation. Further, memory may be 
unaffected by reward if feedback is allocated exclusively to updating the value of the 
choices, performing a function as in reinforcement learning models (Sutton and Barto, 
1998),  
To explore whether and how episodic memory is influenced by choices and 
reward feedback, we developed a novel reward learning task. Participants made repeated 
choices between two options and received trial-by-trial feedback. The reward probability 
associated with each option shifted throughout the game to encourage continuous 
learning. During each trial, incidental pictures of objects appeared within choice options 
or within feedback. Memory was assessed during a surprise memory probe. 
In Study 1, incidental pictures were presented during choice; choice options were 
distinguished by squares with different color shading (green or blue) and objects were 
presented within them (Figure 4.1A). In Study 2, incidental pictures were instead 
presented as part of the reward feedback; reward or miss feedback was distinguished by 
different color shading (green or blue) (Figure 4.1B). Memory was tested immediately 
(Study 1A and 2A) or the following day (Study 1B and 2B) in separate groups of 
participants (Figure 4.1C). Our experimental design thus allows us to determine whether 
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episodic memory for events at choice or outcome are influenced by reward, and whether 
such effects vary as a function of delay.   






Figure 4.1. Reward learning and memory task.  




Participants. A total of eighty-nine participants completed Studies 1 and 2: Study 1A 
(Choice, immediate) included 20 subjects (12 female; mean age, 20 years, range, 18-25); 
Study 1B (Choice, delay) included 29 subjects (19 female; mean age, 21.1 years, range, 
18-27) after excluding two with low corrected memory performance (less than 5%) and 
one who missed more than 20% of choices in the reward learning task; Study 2A 
(Feedback, immediate) included 20 subjects (10 female; mean age, 23.4 years, range, 18-
34) after excluding three subjects with low memory performance and Study 2B 
(Feedback, delay) included 20 subjects (15 female; mean age, 21.2 years, range, 18-34) 
after excluding one with low memory performance. Subjects were paid $12 per hour for 
the approximately 1.5-hour duration of participation plus one-fifth of the nominal 
rewards they earned in the experimental task. Informed consent was obtained in a manner 
approved by the Columbia University Institutional Review Board. 
 
Study 1: Memory for choice events. The experiments consisted of two sessions, either 
performed on the same day (Study 1A) or performed on consecutive days (Study 1B). In 
session 1, subjects completed a reward learning task that included incidental exposure to 
trial-unique picture stimuli during choice. In session 2, subjects completed a surprise test 
of memory for pictures that were seen during the reward learning task. 
The reward learning task (Figure 4.1A) is a variant of a “two-armed bandit” task 
(e.g. Schönberg et al., 2007). Choice options were distinguished by a colored overlay 
(blue or green; Figure 4.1A). Subjects were instructed that each option was associated 
with a different probability of reward, that these probabilities could change slowly, and 
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that their goal was to attempt to find the most rewarding option at a given time in order to 
earn the most money. They were also instructed that rewards were tied to the color and 
not the screen position of the color. Subjects completed a short practice version to 
familiarize them with the task. 
On each trial, subjects had 2 s to choose between the two options. The left-right 
location of the options was permuted randomly from trial to trial. So as to maintain equal 
visual saliency of both options and the included pictures, the selected choice was not 
highlighted. Options remained on the screen for 2.5 s. After a 1 s inter-stimulus-interval, 
subjects received binary reward feedback for 1.75 s. A $0.25 “win” was represented by 
an image of a quarter dollar and a $0.00 “miss” was represented by a phase-scrambled 
image of a quarter dollar (Figure 4.1A). If no choice was recorded during the choice 
period, no reward feedback was displayed and "Too late!" was presented on the screen 
until the end of the trial. Trials were separated by variable duration inter-trial interval 
(ITI) fixation null events (mean 3.25 s, range 1-10 s). To signal trial onset, the ITI 
fixation cross changed to black 1 s preceding the next trial. The experiment consisted of 
80 choices. 
Each of the options was associated with a different probability of monetary 
reward. Throughout the experiment, the reward probabilities diffused gradually to 
encourage continual learning. The reward probability for each option changed over time, 
diffusing between 20% and 80% according to Gaussian random walks with reflecting 
boundary conditions. 
To investigate the influence of reward learning on episodic memory, incidental 
trial-unique object pictures were included in each option. Subjects were informed of the 
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presence of the object pictures and were instructed that the pictures were not part of the 
reward learning task.  
To measure episodic memory formation for the incidental pictures, subjects 
completed a surprise memory probe. The memory probe took place immediately after 
reward learning (Study 1A) or approximately 24 hours later (Study 1B). For each picture, 
subjects indicated whether they thought that the picture was old (i.e. seen during the 
reward learning task) or new (i.e. not previously seen in this experimental context). Then 
subjects indicated how certain they were in their response on a 1-4 scale while viewing 
corresponding response options of  “Guess”, “Somewhat certain”, “Very certain”, and 
“Completely certain”. Responses for the memory session were self-paced and multiple 
opportunities for rest breaks were included. Pictures were drawn from the 160 objects 
from the learning task and 80 new objects. Picture stimuli were presented without color 
overlay to avoid any bias in memory responses from choice color preferences from the 
reward learning task. 
Additionally, in Study 1A, immediately following the reward learning task and 
before the memory probe, subjects completed a control reward learning task. Here, trial 
structure was the same, with the exception that no pictures of objects were presented in 
the colored choice options. Although behavior in the control task was based on more 
experience as it always followed the task with pictures, comparing behavior in the 
preceding task to the control task allows us to explore whether the presence of the 
incidental object pictures led to qualitative changes in reward learning behavior.  
Following the memory probe session, subjects completed a written questionnaire 
which queried choice strategies and attention as well as whether subjects suspected a later 
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memory test of the incidentally presented pictures. Finally, subjects were informed how 
much money they had won in the experiment and were paid for their participation. 
 
 Study 2: Memory for feedback events. Procedures for Study 2 were similar to those for 
Study 1 with the critical difference that incidental trial-unique stimuli were presented 
during reward feedback instead of during choice (Figure 4.1B). As in Study 1, the 
experiment consisted of a reward task and a memory task, either performed on the same 
day (Study 2A) or performed on consecutive days (Study 2B). 
During the reward learning task, choice options were represented by colored 
shapes (e.g., a yellow circle and triangle). On each trial, subjects had 2 s to choose 
between options (Figure 4.1B). After a 1 s inter-stimulus-interval, subjects received 
binary reward feedback for 1.75 s. A “win” was represented by a color overlaid on a 
unique picture stimulus; a “miss” was represented by a different color overlaid on a 
picture (Figure 4.1B). If no choice was recorded during the choice period, no reward 
outcome was displayed and "Too late!" was presented on the screen until the end of the 
trial. Trials were separated by variable duration ITIs (mean 3.25 s, range 1.0-13.5 s). The 
ITI fixation cross changed to black 1 s preceding the next trial to signal trial onset. The 
experiment consisted of 200 choices. As in Study 1, reward probabilities drifted 
gradually. 
To investigate the influence of reward learning on episodic memory, trial-unique 
object pictures were included in the feedback. Subjects were informed of the presence of 
the object pictures but they were instructed that the pictures were not part of the reward 
learning task.  
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To allow the feedback picture memory probe to include color-overlaid objects 
without a reward-related response bias, color was counterbalanced. Specifically, subjects 
were instructed that the associations between color and feedback would switch after 
breaks in the game. The effect of this reversal on learning was minimized with task 
breaks that included text instructions followed by 10 “reminder” trials at the beginning of 
each mini-block of 50 trials. During these 10 reminder trials, text feedback of “Win!” or 
“Miss!” was presented above the associated color feedback square. Stimuli presented 
during these trials were repeated from the first 10 trials in the experiment and were not 
tested in the memory probe session. Thus, out of 200 trials total, 160 trials are of interest 
for subsequent memory analyses. 
To measure episodic memory formation, subjects completed a surprise memory 
probe. The memory probe took place either immediately after reward learning (Study 2A) 
or approximately 24 hours later (Study 2B). The memory probe was as in Study 1 with 
the exception that pictures were presented in their original reward task color (Figure 
4.1C). Subjects made memory judgments for each of the 160 pictures from in the reward 
learning task plus 80 additional novel pictures, in random order. 
In Study 2, an error in data collection during the memory probe resulted in a loss 
of the last 40 of the 240 memory questions (including 26 old and 14 new pictures) for 
approximately half of subjects (12 of 21 subjects in Study 2A, 10 of 20 subjects in Study 
2B). Data analysis was adjusted accordingly. 
The task was presented using Matlab (Mathworks, Natick, MA) and the 





Behavioral analysis. Analysis of the experimental data focused on the modulation of 
subsequent memory by ongoing reward learning. In all studies, we focused on the 
influence of reward on memory, and in Study 1, we also focused on the influence of 
choice on memory.  
We first verified that participants adjusted their choices dynamically in response 
to reward feedback. Because of the fluctuating probability of reward, we could not 
estimate a learning curve or a percent correct over the course of the task. Instead, as in 
prior studies, a logistic regression model was fit to explain each participant’s sequence of 
choices in terms of two explanatory variables coding events from the previous trial: the 
choice made and whether it was rewarded (both coded as binary indicators) (Lau and 
Glimcher, 2005; Gershman et al., 2009; Daw et al., 2011; Li and Daw, 2011).  
Next, we fit a temporal difference reinforcement learning (RL) model to subject’s 
choices (Sutton and Barto, 1998). This model was used to generate estimates of learning 
rate as well trial-by-trial variables to be used as predictors of memory formation. Such 
analyses attempt to explain the time series of choices in terms of previous events. (See 
O'Doherty et al., 2007; Daw, 2011 for reviews of the methodology.) The model tracks 
option value based on recent experience. Option values were initialized with a value of 
0.5 and updated after reward feedback by the difference between the expected option 
value and the reward outcome – reward prediction error – scaled by the learning rate. 
Choices are presumed to be guided by a function of option value, with probabilities 
derived from a softmax distribution. The model also included a perseveration parameter, 
which captures a tendency to repeat or avoid selecting the same option on the subsequent 
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trial (Lau and Glimcher, 2005; Schönberg et al., 2007). In Study 2, to eliminate possible 
contamination of model fitting by relearning of feedback-color associations when colors 
switched, we excluded the first 10 training choices and reset option value to 0.5 in each 
of the 4 mini-blocks. 
Reinforcement learning model-derived memory predictors including value and 
reward prediction error were generated from a fixed-effects parameter fit across all 
subjects in Study 1 or Study 2. The fixed-effects fit was used because the low number of 
choices in the current experiment limits the reliability of individual parameter estimates 
(Daw, 2011). The RL model was also used to generate an “exploration” predictor. 
Choices can be categorized as exploratory (vs. exploitative) when a choice is not 
predicted by the values estimated by RL model, i.e., the chosen option has a lower 
model-predicted choice probability than the non-chosen option. 
 Memory prediction was estimated using random-effects logistic regression 
(implemented in STATA 9.1; StataCorp, College Station, TX). Memory, excluding 
missed reward learning trials, was coded as a binary outcome variable. All responses 
were included in reported analyses; removing low-confidence memory responses did not 
qualitatively alter the results. Reward was a primary predictor of interest across studies. 
In Study 1, choice was also a primary predictor of interest. A simple regression analysis 
was conducted for each study using reward and choice (Study 1) or reward (Study 2) as 
predictors. Additional regressions were conducted to test reward prediction error and the 
absolute value of reward prediction error (“surprise”) in place of reward.  
A further regression analysis was conducted that included other predictors of 
interest as well as control variables. Additional predictors of interest included prior trial 
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reward, next trial reward, exploration, recent trial memory (mean over 4 preceding trials), 
future trial memory (mean over 4 subsequent trials), preceding inter-trial-interval, and 
subsequent inter-trial-interval. Control predictors included reward learning task trial 
number, memory probe trial number, reward learning reaction time, choice difficulty 
(negative entropy), and stimulus presentation side (for Study 1).  
In Study 1, we also constructed a measure of the effect of individual picture 
stimuli on choice to use as a control variable in regressions. For each picture, across 
subjects we computed the probability that the subjects switched to or away from a given 
stimulus. During reward learning, these switches will be predominantly driven by prior 
feedback, but some may be due to particular stimuli being more likely to attract choice 
selection (or push choice selection away); we reasoned that averaging across subjects 
would capture some of the effect of individual stimuli. Each subject’s contribution to the 








We verified that choice behavior was driven by recent rewards. In the reward 
learning task with incidental object pictures during choice (Study 1), reward on the prior 
choice predicted the next choice, and participants also exhibited the well-documented 
tendency to repeat (or perseverate), such that prior choice predicted the next choice 
(Table 5.1). In the reward learning task with pictures at feedback (Study 2), reward on 
the prior choice significantly influenced the subsequent choice, and prior choice also 
predicted the subsequent choice (Table 5.1). These effects of reward on choice are 
comparable to reward effects in similar experiments (e.g. Wimmer et al., 2012). 
In Study 1A, we compared the effect of reward on choice between the task with 
incidental pictures and the control task with no pictures. In the control task, the effect of 
reward on the prior choice was significant (0.90 ± 0.06, P < 0.001) and not different than 
the effect in the task with pictures; the effect of prior choice was also similar (0.62 ± 
0.06, P < 0.001). Thus, reward has a qualitatively similar influence on choice in both the 
task with incidental pictures and the task without pictures. This suggests that choice 
behavior was not strongly influenced by the visual saliency or preferences for the objects 
in the incidental pictures. 
We also fit a simple reinforcement learning model to participant’s choices. For 
the reward learning task with incidental pictures during choice, across-participant fit 
parameters used in memory prediction were: learning rate = 0.61, beta = 1.97, and 
perseveration = 0.23. Mean parameter fits are reported in Table 5.1. For the control task 
without pictures in Study 1A, mean parameters were similar to the mean with pictures: 
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learning rate = 0.67 ± 0.07, beta = 5.75 ± 2.41, and perseveration = -0.01 ±. 0.05. 
Although changes in parameters may be driven by increased task experience, the 
decrease in learning rate from the reward learning task to the control task was significant 
(t(19) = 2.26, P < 0.05). For Study 2, mean parameters are reported in Table 5.1. Fit 
parameters used in memory prediction were: learning rate = 0.53, beta = 2.07, and 
perseveration = 0.23. 
 
Table 4.1. Reward learning behavior. Parameters	  for	  a	  logistic	  regression	  predicting	  choices,	  top	  (all	  P’s	  <	  0.001);	  parameters	  for	  a	  reinforcement	  learning	  model	  fit	  to	  choices,	  bottom.	  
 
 
Parameter Study 1: Choice Memory 
Delay 
Study 2: Feedback Memory 
Delay  Immediate Delay Immediate Delay 
Reward 0.84 (0.06)   0.54 (0.05) 0.85 (0.04) 0.85 (0.04) 
Choice 0.69 (0.06)   0.67 (0.05) 0.85 (0.04) 0.79 (0.04) 
Learning Rate 0.54 (0.08)   0.48 (0.06) 0.56 (0.08) 0.51 (0.06) 
Beta 9.48 (3.20) 10.52 (3.06) 3.60 (0.67) 3.94 (0.56) 
Perseveration 0.06 (0.04)   0.11 (0.05) 0.08 (0.06) 0.13 (0.07) 




Figure 4.2. Reward influence on memory.  Reward	  influence	  on	  memory	  for	  choice	  stimuli	  in	  Study	  1	  (left)	  and	  feedback	  stimuli	  in	  Study	  2	  (right).	  Reward	  enhances	  memory	  for	  both	  choice	  and	  feedback	  stimuli	  when	  tested	  after	  reward	  learning;	  when	  tested	  a	  day	  later,	  reward	  impairs	  memory	  for	  choice	  stimuli	  but	  strongly	  enhances	  memory	  for	  feedback	  stimuli.	  Reward	  memory	  effect	  coefficient	  values	  are	  derived	  from	  logistic	  regression.	  (†	  P	  <	  0.10,	  *	  P	  <	  0.05,	  **	  P	  <	  0.01,	  ***	  P	  <	  0.001)	  
 
Memory for choice events: Study 1 
 Study 1 was designed to probe the effect of ongoing reward learning on memory 
for stimuli experienced during choice. First, we asked whether participants remembered 
the pictures from the reward learning task. While the object pictures were incidental to 
the task, during a surprise memory test we found that participants nevertheless exhibited 
significant subsequent memory for the objects. When tested immediately (Study 1A), the 
mean corrected memory rate was 23.8% ± 4.1 (hit rate, 56.7% ± 3.7, false alarm rate, 
32.9% ± 3.4). When tested after a day (Study 1B), the mean corrected memory rate was 
26.6% ± 3.3 (hit rate, 57.5% ± 2.6, false alarm rate, 30.9% ± 2.6). 
133 
 
Next, we investigated whether memory was modulated by trial-by-trial experience 
during reward learning. When participants were given a surprise memory probe 
immediately, we found that reward increased memory (t(18) = 2.12, P < 0.05; Study 1A, 
Figure 4.2). Surprisingly, however, when memory was tested after a delay in a separate 
group of participants, reward impaired memory (t(27) = -2.24 = , P < 0.05; Study 1B, 
Figure 4.2) (immediate vs. delay reward effect: t(47) = 2.55, P < 0.05).  
We also investigated the influence of reward prediction error, the difference 
between expected and received reward, on memory. This was explored in a separate 
regression, as reward and reward prediction error are correlated (these variables are 
completely correlated when learning rate is zero). We found no effect of reward 
prediction error on memory at the immediate test, but we found that reward decreased 
memory after a delay (t(27) = -1.75, P < 0.10). We found no effect of the absolute value of 
reward prediction error (surprise). 
In addition to reward, we asked whether choice selection influenced memory for 
the stimuli presented during choice. Each reward learning choice included incidental 
stimuli in the chosen and non-chosen options. We found that memory was indeed 
strongly influenced by whether or not a picture was presented in a chosen option when 
tested immediately or after a delay (Figure 4.3). The memory benefit of chosen vs. non-






Figure 4.3. Choice influence on memory.  Chosen	  stimuli	  are	  remembered	  significantly	  more	  often	  than	  non-­‐chosen	  stimuli	  in	  Study	  1,	  regardless	  of	  delay.	  (***	  P	  <	  0.001.)	  	  
 
The modulation of memory by reward was not different for chosen and non-
chosen stimuli. In separate analyses for chosen and non-chosen options, at the immediate 
memory test, we found positive effects of reward on memory for both stimuli (chosen, 
t(18) = 1.05, n.s.; non-chosen, t(18) = 1.68, P < 0.10). In the delayed memory test, we found 
negative but non-significant effects of reward for both stimuli (chosen, t(27) = -1.61, P = 
0.11; non-chosen, t(27) = -1.67, P < 0.10). 
While the effect of reward on memory was similar for chosen and non-chosen 
stimuli, the effect of reward on memory may differ because of changes in choice 
behavior. We thus investigated the effect of choice switches on memory and the reward 
modulation of memory. Participants switched their choice selection from the preceding 
trial (e.g. from green to blue) on approximately a third of all trials (Study 1A, 30.8% ± 
1.8; Study 1B, 32.1 ± 2.7). Switches had no main effect on memory. For the effect of 
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reward on memory, when memory was tested immediately, reward increased memory for 
items on switch and non-switch choices (P’s <0.15). However, choice switching had a 
large influence on the negative reward effect on memory at a delay: reward was a 
significant negative predictor of memory only for stimuli presented on switch choices 
(switch: -0.191 ± 0.057, t(27) = -3.37, P < 0.001; non-switch: -0.211 ± 0.038, t(27) = -.55, 
n.s.; this effect was found for chosen and non-chosen stimuli). 
These data demonstrate that reward learning modulates episodic memory 
formation for stimuli incidentally experienced during choice. Reward initially increased 
memory, but when tested after a delay of approximately 24 hours, reward decreased 
memory. Choice itself strongly increased memory formation, regardless of delay. 
 
Memory for feedback events: Study 2 
Study 2 was designed to probe the effect of ongoing reward learning on memory 
for stimuli experienced during feedback; this is in contrast to Study 1, where incidental 
pictures were presented during choice. First, we asked whether participants remembered 
the pictures from the reward learning task. While the object pictures were incidental to 
the task, a surprise memory test revealed that participants exhibited significant 
subsequent memory for the objects. When tested immediately (Study 2A), corrected hit 
rate was 30.4% ± 2.9 (hit rate: 56.0 % ± 3.0, false alarm rate: 25.6% ± 2.3). When tested 
after a delay of approximately 24 hours (Study 2B), corrected hit rate was 24.9% ± 2.8 
(hit rate: 48.3% ± 3.3, false alarm rate: 23.3% ± 2.8; corrected hit rate was not 
significantly different between Study 2A and 2B). 
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 Next, we investigated whether memory was modulated by trial-by-trial experience 
during reward learning. We found that when tested immediately, there was a trend for a 
positive effect of reward on memory (t(19) = 1.66, P = 0.097; Figure 4.2). When tested 
after a delay, reward was a significant positive predictor of memory (t(19) = 3.55, P < 
0.001; Figure 4.2). Although numerically larger, the effect of reward on memory was not 
significantly greater in the delayed memory test condition. In a separate analysis, we 
found that reward prediction error was a positive but weaker predictor of memory than 
reward (immediate test, t(18) = 1.58, P < 0.15; delayed test t(18) = 2.28, P < 0.05). We 
found no effect of the absolute value of reward prediction error (surprise). 
 
 
Table 4.2. Study 1: Choice stimulus memory prediction.  Choice	  and	  reward	  modulation	  of	  memory	  for	  stimuli	  seen	  during	  choice	  when	  tested	  immediately	  and	  after	  a	  delay.	  (*	  P	  <	  0.05,	  **	  P	  <	  0.01	  ***	  P	  <	  0.001.)	  
 
 Immediate probe 
coef. (se) 
Delayed probe 
 t coef. (se) t coef. (se) 
Choice        5.93*** 0.228 (0.038)      5.95*** 0.185 (0.031) 
Reward        2.12* 0.083 (0.039)    -2.24* -0.070 (0.031) 
constant        8.60*** 0.506 (0.059)      3.23* 0.212 (0.068) 
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Table 4.3. Study 2: Feedback stimulus memory prediction.   Reward	  modulation	  of	  memory	  for	  stimuli	  seen	  during	  feedback	  when	  tested	  immediately	  and	  after	  a	  delay.	  (†	  P	  <	  0.10,	  *	  P	  <	  0.05,	  **	  P	  <	  0.01	  ***	  P	  <	  0.001.)	  
 
Individual Differences 
Finally, we explored whether individual differences in reward learning behavior 
predicted memory formation. For pictures presented during choice (Study 1), we found 
that memory response hit rate was significantly correlated with how well participant’s 
choices were described by a reinforcement learning model (r = 0.43, P < 0.01; n = 49), 
such that participants with a better model fit had higher recognition hit rates. For pictures 
presented during feedback (Study 2), we found the opposite relationship: memory 
response hit rate was negatively correlated with reinforcement learning model fit (r = -
0.42, P < 0.01; n = 40; difference in correlations, P < 0.001). These opposing correlations 
suggest that the relationship between episodic memory encoding and reward-guided 
choice depends on whether memory processes are engaged during choice or feedback.  
  
 Immediate probe 
coef. (se) 
Delayed probe 
 t coef. (se) t coef. (se) 
Reward        1.66† 0.129 (0.078)    3.55*** 0.276 (0.078) 





Encoding of episodic experience and learning from feedback are often intermixed in 
everyday life. However, we know very little about how reward and episodic memory 
interact. To explore whether and how episodic memory formation is affected by ongoing 
reward learning, we adapted a basic reinforcement learning game to include incidental 
trial-unique object stimuli during choice selection or during reward feedback. We found 
that when memory was probed immediately after reward learning, reward increased 
memory for choice stimuli and marginally increased memory for feedback stimuli. 
Surprisingly, after a delay of one day, we found that memory for choice and feedback 
events was oppositely modulated by reward: reward decreased memory for choice stimuli 
but enhanced memory for stimuli presented during reward feedback. Choice itself was a 
positive modulator of memory when tested immediately and after a delay. 
 
Reward and memory.  
The beneficial effect of reward on episodic memory for feedback events fits well 
with prior research on reward and memory where learning was confined to single trials 
(Wittmann et al., 2005; Adcock et al., 2006). In our experiment, reward is experienced 
within a dynamic learning game, and thus the modulation of memory by reward that we 
observe occurs at the same time that reward is updating choice values in the task. In prior 
research, potential reward value was indicated before stimulus presentation (Adcock et 
al., 2006) or was cued by the category of stimulus presentation (Wittmann et al., 2005); 
our results additionally demonstrate that reward can increase memory for stimuli that are 
presented during reward feedback itself. Additionally, in our experiment we are able to 
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compare the effects of surprising positive vs. negative feedback on memory. Surprising 
feedback may increase arousal, which has been found in studies of emotion and memory 
to increase recollection (McGaugh, 2004; Phelps, 2004). However, we did not find an 
influence of overall feedback surprise on memory for choice or feedback events. 
The reward enhancement of memory for feedback episodes is in line with cellular 
research on the enhancing effects of dopamine release on memory (Shohamy and 
Adcock, 2010; Lisman et al., 2011). In the reward learning task, reward was never fully 
predicted, and thus unexpected reward feedback likely led to dopamine release in the 
striatum (Roitman et al., 2008) and possibly the hippocampus. Interestingly, the positive 
effect of reward on feedback memory was numerically higher after an approximately 24-
hour delay between learning and test, suggesting that neural processes such as 
consolidation enhance the effect of reward on memory. Such a consolidation benefit of 
reward-related memory is supported by research on plasticity in the hippocampus, where 
dopamine release during learning leads to stronger memory after consolidation (Huang 
and Kandel, 1995; Bethus et al., 2010). 
Unexpectedly, episodic memory for choice stimuli was negatively affected by 
reward after a delay, in contrast to the positive enhancement observed for feedback 
memory. The origin of this dissociation between choice memory and feedback memory is 
unknown; if the same reward signal from feedback events updates the value of choices, it 
is unclear why memory for choice events would be modulated negatively by reward.  
The different effects of reward on choice and feedback stimuli may be related to 
cognitive processes associated with ongoing behavioral adjustment in the reward learning 
task. Reward or miss feedback is relatively simple to process and does not require any 
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immediate action. The effect of reward feedback on choice options is more complex, 
because feedback must be used to update the value of options that are no longer present 
on the screen. This may influence the effect of reward on memory for choices. Another 
possibility is that the temporal separation between choice and feedback explains the 
dissociable effects of reward on memory: reward could decrease memory for stimuli 
further from feedback while reward could increase memory for stimuli closer to 
feedback.  
Changes in choices over the task provide further insight into how choice 
memories are negatively modulated by reward after a delay. The negative effect of 
reward on choice memory was only observed for choice memory when participants 
switched choices from the preceding trial. Switching commonly happens when a 
previously selected option does not lead to reward as often as expected or when 
participants explore the other option. The influence of switching on memory was only 
evident after a delay; when tested immediately, we found a positive effect of reward on 
memory regardless of switching. The different effects of reward on memory for choice 
and feedback events is an interesting area to explore in future research in choice 
situations as well as in reward learning tasks that do not involve choice (for example, in 
Pavlovian learning). 
The dissociation between the effect of reward on choice and feedback memory 
may have important implications for decision making. When decision-related stimuli are 
encountered later, our results suggest that prior positive experience will decrease 
recognition of choice-related stimuli. In contrast, prior positive experience will increase 
the recognition of feedback-related stimuli. In our study, this dissociation in the effect of 
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reward on memory was found when events were separated by several seconds. The effect 
on memory and future behavior may be even more significant if this dissociation extends 
to situations with longer gaps between decision and feedback.  
In our experiment, we may have been able to detect the dissociation between 
reward effects on choice and feedback memory because choice options were not present 
during feedback. This suggests that studies that do not separate choice and feedback may 
obtain weak or null effects of reward. However, in many experiences, stimuli present 
during choice are also present during feedback; for example, when exploring a new 
restaurant, the environment will be present from the time of ordering to evaluation. Our 
results make no clear predictions about reward and memory in these kinds of situations 
where events persist from decision to feedback. After a delay, memory could be 
dominated by the negative reward effect for choice stimuli, the positive reward effect of 
feedback stimuli, or a combination of both. 
 
Choice and memory. 
In addition to reward, choices during reward learning strongly increased memory 
for incidental stimuli presented within choices. Previous studies have not investigated 
episodic memory during a decision making task, and thus it was unknown whether choice 
would influence memory. The positive effect of choice on memory may be related to the 
greater value participants assign to chosen vs. non-chosen items. Participants’ goal was to 
choose the option that they currently thought was most likely to lead to reward, and thus 
choice itself may be considered a proxy for participant’s internal value estimates.  
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In an exploratory analysis, value, as estimated by a reinforcement learning model, 
exhibited some evidence for modulation of choice picture memory. When tested 
immediately, both chosen value and non-chosen value increased episodic memory at a 
trend level (P’s < 0.10). When tested after a delay, only non-chosen value had a positive 
effect on memory (P < 0.05). In future research, it will be of interest to explore 
connections between a memory benefit for choices and choice value signals, such as 
those commonly found in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Daw et al., 2006; Hare et 
al., 2008).  
Improved memory for choices is also likely related to attention. Recent research 
investigating visual fixation during product decision making has found that participants 
are biased to look at higher valued chosen options (Krajbich et al., 2010). Increased 
visual attention would have clear benefits for memory encoding. In the current 
experiment, we did not record measures of eye movements, but we would predict that 
participants fixated more on the chosen than non-chosen option. Additionally, choice 
selection may elicit similar memory benefits that have been reported for encoding during 
self-directed exploration (Voss et al., 2011). 
  
Conclusion and future directions. 
Our results demonstrate that experiences during ongoing reward learning 
influence episodic memory. The modulation of memory by experience may be 
particularly important for future behavior. For example, episodic memories formed 
during reward learning may influence future decisions. In future research, it will be of 
interest to explore how choice and reward feedback may bias not only later recollection 
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but also value-based decision making. While the reward learning task in our experiments 
looked at learning over a short time horizon, it may be possible for episodic memory and 
reward associations to bias choices hours and days later. 
One interesting question for future research is whether memory also contains 
traces of the reward feedback experienced during the choice trial. It is unknown if 
fleeting reward associations from only a single experience are encoded in memory. Some 
evidence suggests that reward associations are indeed remembered, at least when stimuli 
are repeated multiple times (Eppinger et al., 2010). Neurally, a recent functional imaging 
study of memory suggests that traces related to initial reward associations may be 
detectable upon re-exposure (Kuhl et al., 2010). Future research could determine whether 
participants can explicitly recall the reward feedback associated with choice or feedback 
events. 
In conclusion, we find that during reward learning, reward feedback does not just 
bias ongoing choices: reward exerts an additional influence on episodic memory 
formation. Additionally, choice strongly increases memory. Together, these findings 
support the idea that the brain encodes more than just the value of choices and feedback 


























Chapter	  5	  is	  from	  an	  in	  preparation	  manuscript:	  Wimmer,	  G.E.,	  Braun,	  E.K.,	  and	  Shohamy,	  D.	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In Chapter 4, I demonstrated that choice selection enhances memory. Additionally, 
reward enhances memory for feedback events, but has a shifting effect for choice events 
such that reward initially enhances memory but decreases memory after a delay. Here, I 
explore neural correlates of the enhancing effects of choice on memory and the 
interaction of reward feedback and memory, focusing on the long-term effects on memory 
using a 24-hour delay between reward learning and memory. 
 
Abstract 
 Memory for events is critical for adaptive behavior, but because memory is 
limited, it is important to selectively encode important events. Recent research has begun 
to investigate how episodic memory is modulated by salient experiences such as reward, 
but surprisingly little is known about how memory is affected by ongoing learning and 
decision making. To explore how memory is influenced by learning, we employed 
functional MRI and a reward learning task. Participants made choices between two 
options (colored squares), each associated with a drifting reward probability. Incidental, 
trial-unique object pictures were overlaid on each option. One day after the reward 
learning task, participants were given a surprise memory probe for the pictures. Although 
unrelated to the task, we found that participants had significant memory for the pictures. 
Neurally, activation in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex was related to choice value as 
well as to successful memory formation for pictures in chosen options. A similar effect of 
choice memory was found in the hippocampus: activation in the hippocampus was related 
not just to overall memory, but specifically to the effect of choices on memory. In 
separate regions of the striatum, reward prediction error signals at feedback interacted 
both negatively and positively with memory. Further, activity in the striatum correlated 
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with individual differences in the behavioral influence of reward on memory. These 
results demonstrate that episodic memory formation is influenced by ongoing learning 
and provide insight into how separate neural systems for episodic memory and reward 





We cannot remember everything – our memory formation is selective. Prior 
decisions and outcomes may bias what we remember and what we forget; this selective 
memory, in turn, determines the knowledge we can use in future decisions. Memory and 
learning from feedback are often closely related during dynamic behavior such as goal 
pursuit, but experimentally, memory formation is often studies in isolated environments. 
The hippocampus is a critical part of a neural system for encoding specific experiences, 
termed relational memory (Davachi, 2006). Recently, studies have begun to investigate 
how memory and hippocampal activity are modulated by salient aspects of the 
environment, such as reward (Wittmann et al., 2005; Adcock et al., 2006; Mather and 
Schoeke, 2011). Nevertheless, it remains largely unknown whether and how episodic 
memory is modulated by ongoing behavior, such as learning from reward feedback. Is 
memory affected by the value participants assign to choices? Is memory strengthened by 
the same neural mechanisms by which reward feedback updates values?  
While memory for everyday experiences and events often takes place alongside 
active exploration and goal seeking, few studies have probed the effect of exploration and 
choice on memory. Recently, a benefit for volitional exploration on memory formation in 
an intentional encoding paradigm was demonstrated, an effect supported by increased 
hippocampal-cortical coupling during encoding (Voss et al., 2011).  
 If active choice does modulate episodic memory, this effect may be related to 
neural correlates of predicted reward value. In human fMRI studies, choice value has 
been shown to correlate with activation in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) 
(Daw et al., 2006; Knutson et al., 2007; Plassmann et al., 2007; Hare et al., 2008). 
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Participant’s choices can also be predicted by attention, as measured by visual fixations 
(Krajbich et al., 2010). This attentional effect has been related to valuation in the VMPFC 
(Lim et al., 2011).  
Reward may also modulate episodic memory. The reward value of cues has been 
shown to enhance incidental memory (Wittmann et al., 2005; Mather and Schoeke, 
2011), an effect related to midbrain and hippocampal activity (Wittmann et al., 2005). In 
a reward-motivated encoding context, reward has also been shown to enhance memory 
and hippocampal activation (Adcock et al., 2006). In addition to reward, many previous 
studies have explored the influence of emotion on memory. Emotion, in particular 
arousal, has also been shown to increase memory (McGaugh, 2004; Phelps, 2004). 
Collectively, these findings provide preliminary evidence for the possible role of 
choice and reward on episodic memory formation. However, other research suggests that 
memory may be unaffected by reward learning. This hypothesis is suggested by results 
showing a competition between an episodic memory system in the hippocampus and a 
reward learning system in the striatum (Poldrack and Packard, 2003). Similarly, reward 
learning may have no effect on memory formation simply because reward feedback only 
affect the value of options, to the exclusion of modulating episodic memory formation. 
Our goal was to better understand how choice and reward modulate memory and 
to explore the neural systems that predict memory during learning. We adapted a well-
established reward learning task that has been shown in previous studies to reliably elicit 
neural activation related to choice value and reward prediction error, the difference 
between choice value and reward feedback (Daw et al., 2006; Schönberg et al., 2007). 
Participants attempted to choose the most rewarding option in a simple learning game 
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with fluctuating reward probabilities. Choice options also contained incidental object 
pictures. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data were collected during 
reward learning. Memory was measured in a surprise memory probe approximately 24 
hours after encoding. Our paradigm brings together learning and decision making in the 
kind of dynamic environment experienced in everyday behavior, where there are no 
discrete episodic learning phases and reward learning phases, and where multiple 
memory systems, including reward learning in the striatum and episodic memory 





Figure 5.1. Reward learning and memory task.  
A,	  Reward	  learning	  task	  where	  participants	  tried	  to	  maximize	  reward	  by	  making	  repeated	  choices	  between	  colored	  options.	  B,	  Choice	  options	  included	  incidental	  trial-­‐unique	  picture	  stimuli	  that	  were	  unrelated	  to	  the	  reward	  learning	  game.	  Surprise	  subsequent	  memory	  test,	  administered	  a	  day	  after	  the	  reward	  learning	  session.	  	  	  
Methods  
Participants. Thirty-two fluent English speakers with no neurological or psychiatric 
disorders and normal or corrected-to-normal vision participated in the study. Informed 
consent was obtained in a manner approved by the Columbia University Institutional 
Review Board. Two subject’s data were excluded due to errors in behavioral data 
collection, leaving thirty subjects (15 female; mean age, 23 years; range, 18-35). For the 
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reward learning and subsequent memory MRI analyses, we first analyzed all subjects. In 
later analyses, we focused on a subgroup of 18 subjects with higher memory performance 
(> 5% corrected memory). Subjects were paid $20 per hour for the approximately 3.5-
hour duration of participation in the two sessions plus one-half of the nominal rewards 
they earned in the experimental task. 
 
Task. The experiment consisted of two sessions performed on consecutive days. On day 
one, subjects completed a reward learning task that included incidental exposure to trial-
unique picture stimuli. On day two, subjects returned to the lab to complete a surprise 
probe of memory for pictures that were seen on day one. 
In the reward learning task (Figure 5.1A), subjects chose one of two presented 
options and then received monetary feedback. The reward learning task is a variant of a 
“two-armed bandit” task (e.g., Schönberg et al., 2007), with the two choice options 
distinguished by a (blue or green) colored frame around a central square. The left-right 
location of the options was permuted randomly from trial to trial. On each trial, subjects 
had 2 s to choose between the options, using an MR-compatible button response pad held 
in the right hand (Figure 5.1A). So as to maintain equal visual saliency of both options 
and the included pictures, the choice selection was not highlighted. Options remained on 
the screen for 2.5 s. After a blank 1 s inter-stimulus-interval, subjects then received 
binary reward feedback for 1.75 s. A $0.25 “win” outcome was represented by an image 
of a quarter dollar (Figure 5.1A) and a $0.00 “miss” outcome was represented by a 
phase-scrambled image of a quarter dollar. If no choice was recorded during the choice 
period, no reward outcome was displayed and "Too late!" was presented on the screen 
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until the end of the trial. A jittered fixation inter-trial-interval (ITI) preceded the next trial 
(mean 3.5 s, range 1.5-13.5); to signal trial onset, the fixation cross shifted from white to 
black 1 s preceding the next trial. 
Subjects were instructed that each option was associated with a different 
probability of reward, that these probabilities could change slowly, and that their goal 
was to attempt to find the most rewarding option at a given time in order to earn the most 
money. They were also instructed that rewards were tied to the color and not the option 
position. Subjects completed a short paid practice version to familiarize them with the 
task, and this practice was repeated once participants were situated inside the MRI 
scanner. 
Each of the two options was associated with a different probability of monetary 
reward. Throughout the 100 choices in the experiment, the reward probabilities diffused 
gradually to encourage continual learning. Reward probabilities were generated using 
Gaussian random walks with reflecting boundary conditions at 20% and 80%. Two 
instantiations of random walks were generated of mean 50%; these were inverted to 
create four total reward probability sequences. Reward probability sequences were 
counterbalanced between subjects, as was the mapping of color assignment to the 
underlying reward sequences.  
To investigate the influence of reward learning on memory formation, trial-unique 
object pictures were included in the center of each option. Subjects were informed of the 
presence of the object pictures but they were instructed that the pictures were not part of 
the reward learning task. Four different lists of 200 stimuli were selected for the reward 
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learning task, and 100 stimuli were reserved as new items for the memory probe. Object 
picture lists were counterbalanced between subjects. 
Following the initial reward learning task, subjects completed a control reward 
learning task with 100 trials that lacked object pictures. In this task, choice options were 
represented by shapes (e.g., a yellow circle and triangle) instead of colored frames. 
The duration and distribution of null events was optimized for estimation of rapid 
event-related fMRI responses as calculated using Optseq software 
(http://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/optseq/). The task was presented using Matlab 
(Mathworks, Natick, MA) and the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997). The reward 
learning task was projected onto a mirror above the subject’s eyes. 
On the day after the first session, subjects returned to the lab and completed a 
surprise memory probe to measure subsequent memory for the object pictures 
incidentally presented during the reward learning task. In the memory session, subjects 
saw each of the 200 pictures that had been presented on the preceding day plus 100 novel 
pictures, in a pseudo-randomized order. Pictures were presented in the center of the 
screen above the response options “Old” and “New” (Figure 5.1B). Pictures were 
surrounded by a grey frame to avoid the influence of color choice biases from reward 
learning on memory responses. Subjects indicated by key press whether they thought that 
the picture was old (seen during the preceding day’s reward learning task) or new (not 
previously seen in this experimental context). Then, subjects indicated how certain they 
were in their response on a 1-4 scale while viewing corresponding response options of 
“Guess”, “Somewhat certain”, “Very certain”, and “Completely certain”. Responses for 
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the memory session were self-paced. Multiple opportunities for rest breaks were 
included. The memory probe session was completed on a laptop computer.  
Following the memory probe session, subjects completed a written questionnaire 
that queried choice strategies and attention during the reward task and memory probe 
session, as well as whether they thought during the reward task that their memory may be 
tested for the incidentally-presented object pictures. Finally, subjects were informed how 
much money they had won in the experiment and were paid for their participation. 
 
Imaging procedure. Whole-brain imaging was conducted on a 3.0T Phillips MRI system 
at Columbia University’s Program for Imaging and Cognitive Sciences, using a SENSE 
head coil. Head padding was used to minimize head motion; no subject’s motion 
exceeded 2 mm in any direction from one volume acquisition to the next. Functional 
images were collected using a gradient echo T2*-weighted echoplanar (EPI) sequence 
with blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) contrast (TR = 2000 ms, TE = 15 ms, 
flip angle = 82, 3 X 3 X 3 mm voxel size; 45 contiguous axial slices). For each functional 
scanning run, five discarded volumes were collected prior to the first trial to allow for 
magnetic field equilibration. Four functional runs of 232 TRs (7 min and 44 s) were 
collected, each including 50 trials. Following the functional runs, structural images were 






First, we verified that subjects adjusted their choices dynamically in response to 
the rewarding outcomes in both the reward learning task with incidental stimuli and in the 
second control task without pictures. Because of the fluctuating probability of reward, we 
could not estimate a learning curve or a percent correct over the course of the task. 
Instead, as in prior studies, a logistic regression model was fit to explain each subject’s 
sequence of choices in terms of two explanatory variables coding events from the 
previous trial: the choice made and whether it was rewarded (both coded as binary 
indicators) (Lau and Glimcher, 2005; Gershman et al., 2009; Daw et al., 2011; Li and 
Daw, 2011).  
To estimate reward learning rates in the primary task and the control task, as well 
as to generate trial-by-trial reward prediction error predictors of memory, we fit a 
temporal difference reinforcement learning (RL) model to subject’s choice behavior 
(Sutton and Barto, 1998). Such analyses attempt to explain the timeseries of choices in 
terms of previous events. (See O'Doherty et al., 2007; Daw, 2011 for reviews of the 
methodology.) Option values were initialized with a value of 0.5 and updated after 
reward feedback by the difference between the expected option value and the reward 
outcome – reward prediction error – scaled by the learning rate. Choices are presumed to 
be guided by a function of option value, with probabilities derived from a softmax 
distribution. The model also included a perseveration parameter, which captures a 
tendency to repeat or avoid selecting the same option on the subsequent trial (Lau and 
Glimcher, 2005; Schönberg et al., 2007).  
Parameters were optimized for each subject using an optimization routine which 
included 20 starting points to avoid local minima. Median values for the learning rate, 
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softmax inverse temperature (beta), and perseveration were used to generate choice 
values and reward prediction errors. Median values were used as the relatively low 
number of choices in the current experiment (selected to maximize subsequent memory 
performance) limits the reliability of individual parameter estimates.  
To predict memory formation during reward learning, we employed random-
effects logistic regression (implemented in STATA 9.1; StataCorp, College Station, TX). 
The model predicted memory for incidental pictures (a binary outcome variable) via trial-
by-trial variables from the reward learning task. All responses were included in reported 
analyses; removing low-confidence memory responses did not qualitatively alter the 
results. In the memory analyses, we constructed two models. A simple model included 
only choice and the effect of feedback, formalized as reward prediction error.  
A complete memory prediction model also included decision reaction time, 
reward learning trial number, memory probe trial number, prior trial reward, next trial 
reward, choice difficulty (negative entropy), exploratory choices, recent memory (mean 
over the past four trials), future memory (mean over the next four trials), the likelihood 
that a stimulus would lead to a switch in choice (derived from the group’s behavior), and 
the side of stimulus presentation. Results for predictors of interest do not change with the 
inclusion of these additional control variables. Additionally, we hypothesized that reward 
feedback may have a larger influence on memory when reward and omitted reward is 
more surprising. Thus, we conducted a second regression model that only included trials 





Imaging analysis. Preprocessing and data analysis was performed using AFNI (Cox, 
1996) and Statistical Parametric Mapping software (SPM8; Wellcome Department of 
Imaging Neuroscience, Institute of Neurology, London, UK). Functional images were 
coregistered manually using AFNI; the remainder of the analysis was completed in SPM. 
Images were realigned to correct for subject motion and then spatially normalized by 
estimating a warping to template space from each subject’s anatomical image and 
applying the resulting transformation to the EPIs. Images were resampled to 2 mm cubic 
voxels, smoothed with an 8 mm FWHM Gaussian kernel, and filtered with a 128 s high-
pass filter. Data collected for one subject during the 2011 Virginia earthquake were 
inspected with independent component analysis as implemented in FSL’s MELODIC 
(Beckmann and Smith, 2004) to ensure that no artifacts were introduced by the 
earthquake. 
For analysis of all phases of the experiment, fMRI model regressors were 
convolved with the canonical hemodynamic response function and entered into a general 
linear model (GLM) of each subject’s fMRI data. The six scan-to-scan motion parameters 
produced during realignment were included as additional regressors in the GLM to 
account for residual effects of subject movement. Linear contrasts of the resulting SPMs 
were taken to a group-level (random-effects) analysis. We report results corrected for 
family-wise error (FWE) due to multiple comparisons (Friston et al., 1993); this approach 
assesses the strength of activations defined by an initial and arbitrary uncorrected 
threshold, which we take as P < 0.005 for all analyses. Accordingly, for display purposes, 
we render all SVC significant activations at this threshold. We conduct this correction at 
the peak-level within small volumes for which we had an a priori hypothesis or at the 
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whole-brain cluster level. For regions of interest in the striatum and in the MTL 
(including both the hippocampus and parahippocampal cortex) we used anatomically 
defined masks derived from the AAL atlas (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002). For more 
focused a priori analyses in the hippocampus, we used 6mm spherical regions of interest 
centered at (-20, -10, -18) and (20, -12, -18) based on a previous report of reward and 
memory interactions (Adcock et al., 2006). Further, choice value and reward prediction 
error activation during the reward learning task was used to define masks for small 
volume correction in the VMPFC and striatum, respectively (thresholded at P < 0.005, 
uncorrected). All voxel locations are reported in Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) 
coordinates, and results are displayed overlaid on the average of all subjects’ normalized 
high-resolution structural images. 
In an initial general linear model (GLM), we estimated BOLD correlates of trial-
to-trial reinforcement learning variables. The model included regressors at choice for 
choice probability (referred to henceforth as choice value) and at feedback for reward 
prediction error (both modeled for 0.5 s). This model was estimated for functional data 
from the reward learning task with pictures, the control task without pictures, and both 
tasks combined. Mean RL parameter values across subjects were used to generate 
regressors for the fMRI model, as individual parameter fits in tasks and models of this 
sort tend to be noisy, and regularization of the fit parameters across subjects tends to 
improve a model’s subsequent fit to fMRI data (following previous work: Daw et al., 
2006; Schönberg et al., 2007; Gershman et al., 2009). 
Our primary GLM analysis targeted neural signals predictive of subsequent 
memory for the incidentally presented object pictures. This model included two 
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regressors during the choice period for memory for chosen items and non-chosen items 
(modeled for 0.5 s) and two regressors during the feedback period for reward prediction 
error modulated by memory for chosen items and non-chosen items (modeled for 0.5 s). 
At the second level, we constructed contrasts of interest of the resulting beta maps: at 
choice, the contrasts of interest were overall memory, memory for chosen items, and 
memory for non-chosen items; at reward feedback, the contrast of interest was the 
modulation of reward prediction error by memory. Finally, individual differences in the 
influence of reward prediction error on memory were correlated with the beta coefficients 
from the interaction of reward prediction error and memory. To capture the full range of 
individual variability and to maximize power to detect an effect, this analysis was 








First, we established that participants used reward feedback to guide their choices 
in the reward learning task. In a logistic regression model of choice, the effect of reward 
on the prior choice was significant (0.766 ± 0.043 (mean ± SEM), P < 0.001), as was the 
effect of prior choice (0.731 ± 0.043, P < 0.001). In the control task with no pictures, the 
effect of reward on the prior choice was also significant (0.994 ± 0.047, P < 0.001), as 
was the effect of prior choice (0.924 ± 0.047, P < 0.001). These effect did not differ 
between the two tasks. The similar influence of reward on choice from these two tasks 
indicates that reward learning behavior was not qualitatively changed by the inclusion of 
incidental pictures in choice options. 
Using a reinforcement learning model, mean parameters were: learning rate = 
0.62 ± 0.05, beta = 2.94 ± 0.39, and perseveration = 0.09 ± 0.05. In the control task, mean 
parameters were: learning rate = 0.71 ± 0.05, beta = 3.69 ± 0.52, and perseveration = 0.05 
± 0.04. While any differences between these parameters could be due to additional 
experience in the reward learning task, perseveration was lower in the control task (t(29) = 
2.30, P < 0.05).  
Next, we turned to our primary question of whether and how episodic memory is 
modulated by reward learning. Although the object pictures were incidental to the 
participant’s goal of maximizing their reward, participants nevertheless exhibited 
significant subsequent memory. Corrected hit rate was 16.9% ± 2.2 (hit rate: 53.0% ± 
2.4; false alarm rate: 36.1% ± 2.8 (n = 18)). We found that memory was strongly 
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enhanced when a picture was presented in a chosen option (0.110 ± 0.035; t(16) = 3.16, P 
< 0.01; choice memory benefit = 5.4%; Figure 5.2). 
We then explored the modulation of memory by reward feedback, focusing on 
reward prediction error, a trial-by-trial variable computed as the difference between 
expected reward and received reward. The effect of reward prediction error on memory 
was negative but non-significant (-0.064 ± 0.064; t(16) = -1.00; Figure 5.2). As more 
surprising reward feedback may have a stronger effect on memory, we next restricted our 
analysis to trials with high positive and negative reward prediction errors. We found a 
significant negative effect of reward prediction error on memory (-0.265 ± 0.090; t(16) = -
2.94,  P < 0.01). We found no effect of feedback “surprise”, the absolute value of reward 
prediction error, on memory. Thus, surprising positive reward feedback led to a 
decreased likelihood of memory formation, while surprising miss feedback led to an 
increased likelihood of memory formation. The finding of a negative influence of reward 







Figure 5.2. Memory prediction.  
Influence of choice and reward feedback on the likelihood of successful memory 
formation. (*  P < 0.01.) 
 
fMRI Results 
We focused our imaging analyses on detecting brain activity related to the 
modulation of episodic memory by reward learning. First, we found that overall memory 
was predicted by activation in the posterior hippocampus (Figure S5.1) and visual cortex 
during choices (Figure S5.2). Next, we localized regions correlated with choice value 
and reward prediction error. Replicating prior results, we found that activity in the 
VMPFC correlated with chosen option value (z = 4.78 (-6, 50, -8); Figure S5.3) and that 
activity in the striatum correlated with reward prediction errors at feedback (right z = 
4.87 (30, -10, -6), left z = 4.21 (-30, -10, 6); Figure S5.3).  
Neural correlates of the benefit of choice on memory. In the region of the VMPFC 
correlated with choice value, we found a significant subsequent memory effect for 
chosen, but not non-chosen, items (Figure 5.3A). Greater activity correlated with 
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memory for chosen items. The same region of the VMPFC region was responsive to 
value and choice memory, but the value signal was not modulated by memory. 
Additionally, we found that activation in the bilateral anterior hippocampus correlated 
with memory for chosen stimuli (Figure 5.3B).  
 
 




Interactions between memory formation and reward prediction error. We next 
explored activation to reward feedback that may be modulated by memory formation. 
Thus, we examined the interaction of subsequent memory and reward prediction error. 
Regions where activity significantly correlates with the interaction show differential 
prediction error activity for remembered versus forgotten trials. Neural effects were 
similar for chosen vs. non-chosen items, so results are presented for the combined 
interaction. We first examined this interaction in the striatal region with the strongest 
effect of reward prediction error, the ventral putamen, (Figure S5.3). Activation in the 
right ventral putamen negatively correlated with the interaction of episodic memory and 
reward prediction error (Figure 5.4). In this region, activity was significantly correlated 











Figure 5.5. Memory and prediction error interaction in the right caudate.  (z	  =	  3.77	  (16,	  14,	  8);	  P	  <	  0.05	  SVC	  in	  the	  striatum.)	  
 
 We next explored the interaction of memory and reward prediction error 
in the striatum more broadly. In the right caudate, activation was significantly positively 
correlated with the interaction of reward prediction error and memory (Figure 5.5). Thus, 
in contrast to the effect in the putamen, in the caudate, the correlation with reward 
prediction error was greater on remembered trials. 
We also probed interactions between memory and reward prediction error in the 
medial temporal lobe. In the left hippocampus, we found a positive interaction of reward 
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prediction error and memory (-24, -14, -18, z = 2.80, P < 0.05 SVC). This cluster was 
adjacent to the region of the left hippocampus that correlated with memory for chosen 
items. 
 Finally, we explored whether individual differences in the negative effect of 
reward on memory related to neural activity during learning. Reward prediction error 
tended to negatively influence memory; we correlated individual differences in this 
behavioral effect with the neural interaction of memory and reward prediction error. We 
found a significant correlation between participant’s tendency to remember stimuli on 
rewarded trials and activity in the caudate correlated with interaction of reward prediction 
error and memory (Figure 5.6). While reward prediction error tended to negatively 
influence memory formation, in the caudate, only participants with a beneficial effect of 









Figure 5.6. Reward memory effect correlates with caudate interaction of prediction 





We explored the modulation of episodic memory formation by ongoing reward learning. 
Our results demonstrate that episodic memory for incidental pictures is influenced by 
choice and reward. Neurally, memory for pictures in chosen options was related to 
activation in the VMPFC, a region also correlated with choice value. Additionally, 
prediction error responses in the striatum were significantly modulated by successful 
memory formation. While it may be predicted that memory would be unaffected by 
reward learning, our results support a perspective suggesting a cooperative interaction 
between memory systems in the hippocampus and striatum (Shohamy and Adcock, 2010; 
Wimmer et al., 2012).  
 
Choice and memory 
Behaviorally, we found that memory for incidental pictures was strongly 
predicted by choice selection, such that an object presented in a chosen option was much 
more likely to be recognized later than an object presented in a non-chosen option. The 
increase in memory for choices may be related to value: participants’ goal was to choose 
the option that they currently thought was most likely to lead to reward, and thus at this 
level choice is a proxy for valuation. While choice predicted memory, choice values 
estimated from a reinforcement learning model did not significantly predict memory; this 
null effect may be due to limitations in the reward learning model or in model fitting.  
In the VMPFC, a region commonly found to correlate with value (Daw et al., 
2006; Plassmann et al., 2007; Hare et al., 2008), we found an overlapping neural correlate 
of memory for chosen items and choice value. Interestingly, we found that the neural 
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correlate of choice memory did not relate to correlates of choice value: activity during 
remembered and forgotten choices was similarly correlated with choice value. Future 
studies targeted at memory and value may be necessary to better understand these signals 
in the VMPFC. 
In conjunction with value, the benefit of choice on memory may also be related to 
attention. During decision making, it has been demonstrated that participants are biased 
to look more at chosen versus non-chosen options (Krajbich et al., 2010). In the current 
experiment, we did not record eye-tracking data, but it is likely that participants exhibited 
differential looking toward the chosen option, which may have contributed to enhanced 
memory. Interestingly, the effect of visual fixation during decision making has been 
correlated with activation in the VMPFC (Lim et al., 2011). 
Episodic memory for chosen options was also predicted by activation in the 
hippocampus, a region critical for relational memory formation (Davachi, 2006). 
Activation in these regions of the hippocampus did not predict successful memory 
formation for non-chosen items. The differential effect of hippocampal activation on 
memory for chosen vs. non-chosen items suggests that the hippocampus does not blindly 
encode experiences: hippocampal responses are modulated by choice and likely by active 
behavior. This interpretation is supported by a recent study that demonstrated greater 
memory for items experienced during volitional exploration and intentional encoding 
(Voss et al., 2011), an effect related to enhanced hippocampal-cortical functional 
connectivity. Our results further demonstrate that trial-by-trial choice engage encoding 




Reward and memory 
During reward learning, surprisingly, we found that reward feedback had a 
negative influence on episodic memory. For high values of prediction error, large positive 
prediction errors decreased the likelihood of successful memory while large negative 
prediction errors increased the likelihood of successful memory. Overall, reward 
prediction error negatively but non-significantly modulated memory. The negative effect 
of reward result is counter to a hypothesized positive effect of reward on memory 
suggested by related studies (Wittmann et al., 2005). However, the negative effect of 
reward replicates a behavioral finding of a significant negative effect of reward on choice 
stimulus memory in a similar experiment (Chapter 4). The current finding is weaker; this 
may be due to the relatively low rate of overall memory, possibly caused by the change in 
environment from the scanned encoding phase to the non-scanned probe. 
Neurally, we found that episodic memory formation modulated a reward 
prediction error signal in the striatum. In the ventral putamen, a region correlated with 
prediction error overall, we found that prediction error was only expressed for 
unsuccessful memory trials (Figure 5.4). Conversely, in a more anterior region of the 
striatum in the caudate, we found a positive interaction of reward and memory (Figure 
5.5); here, prediction error was only expressed when stimuli were successfully encoded. 
The same region predicted individual differences of the influence of reward on memory: 
participants with a reward enhancement of memory exhibited differential reward 
prediction error signaling for remembered vs. forgotten stimuli (Figure 5.6). Reward 
prediction error-related activation in human fMRI has been demonstrated in many 
different types of reward tasks (O'Doherty et al., 2007). However, to our knowledge, the 
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modulation of reward prediction error by memory encoding processes has not been 
shown.  
Based on prior studies of memory, we predicted that reward would have a positive 
effect on episodic memory. Prior fMRI research has found that incidental stimuli that 
signal high versus low potential reward value show increased memory and greater 
activity in the hippocampus and midbrain (Wittmann et al., 2005). Also, in an intentional 
encoding paradigm, stimuli presented on high value trials were more likely to be 
remembered (Adcock et al., 2006), an effect predicted by correlated activity in the 
hippocampus and midbrain.  
Our finding of a negative effect of reward on memory is also surprising given the 
role of dopamine in memory formation in the hippocampus (Shohamy and Adcock, 
2010). Dopamine has been shown to be critical for the maintenance of long-term neural 
connections in the hippocampus (Huang and Kandel, 1995; Otmakhova and Lisman, 
1996; Bethus et al., 2010). Phasic fluctuations in dopamine in the striatum have been 
related to reward prediction errors (Schultz, 2006). However, the timescale of dopamine 
fluctuations in the hippocampus has not been resolved and thus it is difficult to make 
strong predictions about the effect of dopamine on memory in the hippocampus 
(Shohamy and Adcock, 2010). Future studies may reveal the mechanisms underlying the 
effect of reward on memory by investigating the effect of memory probe delays and the 
effect of presenting incidental stimuli at choice or at feedback. 
 During reward learning, how does memory formation interact with reward 
prediction errors? Ongoing neural processes responsible for memory encoding may 
influence striatal activity coding reward prediction errors. By the time of reward 
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feedback, memory encoding processes are already underway (as evidenced by activation 
predicting memory in the hippocampus and posterior cortex, Figures S5.1-S5.2). These 
memory processes may interact with striatal coding of prediction errors via cortico-
striatal and hippocampal-striatal connections (Haber and Knutson, 2010; Pennartz et al., 
2011). Alternatively, reward prediction error signaling may promote or inhibit neural 
systems responsible for memory encoding. While we did not find correlates of 
connectivity changes between the striatum and hippocampus during memory formation, 
functional connectivity could provide further information about the interaction between 
memory processes and reward prediction error. Connectivity may also illuminate the 
different patterns of memory and prediction error interactions we observed in the 
putamen and caudate. 
 
Conclusion and future directions 
In future work, it will be of interest to probe whether and how episodic memory 
formed during reward learning influences later decision making. It is possible that the 
fleeting experience of reward and choice during learning leaves traces in memory. 
Supporting this idea, a recent fMRI study found significant traces of value from a reward-
motivated encoding task at re-exposure (Kuhl et al., 2010). In a future encounter, it is an 
interesting question whether remembered items could push or pull behavior based on 
traces of choice and value from initial encoding. For example, if remembered choices 
reactivate the VMPFC region associated with successful encoding, could this activity 
shift valuation processes in the VMPFC and bias decision making? 
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In conclusion, we find that episodic memory formation is modulated by ongoing 
reward learning. The idea that memory, reward, and decision making are tightly related is 
consistent with recent research that has begun to show how episodic memory guides 
future behavior (Buckner, 2010). A strength of the current approach is that episodic 
memories were formed during ongoing, goal-directed reward learning. This approach 
allows us to concurrently probe both reward learning and episodic memory. Our results 
demonstrate that during reward learning, the brain encodes more than just choice values 
and feedback. Behaviorally, episodic memory was increased for chosen options. 
Surprisingly, memory was negatively modulated by reward feedback. Neurally, we find 
that regions coding value and reward are also modulated by successful memory 
formation. The integrative study of memory formation and learning from feedback 








Figure S5.1. Hippocampus and memory.  Activation	  in	  the	  left	  hippocampus	  during	  choice	  predictive	  of	  overall	  subsequent	  memory	  (z	  =	  3.97	  (-­‐26,	  -­‐26,	  -­‐12);	  P	  <	  0.05	  SVC).	  	  
 
  



































In the studies presented in this dissertation, I have demonstrated novel interactions 
between learning and memory systems during learning and decision making. These 
studies further our broader understanding of learning systems, how they interact, and how 
they guide behavior. The studies described in Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrated that 
relational representations, supported by the hippocampus, interact with the striatum and 
affect reward learning and value-based decision making. The studies reported in Chapters 
4 and 5 demonstrated that the formation of long-term episodic memories is affected by 
processes previously thought to be the exclusive domain of incremental stimulus-reward 
learning, including choice, value and reward feedback.  
 In Chapter 2, I investigated the neural systems supporting generalization of value 
information across options in an environment where stimuli are related by similar reward 
likelihood (Wimmer, Daw, and Shohamy, 2012). The striatum, as shown previously, 
contributed to reward learning. Interestingly, however, striatal signals related to reward 
learning also reflected generalization across options, based information beyond each 
option’s reward history. Activity in the hippocampus reflected a different aspect of 
learning, coding choice values. Functional connectivity between the striatum and 
hippocampus predicted the degree to which participants generalized reward across 
options. Thus, although striatum and hippocampus are traditionally associated with 
reward learning and relational learning, respectively, I observed reflections of both sorts 
of learning in both systems. 
 Next, in Chapter 3, I explored the interaction of relational and reward learning 
systems in to further probe how relational representations guide decision making 
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(Wimmer and Shohamy, in press). This experiment was designed to test the hypothesis 
that relational memory processes in the hippocampus can support shifts in value and bias 
later decision making. Here, I found that activation in the hippocampus during reward 
learning indeed predicted a shift in value for previously associated stimuli. Additionally, 
this behavior was predicted by reactivation of associations in specific visual cortical 
regions as well as by functional connectivity between the hippocampus and striatum. 
 Finally, in Chapter 4 and 5 I explored how choice and reward learning influence 
memory formation. Behaviorally, these studies demonstrated that memory formation 
during reward learning was significantly modulated by reward, as well as choice. 
Intriguingly, a 24-hour delay between learning and the memory test revealed changes in 
the strength and direction of the influence of reward on memory. For pictures presented 
during choice, reward enhanced memory at the immediate test but impaired memory at 
the delayed test; for pictures presented during feedback, reward enhanced memory both 
immediately and after a delay. Chapter 5 explored the neural correlates of the effect of 
choice and reward on episodic memory. Neurally, the enhancement of choice picture 
memory by choice was related to activation in the VMPFC and hippocampus, while the 
surprising impairment of memory by reward was related to a modulation of prediction 
error activity in the striatum. 
 
Limitations and Future Directions 
Limitations 
The research studies presented in this dissertation have several limitations. First, 
the results on the neural substrates of learning and memory are based on fMRI data. The 
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fMRI BOLD signal provides correlational evidence for neural involvement in learning 
and memory, but data from this method cannot show that a given area is necessary for 
relational or reward learning. However, it is important to note that our interpretation of 
these results is based upon and converges with evidence from lesion and 
electrophysiology studies in animals. For example, in the case of decision bias in Chapter 
3, my results on the role of the hippocampus in learning are supported by prior animal 
lesion studies that show a necessary role for the hippocampus in similar behaviors (e.g. 
Port and Patterson, 1984; Port et al., 1987). Importantly, fMRI can demonstrate precisely 
when learning systems are engaged, evidence that these lesion studies cannot provide. 
Additionally, my fMRI results that suggest an interaction between learning 
systems only provide correlational evidence for an interaction. For example, the finding 
in Chapter 3 that functional connectivity between the hippocampus and striatum predicts 
decision bias cannot demonstrate that the correlation between the hippocampus and 
striatum plays a causal role in driving decision bias. Future research studies using 
different methodologies such as patient studies will be necessary to determine the causal 
role of the hippocampus and striatum in these processes. Notably, the studies in Chapter 2 
and 3 make use of paradigms that can be easily tested in animals. Thus, future 
electrophysiological or optogenetic studies in animals may provide an important test of 
the necessary role of different brain regions for these behaviors, complementing the fMRI 
results in humans.  
A further limitation is that these studies were all conducted using controlled 
experimental paradigms and environments. It will be of interest to explore how the 
findings presented in this dissertation connect to real-world behavior. A primary 
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motivation of these studies was to investigate learning in situations more similar to 
everyday experience than many prior studies of learning and memory. In my 
experiments, both reward and relational information is often concurrently available. Even 
though the results suggest that different learning systems are indeed engaged in decision 
making, it is possible that the experimental situations do not generalize to how decision 
making operates in real-world situations. Further, the experimental results themselves 
may have limited generalizability to the larger population, as our studies were conducted 
on a young adult group largely drawn from a selective university community.  
 Finally, this research may be limited as they rely on using monetary rewards as 
positive feedback. It will be of interest to explore whether these results extend to learning 
and decision making when the rewards used are not only monetary gains. While 
monetary rewards have been shown to elicit similar patterns of brain activity as desired 
products, foods, and primary rewards such as juice (e.g. Chib et al., 2009), the 
implications of our results for decision making would be more generalizable if other 
forms of reward were used. Similarly, it will be important to verify whether these results 
extend to aversive feedback such as monetary loss. Of interest, prior results in the 
decision bias paradigm hint that monetary loss leads to a weaker decision bias (Wimmer 
and Shohamy, 2011).  
In particular, regarding the effect of reward learning on memory in Chapters 4 and 
5, it is not known if similar behavioral and neural effects would be found in a loss-
avoiding context instead of a reward-seeking context. Future studies could determine if 
loss has the same impact on memory as a missed reward, and loss avoidance the same 
impact on memory as reward. Loss avoidance has been shown to elicit similar activation 
182 
 
as reward in the VMPFC (e.g., Kim et al., 2006), which may indicate that similar choice 
and reward effects on memory would be found for monetary losses. However, loss 
avoidance motivation has recently been shown to engage a distinct neural circuit from 
reward motivation during motivated memory encoding (Murty et al., 2012). 
 
Future Directions 
 In future research, I plan to further explore the role of different learning systems 
in decision making, and their potential interactions, in several different directions.  
 
Effects of age and disease on relational and reward learning 
The interaction of relational learning and reward learning, as demonstrated in the 
decision bias paradigm in Chapter 3, may be impacted by age, disease, and addiction. In 
ongoing work with collaborators, I am investigating the role of dopamine and aging in 
the decision bis paradigm using a Parkinson’s disease (PD) model of dopamine depletion. 
Preliminary results show that PD patients have intact reward learning as well as an intact 
shift in value. Older adults, in contrast, do not show a significant shift in value. This 
result suggests that decision bias in PD patients may depend different cognitive and 
neural systems. 
In future work, it will be of interest to explore the connection between the use of 
relational learning in decision making and disorders that impact decision making such as 
addition. Over habitual use, stimuli and environments linked to addictive drugs become 
highly valued (e.g. Redish, 2004). In a process similar to the proposed mechanism for 
decision bias, associative memory processes in the hippocampus could lead to rapid shifts 
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in value of stimuli in the network of experiences connected to drug use. Such an 
interaction of associative memory processes and strong reinforcers may lead to 
systematic changes in decision making, and a greater understanding of these processes 
may suggest novel routes for treatment. 
 
Decision making and consolidation of learning 
In the future, it will be essential to study how the representations formed by 
relational as well as reward learning systems change over time. The consolidation 
processes that lead to long-term memory maintenance may begin with replay of learning 
events during rest and sleep (Tambini et al., 2010; Carr et al., 2011). And as noted in 
Chapter 1, consolidation over a short time-span of hours and days may be facilitated by 
dopamine in the hippocampus. Here, dopamine has been shown to facilitate cellular 
traces of memory after hours but not immediately (Huang and Kandel, 1995; Otmakhova 
and Lisman, 1996; Bethus et al., 2010). Over the long-term, different neural systems may 
be engaged in the maintenance of representations in memory. Representations encoded 
rapidly by the hippocampus may be slowly shifted to storage in other cortical regions 
(e.g., McClelland et al., 1995; Marshall and Born, 2007).  
For decision making, memory consolidation may particularly have an effect on 
the interaction between relational and reward learning described in Chapter 3. Using a 
decision bias task similar to the paradigm used in Chapter 3, I am currently exploring the 
effect of a delay between learning and the probe of decision bias. These studies will 
probe whether consolidation of relational associations, or relational and reward 




Memory for reward associations and decision episodes 
Building on the studies described in Chapter 4 and 5, I am interested in further 
exploring the effect of reward learning on episodic memory, as well as the effect of 
episodic memory on later decision making. In particular, I am interested in whether 
people are able to recollect the experience of reward or miss feedback associated with the 
fleeting experience of items during learning. Further, I am interested in the broader 
question of whether and how people remember prior decision episodes. 
In a follow-up study of the effect of reward learning on episodic memory, I am 
currently testing whether participants exhibit significant memory for reward and miss 
feedback associated with trial-unique pictures. Even though pictures are only seen once, 
initial data from a reward learning task with pictures presented during feedback suggests 
that reward and miss associations are remembered at above-chance levels. Significant 
memory for reward and miss associations would indicate that the impact of reward 
learning on episodic memory is even more extensive than initially found.   
Memory for and neural traces of reward and miss feedback may also be explored 
in future fMRI studies. For example, with fMRI data collected during a memory 
recollection probe after reward learning, analyses could detect neural correlates of reward 
feedback associations. Supporting the existence of memory for reward associations, in a 
study where items were presented for motivated encoding, later re-presentation elicited 
traces of the initial value associated with the item (Kuhl et al., 2010). A demonstration of 
memory encoding and recollection of value would have important implications for later 
decisions that could be based on this value memory. 
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Separately, I am interested in how people encode memory for decisions. In 
particular, I am interested in memory for the choice situation, options, and estimated 
values of options – what could be called a “decision environment”. For example, consider 
the experience of making a decision between multiple important options in life. Each is 
associated different future actions and estimates of success. After choosing one option 
and receiving feedback, what remains in memory of the original decision environment? 
Can this kind of memory support updating of option values and later decision making, 
similar to model-based reinforcement learning? How do neural systems of relational and 
reward learning support this kind of memory? Understanding how the brain stores 
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